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Allegations of anticompetitive tying and bundling were significant parts of the 
antitrust cases against Microsoft in the United States and the European Union. The facts 
are well known. Starting with the integration of MS-DOS to Windows and the 
introduction of Windows XP, Microsoft has progressively produced and added to the 
Windows operating system a number of applications, such as its Web browser, Internet 
Explorer (which was included in Windows 95 in 1995), and Windows Media Player 
(WMP), which was integrated to Windows ME in 2000. Microsoft’s policy of integrating 
new functionalities to the Windows operating system has been challenged by both the 
U.S. and the European antitrust authorities.1 
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1  One could also add the procedure at the Korean Fair Trade Commission 
challenging the integration of Windows Media Server, WMP, and MSN Instant 
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Interestingly, the EU case and the U.S. case — which had many similarities in 
their bundling and tying allegations — had opposite final resolutions. In the United 
States, the Department of Justice decided not to pursue the bundling aspect of the case 
(bundling of Windows and Internet Explorer) after the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. 
Circuit reversed the federal district court’s finding of a per se violation for attempted 
monopolization of the browser market and remanded the issue with instructions that it 
could be pursued only under a rule of reason standard.2  By contrast, in the European 
Union, the Commission found that Microsoft was liable for bundling Windows with 
WMP and required Microsoft to produce a Windows version without WMP in addition to 
the bundled version that Microsoft offered on the market.3 Microsoft was not allowed to 
offer any technological, commercial, or contractual term or inducement to make the 
                                                                                                                                                 
Messenger to the Windows operating system. See Press Release, Korea Fair Trade 
Comm’n, Microsoft Case (July 3, 2008), available at http://www.ftc.go.kr/eng. 
2  See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (The court 
did uphold liability for monopoly maintenance in the operating system market for 
integrating the browser with the operating system, commingling the code, and making it 
difficult to remove the browser). On the U.S. Microsoft case, see, among others, Nicholas 
Economides, The Microsoft Antitrust Case, 1 J. INDUS. COMPETITION & TRADE 7 (2001); 
Nicholas Economides, The Microsoft Antitrust Case: Rejoinder, 1 J. INDUS. COMPETITION 
& TRADE 71 (2001); Nicholas Economides, United States v. Microsoft: A Failure of 
Antitrust in the New Economy, 32 UWLA L. REV. 3 (2001); David S. Evans, Albert L. 
Nichols & Richard Schmalensee, U.S. v. Microsoft: Did Consumers Win? (Nat’l Bureau 
of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 11727, 2005); Harry First & Andrew I. Gavil, Re-
framing Windows: The Durable Meaning of the Microsoft Antitrust Litigation, 2006 
UTAH L. REV. 641; WILLIAM H. PAGE & JOHN E. LOPATKA, THE MICROSOFT CASE – 
ANTITRUST, HIGH TECHNOLOGY, AND CONSUMER WELFARE (2007); A. Douglas Melamed 
& Daniel L. Rubinfeld, U.S. v. Microsoft: Lessons Learned and Issues Raised, in 
ANTITRUST STORIES 287 (Eleanor M. Fox & Daniel A. Crane eds., 2007). 
 
3  See Case COMP/C-3/37.792—Microsoft Corp., Comm’n Decision (Mar. 24, 
2004) (summary at 2007 O.J. (L32) 23) [hereinafter Microsoft Comm’n Decision], 
available in full at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/cases/decisions/37792/en.pdf, 
aff’d, Case T-201/04, Microsoft Corp. v. Comm’n, 2007 E.C.R. II-3601 (Ct. First 
Instance). 
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bundled version the more attractive, and a monitoring trustee was required to ensure that 
the unbundled version of Windows works as well as the bundled version.4 The Grand 
Chamber of the Court of First Instance of the European Communities (CFI) confirmed 
the Commission’s decision, although it annulled the part of the Commission’s decision 
that imposed a monitoring mechanism for the implementation of the decision by a 
monitoring trustee at Microsoft's cost.5 Microsoft did not appeal the CFI decision to the 
European Court of Justice (ECJ).6   
This sharp difference in the application of competition law arises out of the 
different treatment of bundling, tying, single-product and multi-product (loyalty) 
discounts, and foreclosure in the two jurisdictions. In this article we discuss and contrast 
the differences in competition policy and enforcement on the subjects of bundling and 
tying in the United States and European Union in light of advances in economic analysis. 
In its broadest terms, the subject of bundling has been the focus of antitrust 
scholarship well before the cases brought against Microsoft in the United States and in 
Europe. The competition issues raised are similar, and one could be tempted to classify 
them into the same antitrust category.7 They involve practices that take place in and 
                                                 
4  Id. ¶¶ 1011–12. On the remedies aspect of the case, see Nicholas Economides & 
Ioannis Lianos, The Quest for Appropriate Remedies in the Microsoft Antitrust EU 
Cases: A Comparative Appraisal (NET Inst., Working Paper No. 09-05, 2009), available 
at. http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1464505. 
 
5  Case T-201/04, Microsoft Corp. v. Comm’n, 2007 E.C.R. II-3601, ¶ 1278 (Ct. 
First Instance). 
 
6  Microsoft withdrew its appeal against the Korea Fair Trade Commission’s 
decision to the High Court, following the decision of the CFI. 
 
7  For the importance of categorical thinking in antitrust, see Mark A. Lemley & 
Christopher R. Leslie, Categorical Analysis in Antitrust Jurisprudence, 93 IOWA L. REV. 
1207 (2008). 
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affect different relevant markets of separate products or services and aim to exclude 
competitors from the market in which the incumbent firm is active, or from an adjacent 
market. Bundling can take many different forms (contractual, technological, financial 
through rebates), which in turn has led competition authorities and courts to develop 
specific antitrust standards for each category. These different standards can be explained 
by the need to take into account the risk of enforcement errors and the likelihood of 
exclusionary effects, which may be different for each form of bundling. It is important, 
therefore, to develop coherent antitrust standards so that any similarity or difference in 
the treatment of these practices is adequately explained. Antitrust categories are not clear 
cut: it is possible to present the facts of a case as fitting within more than one specific 
antitrust category. For example, there is a slight conceptual line that may separate the 
characterization of the facts of the WMP Microsoft case (in the EU) as being a bundled 
discount rather than a tying case. WMP was offered for free, which may formally 
correspond to a bundled discount, a practice that entails the offering by the supplier to the 
distributor of a discount (zero price in this case) for accepting a bundle of different 
products or services.8 The fact that the courts analyzed the facts of the case as tying 
should not mask the importance of developing a coherent conceptual framework for all 
types of bundling. Accordingly, one should consider whether the practice at issue — and 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
8  See Einer Elhauge, Tying, Bundled Discounts, and the Death of the Single 
Monopoly Profit Theory, 123 HARV. L. REV. (forthcoming Dec. 2009) (discussion paper 
at 58), available at 
http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/olin_center/papers/pdf/Elhauge_629_3.pdf (tying 
is “simply a special case of bundled discounts, where the unbundled price on the linking 
product is set at infinity”). 
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its marketplace effects — are better assessed through a different antitrust category.  
Doing otherwise would jeopardize the effectiveness of antitrust enforcement. 
Antitrust categories are not just analytical tools. They also reflect the objectives 
and underlying premises of the entire competition law system. Toward that end, this 
article adopts a broader perspective, aiming to understand the essence of the different 
approaches followed in Europe and in the United States with regard to bundling. We 
identify three important differences The first relates to the process of antitrust 
categorization, and in particular the recourse to analogical reasoning in setting the 
antitrust standards that apply to bundling practices in both jurisdictions. The second 
relates to the standard of proof for the finding of anticompetitive foreclosure and 
consumer harm in Section 2 Sherman Act and Article 82 cases, which seems to be lower 
in Europe than in the United States. The third difference relates to the remedies imposed 
in the two jurisdictions to preserve consumer choice and benefit, which seems to be the 
underlying objective of competition law in Europe and in the United States. We advocate 
a unified test for bundling and tying that would focus on anticompetitive foreclosure and 
absence of objective justifications. The function of the distinct product element of the 
tying test should be reconsidered and the separate function of the coercion element of the 
test should be abandoned.  
I.  DIFFERENT ANALOGIES IN THE ANTITRUST STANDARDS APPLIED TO 
BUNDLING PRACTICES 
 
The analysis of bundling practices and tying under various antitrust standards 
continues to be a hot topic in competition law, literature, and jurisprudence. The subject 
of bundled discounts has been, in particular, one of the most controversial in recent 
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competition law and enforcement against exclusionary anticompetitive practices of 
dominant firms.9  
Much of the discussion revolves around choosing the proper analogy for bundled 
discounts as compared with other conduct that may produce similar exclusionary effects, 
such as exclusive dealing, predatory pricing, and tying. Although one may consider that 
this quest for the “right” analogy asks the wrong question — as the real issue arguably 
                                                 
9  See Michael D. Whinston, Tying, Foreclosure, and Exclusion, 80 AM. ECON. 
REV. 838 (1990); Barry Nalebuff, Bundling as an Entry Barrier, 119 Q.J. ECON. 159 
(2004); Bruce H. Kobayashi, Does Economics Provide a Reliable Guide to Regulating 
Commodity Bundling by Firms? A Survey of the Economic Literature, 1 J. COMPETITION 
L. & ECON. 707 (2005); Bruce H. Kobayashi, The Economics of Loyalty Rebates and 
Antitrust Law in the United States, 1(2) COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L 115 (2005); Thomas 
A. Lambert, Evaluating Bundled Discounts, 89 MINN. L. REV. 1688 (2005); Daniel L. 
Rubinfeld, 3M’s Bundled Rebates: An Economic Perspective, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 243 
(2005); David Spector, Loyalty Rebates: An Assessment of Competition Concerns and a 
Proposed Structured Rule of Reason, 1(2) COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L 89 (2005); Daniel 
A. Crane, Multiproduct Discounting: A Myth of Nonprice Predation, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 
27 (2005); Kai-Uwe Kühn et al., Economic Theories of Bundling and Their Policy 
Implications in Abuse Cases: An Assessment in Light of the Microsoft Case, 1 EUR. 
COMPETITION J. 85 (2005); Christian Ahlborn & David Bailey, Discounts, Rebates and 
Selective Pricing by Dominant Firms: A Trans-Atlantic Comparison, in HANDBOOK OF 
RESEARCH IN TRANSATLANTIC ANTITRUST 195 (Philip Marsden ed., 2006); Herbert 
Hovenkamp, Discounts and Exclusion, 2006 UTAH L. REV. 841; Robert H. Lande, Should 
Predatory Pricing Rules Immunize Exclusionary Discounts?, 2006 UTAH L. REV. 863; 
Frank P. Maier-Rigaud, Article 82 Rebates: Four Common Fallacies, 2 EUR. 
COMPETITION J. 85 (2006); Martin Beckenkamp & Frank P. Maier-Rigaud, An 
Experimental Investigation of Article 82 Rebate Schemes, 2(2) COMPETITION L. REV. 1 
(Supp. 2006); John Simpson & Abraham L. Wickelgren, Bundled Discounts, Leverage 
Theory, and Downstream Competition, 9 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 370 (2007); Gregory K. 
Leonard, The Competitive Effects of Bundled Discounts, in ECONOMICS OF ANTITRUST: 
COMPLEX ISSUES IN A DYNAMIC ECONOMY 3 (Laurence Wu ed., 2007); Timothy J. 
Brennan, Bundled Rebates as Exclusion Rather than Predation, 4 J. COMPETITION L. & 
ECON. 335 (2008); Damien Geradin, A Proposed Test for Separating Pro-Competitive 
Conditional Rebates from Anti-Competitive Ones, 32(1) WORLD COMPETITION  41 
(2009); Patrick Greenlee et al., An Antitrust Analysis of Bundled Loyalty Discounts 
(Econ. Analysis Group, Discussion Paper No. 04-13, 2004), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=600799; Janusz A. Ordover & Greg 
Shaffer, Exclusionary Discounts (Centre for Competition Policy, Working Paper No. 07-
13, 2007), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=995426). 
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should be the effect of the specific practice on consumer welfare10 — it is clear that the 
initial choice of differing analogies may explain much of the divergence between the 
antitrust standards on bundled discounts in the United States and in the European Union. 
The choice of an adequate analogy for bundled rebates also could have an impact on the 
antitrust standards applied to tying, where there has been some convergence between the 
positions of the U.S. and EC antitrust laws. It is therefore important to examine what, 
according to the case law, distinguishes bundling from tying. That characterization will 
have implications on the antitrust standard that would apply, and it could lead to a 
different outcome if the case were brought in the European Union or in the United States. 
 
A.  THE U.S. ANTITRUST STANDARD FOR BUNDLED DISCOUNTS 
 
U.S. law focuses on discounts available in a product bundle. Suppose that an array 
of products bought by the same buyer is offered a la carte. Additionally, assume that 
buyers are offered a discount if a buyer fulfills a specific requirement contract, for 
example, if he buys at least 90 percent of his needs for several products from this seller. 
In economics, this is generally called “mixed bundling.” A firm dominant in one market 
can use this strategy to leverage its monopoly or dominant position to other products 
where its market position is weaker. Similarly, this strategy can be used for monopoly 
maintenance across markets.  
In the United States, there are divergent opinions among the circuits of the U.S. 
Courts of Appeal on the legality of this form of bundling. On one hand, there are circuits 
that accept mixed bundling as lawful if the effective price charged for one or more 
                                                 
10  ROBERT O’DONOGHUE & A. JORGE PADILLA, THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF 
ARTICLE 82 EC at 500 (2006). 
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products in the bundle is not “predatory” or below some measure of cost.11 The following 
test has been suggested: calculate the total dollar discount (across all the products of the 
bundle) and then apply it all to the competitive product(s). If the resulting hypothetical 
price for the competitive product of the bundle is above a measure of per unit cost, then 
there is no antitrust violation (the “discount allocation safe harbor”).12 There are, of 
course, questions about whether the right cost measure should be marginal cost, average 
variable cost, or average total cost, but the basic idea is that unless one can construct a 
predatory price analogy, there is no antitrust violation. Yet, these courts would not 
impose the recoupment element of predatory pricing; hence, we call this the “modified 
predatory pricing rule” approach. 
On the other hand, there are circuits that consider that bundled discounts may in 
some circumstances amount to anticompetitive behavior even when the dominant firm 
                                                 
11  See Cascade Health Solutions v. PeaceHealth, 515 F.3d 883, 894–903 (9th Cir. 
2007); Virgin Atl. Airways Ltd. v. British Airways PLC, 257 F.3d 256, 266–69 (2d Cir. 
2001); Concord Boat Corp. v. Brunswick Corp., 207 F.3d 1039, 1061–62 (8th Cir. 2000). 
 
12  See the discussion of these standards in U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, COMPETITION 
AND MONOPOLY: SINGLE FIRM CONDUCT UNDER SECTION 2 OF THE SHERMAN ACT 99–
102 (2008) [hereinafter DOJ SECTION 2 REPORT], available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/reports/236681.pdf. The report distinguishes between 
two price-cost screens that have been advanced as safe-harbors for bundled discounts: 
“the total-bundle predation-based” safe harbor, which essentially examined if the 
“discounted price of the bundle exceeds an appropriate measure of the aggregate cost of 
the bundle’s constituent products,” id. at 98; and the “discount-allocation safe harbor,” id. 
at 99. Both of these tests build on price predation theory, in the sense that they try to 
identify the existence of a profit sacrifice for the dominant firm measured by the 
existence of a negative difference between net revenues and an appropriate measure of 
costs for the antitrust claim to be examined further. In May 2009, the DOJ severely 
criticized this report and withdrew it. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Justice 
Department Withdraws Report on Antitrust Monopoly Law (May 11, 2009), available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov//atr/public/press_releases/2009/245710.pdf. 
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would not be liable under the modified predatory pricing rule approach.13 A central issue 
in this more enforcement-oriented approach is the possibility that bundled pricing 
strategies may foreclose or exclude equally efficient rivals, even if the discount results in 
prices that are above the dominant firm’s costs. Interestingly, these courts make an 
analogy between bundled discounts and traditional tying, as all these practices may lead 
to anticompetitive market foreclosure. We call this the “anticompetitive foreclosure 
approach” to bundling. 
1.  The Modified Predatory Pricing Rule Approach to Bundling 
 
In Cascade Health Solutions v. PeaceHealth, the Ninth Circuit held that an 
antitrust plaintiff can prove that a bundled discount was exclusionary or predatory (for 
the purposes of a claim of monopolization or an attempted monopolization under Section 
2 of the Sherman Act) only if the plaintiff established that “after allocating the discount 
given by the defendant on the entire bundle of products to the competitive product or 
products, the defendant sold the competitive product or products below its average 
variable cost of producing them.”14 The case arose from a challenge by Cascade to the 
pricing strategies of PeaceHealth, a non-profit provider of hospital care services in a 
county in which PeaceHealth and Cascade were the only hospital care providers. Cascade 
offered primary and secondary hospital care but not tertiary hospital services, which 
involve more complex services. PeaceHealth offered insurance companies, which are the 
effective purchasers of hospital services on behalf of consumers,  discounts on tertiary 
                                                 
13  See SmithKline Corp. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 575 F.2d 1056 (3d Cir. 1978); LePage’s 
Inc. v. 3M, 324 F.3d 141 (3d Cir. 2003); United States v. Dentsply Int’l, Inc., 399 F.3d 
181 (3d Cir. 2005). 
 
14  Cascade Health Solutions, 515 F.3d at 910. 
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hospital services if they made PeaceHealth their sole preferred provider for all hospital 
services: primary, secondary, and tertiary. It also offered insurance companies less 
favorable reimbursement rates if Cascade was added as a preferred provider of primary 
and secondary services. The jury found PeaceHealth liable for attempted monopolization 
and PeaceHealth appealed. 
The Ninth Circuit focused on the conduct element of the attempted 
monopolization claim. Remarking that bundled discounts are “a common feature” of the 
current economic system, as they are used by both large corporations and smaller firms,15 
the court emphasized that they “always provide some immediate consumer benefit in the 
form of lower prices” and that they also can result in savings for the seller as “it usually 
costs a firm less to sell multiple products to one customer at the same time than it does to 
sell the products individually.”16 The pervasive character of mixed bundling and the fact 
that “price cutting is a practice the antitrust laws aim to promote”17 led the court to 
emphasize the risks of false positives in applying Section 2 of the Sherman Act and to 
advocate a cautious approach that should not discourage legitimate price competition. 
                                                 
15  Id. at 895 n.5. The court also referred to the “endemic nature of bundled 
discounts in many spheres of normal economic activity” as a reason to decline to endorse 
the Third Circuit’s anticompetitive foreclosure standard for bundled discounts in 
LePage’s.  Id. at 903. The court noted: 
 
The frequency with which we see bundled discounts in varied contexts 
does not insulate such discounts from antitrust review, but it heightens the 
need to ensure that the rule adopted does not expose inventive and 
legitimate forms of price competition to an overbroad liability standard. 
 
 Id. at 895 n.5. 
 
16  Id. at 895. 
 
17  Id. at 896. 
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The court accepted, however, that “it is possible, at least in theory” that a firm uses a 
bundled discount to exclude an equally or more efficient rival and therefore reduces 
consumer welfare in the long run.18 This can be achieved without any sacrifice of short 
run profits if the multi-product firm excludes less diversified but more efficient rivals 
who will not be able to sell their competitive product above their average variable costs. 
A test focusing on foreclosure effects and consumer harm would take into account 
these anticompetitive effects. The court, however, implicitly dismissed this alternative 
approach based on the risk of false negatives. It found instead that “the exclusionary 
conduct element of a claim arising under Section 2 of the Sherman Act cannot be 
satisfied by reference to bundled discounts unless the discounts result in prices that are 
below an appropriate measure of the defendant’s costs.”19 The objective in the court's 
view was clear: the test will filter the meritorious claims (where at least equally efficient 
rivals are excluded from the market) from unmeritorious claims (where less efficient 
rivals are excluded, even if this exclusion might have lead to higher prices for the 
consumers), thus creating a safe harbor for monopolists that price their bundles to meet 
this standard. 
As a cost-based rule the court adopted the “discount attribution standard” or 
“discount allocation standard”:20 
Under this standard, the full amount of the discounts given by the 
defendant on the bundle are allocated to the competitive product or 
products. If the resulting price of the competitive product or products is 
below the defendant’s incremental cost to produce them, the trier of fact 
                                                 
18  Id. 
 
19  Id. at 903. 
 
20  See Crane, supra note 9, at 28. 
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may find that the bundled discount is exclusionary for the purpose of § 2. 
This standard makes the defendant’s bundled discounts legal unless the 
discounts have the potential to exclude a hypothetical equally efficient 
producer of the competitive product.21 
 
The Ninth Circuit used as an “appropriate measure of the defendant’s [incremental] 
costs,” average variable costs, the same as it employs in predatory pricing cases.22 
The Ninth Circuit adopted a form of predatory pricing test (the attribution test) for 
bundled discounts for essentially two reasons. First, in its view, the alternative 
foreclosure standard will create false positives and lacks clarity because it does not 
provide firms with objective criteria to which they can compare their commercial 
strategies and determine, ex ante, if these will lead to liability under Section 2 of the 
Sherman Act.23 Second, the anticompetitive foreclosure standard may have the effect of 
protecting a less efficient competitor. The exclusion of a rival that has higher average 
variable costs will lead to the application of Section 2 of the Sherman Act, if the effect of 
this exclusion will be to extend or maintain the market power of the firm employing the 
bundled discount practice. 
In reaching this conclusion, the Ninth Circuit relied on what it perceived as 
significant differences between bundled discounts and traditional tying practices, 
therefore implying that the attribution test will not apply in tying cases: “[O]ne difference 
between traditional tying by contract and tying via package discounts is that the 
                                                 
21  Cascade Health Solutions, 515 F.3d at 906 (emphasis added). 
 
22  Id. at 903, 910. 
 
23  See id. at 903 (“[W]e think the course safer for consumers and our competitive 
economy to hold that bundled discounts may not be considered exclusionary conduct 
within the meaning of § 2 of the Sherman Act unless the discounts resemble the behavior 
that the Supreme Court . . . identified as predatory.”). 
 
 
 
13 
traditional tying contract typically forces the buyer to accept both products, as well as the 
cost savings.” Conversely, “the package discount gives the buyer the choice of accepting 
the cost savings by purchasing the package, or foregoing the savings by purchasing the 
products separately.”24 The package discount thus does not constrain the buyer’s choice 
as much as the traditional tie. For that reason, the late Professor Areeda, and Professor 
Hovenkamp, suggest that “[a] variation of the requirement that prices be ‘below cost’ is 
essential for the plaintiff to establish one particular element of unlawful discounting — 
namely, that there was actually ‘tying’ — that is, that the purchaser was actually 
‘coerced’ (in this case, by lower prices) into taking the tied-up package.”25 
Thus, as the court explained, Areeda and Hovenkamp take the view that bundled 
discounts are a specific form of tying, but they also advocate a stricter standard to 
establish coercion under bundled discounts — i.e., a requirement that the attributed prices 
are below some measure of cost—than the standard used under the traditional tying test. 
This is not similar to the claim that bundled discounts should be analyzed under the 
predatory pricing test. Predatory pricing provides an immediate benefit to consumers that 
is objectively measured by reference to the costs of the undertaking.26 The terminology of 
bundled “discounts” may induce the erroneous assumption that bundled discounts reduce 
prices to buyers, although it simply means that the defendant charges lower prices to the 
                                                 
24  Id. at 900. 
25  Id. at 900–01 (emphasis added) (second alteration in original) (quoting 3 PHILLIP 
E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 749b2, at 331 (Supp. 2006)). 
 
26  Professor Hovenkamp seems to support even stricter requirements than the test 
adopted in Cascade Health for bundled discounts. See Herbert J. Hovenkamp & Erik N. 
Hovenkamp, Exclusionary Bundled Discounts and the Antitrust Modernization 
Commission (Univ. of Iowa, Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Research Paper No. 
08-13, 2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1126723. 
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clients that conform with the bundling condition than to those that do not.27 The 
defendant is free to set the prices above the levels that would have prevailed but for the 
bundling and therefore, as Einer Elhauge rightly observes, “There is no warrant for 
presuming that noncompliant prices equal but-for prices, and thus no justifiable grounds 
for assuming that ‘discounts’ from noncompliant prices reflect a true discount from but-
for levels.”28 The Ninth Circuit did not hesitate, however, to establish an analogy between 
bundled discounts and predatory pricing and to refer to Supreme Court precedents on 
pricing abuses,29 notwithstanding the fact that no specific argument other than the one 
previously mentioned was made to support this analogy.  
Based on Supreme Court precedent on pricing abuses, the Ninth Circuit derived 
the proposition that “antitrust laws do not punish economic behavior that benefits 
consumers and will not cause long-run injury to the competitive process.”30 The benefits 
to consumers are immediate, “because the discounts allow the buyer to get more for 
less.”31 Yet, as we have explained, this is based on the incorrect assumption that bundled 
discounts are true discounts. 
The Ninth Circuit also relied on the fact that the Antitrust Modernization 
Commission (AMC) suggested a predatory pricing standard for bundled discounts. This 
                                                 
27  See Elhauge, supra note 8, at 57. 
 
28  Id. 
 
29  Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 
414 (2004) (“[A]bove-cost predatory pricing schemes, [are] ‘beyond the practical ability 
of a judicial tribunal to control.’” (citation omitted)); Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Ross-
Simmons Hardwood Lumber Co., 549 U.S. 312, 325 (2007) (same). 
 
30  Cascade Health Solutions v. PeaceHealth, 515 F.3d 883, 903 (9th Cir. 2007). 
 
31  Id. at 895. 
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standard requires the plaintiff to prove that the defendant (after attribution of the bundled 
discount) priced below incremental costs for the competitive product (attribution test), 
that the defendant is likely to recoup these short-term losses (recoupment test), and that 
the bundled discount or rebate program has had or is likely to have an adverse effect on 
competition (evidence of a likely adverse anticompetitive effect test).32 However, when it 
came to the definition of the different steps of the analysis for bundled discounts, the 
Ninth Circuit omitted the additional elements of the test advocated by the AMC, other 
than the attribution test. First, it refused to integrate the recoupment test of predatory 
pricing in the test applied to bundled discounts, asserting that the bundled discounter may 
not lose any profits by bundling.33 Second, it found redundant the third prong of the test 
suggested by the AMC, holding it  “no different than the general requirement of ‘antitrust 
injury’ that a plaintiff must prove in any private antitrust action.”34 
2.  The Anticompetitive Foreclosure Approach to Bundling 
 
At the opposite end of the spectrum, some courts have ruled that bundled 
discounts may in some circumstances amount to anticompetitive behavior even when the 
dominant firm would not be liable under the modified predatory pricing test. 
Interestingly, these courts make a more direct analogy between bundled discounts and 
                                                 
32  ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMM’N, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 94–98 
(2007) [hereinafter AMC REPORT], available at 
http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/amc/report_recommendation/amc_final_report.pdf. 
 
33  See Cascade Health Solutions, 515 F.3d at 910 n.21 (“We do not believe that the 
recoupment requirement from single product cases translates to multi-product 
discounting cases. Single-product predatory pricing, unlike bundling, necessarily 
involves a loss for the defendant. . . . By contrast, as discussed above, exclusionary 
bundling does not necessarily involve any loss of profits for the bundled discounter.”). 
 
34  Id. 
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tying, as all these practices lead to anticompetitive market foreclosure (the 
anticompetitive foreclosure approach). 
In LePage’s, the Third Circuit made explicit the analogy between bundled rebates 
and tying, and it adopted an abbreviated rule of reason approach. In that case, 3M, a 
dominant supplier of transparent tape, bundled rebates relating to the purchase of its 
private label tape, which was a product for which it faced important competition from 
LePage’s, with a requirement that customers purchase other products from 3M’s different 
product lines that LePage’s did not offer. LePage’s argued that 3M’s behavior constituted 
monopolization under Section 2 of the Sherman Act because, by bundling its rebates, 3M 
had created a de facto exclusivity as the bundled rebates induced many of LePage’s major 
customers to eliminate or reduce their purchases of tape from LePage’s. 3M argued that 
its conduct was legal as it never priced its transparent tape below its cost. The court did 
not examine whether 3M’s price of transparent tape was below a certain measure of its 
cost. It applied instead an anticompetitive foreclosure test: “[T]he principal 
anticompetitive effect of bundled rebates . . . is that when offered by a monopolist they 
may foreclose portions of the market to a potential competitor who does not manufacture 
an equally diverse group of products and who therefore cannot make a comparable 
offer.”35 
 
The Third Circuit found that foreclosure of LePage’s, which was a significant 
competitor, could lead to higher prices and reduced output. 3M could have later recouped 
the profits it had forsaken with the discount scheme by selling higher priced Scotch-brand 
tape. This was a possible strategy in view of evidence indicating that “‘significant entry 
                                                 
35  LePage’s Inc. v. 3M, 324 F.3d 141, 155 (3d Cir. 2003). 
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barriers’” prevented competitors from entering the tape market in the United States.36 
According to the court, 3M’s practice had “long-term” anticompetitive effects, without 
3M offering any adequate business justification for its practices.37 The Supreme Court 
refused the petition for a writ of certiorari.38 
The decision has been controversial, in particular because the anticompetitive 
foreclosure test applied by the court could lead to the application of Section 2 of the 
Sherman Act even if the excluded competitor was not as efficient as the defendant. As 
Judge Greenberg remarked in his dissenting opinion, “LePage’s is not as efficient a tape 
producer as 3M.”39 The introduction of the requirement that Section 2 of the Sherman 
Act should only apply if the plaintiff brings evidence that the defendant priced below its 
average variable costs, therefore, aims to take into account the possible false positives 
that could follow from the full application of the anticompetitive foreclosure approach. 
The adoption of a price-cost test and the contrary position of the Third Circuit in 
LePage’s have been a matter of controversy in U.S. antitrust law.40 The DOJ Section 2 
Report, published by the George W. Bush administration, embraced a cost-based safe 
                                                 
36  Id. at 163 (citation omitted). 
 
37  Id. 
 
38  3M Co. v. LePage’s Inc., 542 U.S. 953 (2004) (mem.). The decision followed a 
brief from the solicitor general suggesting that “[t]here is insufficient experience with 
bundled discounts to this point to make a firm judgment about the relative prevalence of 
exclusionary versus procompetitive bundled discounts.” Brief for the United States as 
Amicus Curiae, 3M Co., 542 U.S. 953 (No. 02-1865), 2004 WL 1205191, at *12. 
 
39  LePage’s, 324 F.3d at 177 (Greenberg, J., dissenting). 
 
40  See the discussion in DOJ SECTION 2 REPORT, supra note 12, ch. 6. 
 
 
 
18 
harbor.41 Where bundle-to-bundle competition was not possible, the DOJ suggested a 
discount allocation safe harbor that would compare the dominant firm’s cost for the 
competitive product in the bundle to the “imputed” price of that product, i.e., the price 
after allocating to the competitive product all discounts and rebates attributable to the 
entire bundle. The bundling scheme could fall within the scope of Section 2 only if the 
plaintiff showed that the defendant sold the competitive product at an imputed price that 
was below the product’s incremental costs.42 In contrast, in its Transition Report the 
American Antitrust Institute, a liberal think tank advancing a more active antitrust 
enforcement agenda for Section 2, rejected a cost-based safe harbor for bundle rebates 
and supported a structured rule of reason that would allow plaintiffs to establish that such 
discounts are prima facie exclusionary under certain conditions.43 Recently, early in the 
Obama administration the DOJ Antitrust Division has withdrawn the DOJ Section 2 
Report and expressed its disagreement with the reasoning and the conclusions of the 
report.44  The position of the new administration with regard to the price-cost based test is 
still unclear. 
B.  THE STANDARD FOR BUNDLED DISCOUNTS IN EC COMPETITION LAW 
 
                                                 
41  Id. 
 
42   Id. at 101–02. The AMC Report provides for an additional condition, as it 
requires the plaintiff to prove that the defendant is likely to recoup these short-term 
losses. AMC REPORT, supra note 32, at 99. 
 
43  AM. ANTITRUST INST., TRANSITION REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY TO THE 
44TH PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES 71 (2008), available at 
http://www.antitrustinstitute.org/archives/transitionreport.ashx. 
 
44  See Press Release, supra note 12. 
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In the following discussion we explore the differences between the case law of the 
European Courts (ECJ and CFI), which seems to apply to bundled discounts a 
foreclosure-based approach, and the European Commission, which has recently adopted a 
price-cost based approach. 
1. The Foreclosure Standard of the European Courts 
 
The case law of the ECJ and the CFI does not draw a distinction between single-
product rebates and bundled discounts. The case law distinguishes between volume 
(quantity discounts), which are legal per se, and loyalty rebates, which are illegal in most 
circumstances. The European judiciary adopts a foreclosure test that does not require 
evidence that the discount on the competitive product was below an appropriate measure 
of the defendant’s cost. 
A dominant firm can grant quantity discounts without infringing Article 82 of the 
EC Treaty if these are offered on equal terms to all customers of the firm. Discounts also 
should reflect efficiency gains (economies of scale in production, cost savings, etc.). By 
contrast, loyalty rebates rewarding exclusivity or strongly encouraging the customer to 
stay with the supplier may in certain circumstances be considered illegal under Article 
82.45 
A system whereby the rebate is conditional on purchasing mainly or exclusively 
from the dominant undertaking is abusive in principle.46 Dominant firms may not enter 
into exclusive purchasing agreements and may not operate rebate schemes that have the 
                                                 
45  See, e.g., Case 85/76, Hoffmann-La Roche & Co. v. Comm’n, 1979 E.C.R. 461 
(Eur. Ct. Justice); Case T-65/89, BPB Indus. Plc v. Comm’n, 1993 E.C.R. II-389 (Ct. 
First Instance). 
 
46  Hoffmann-La Roche, 1979 E.C.R. 461, ¶ 89. 
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same adverse effect as an exclusive purchasing agreement. For example, in Hoffmann-La 
Roche v. Commission, the discounts were conditioned on the customer’s obtaining from 
the dominant defendant firm all or most of its requirements on sometimes different 
vitamins, which were part of different relevant markets. The court found that these 
conditional rebates foreclosed the access of rival producers in the market,47 and it 
observed that such rebates amounted to an unlawful tie-in, infringing Article 82(d).48 
Recent case law has focused on targeted (individualized) retroactive discounts 
producing an exclusionary and loyalty effect.49 These are generally found to infringe 
Article 82 when they are capable of producing an exclusionary effect by causing, without 
any objective economic justification, the entry of competitors into the market to be more 
difficult, or impossible.50 Somewhat analogous to the LePage's decision in the United 
States, the excluded rival may be a less efficient firm than the defendant, but this is not an 
element that is taken into account in the application of Article 82 to rebates. 
In Michelin II, the CFI found that discounts based on standardized sales targets 
over a relatively long reference period (almost a year) were abusive under Article 82. The 
rebates applied retroactively to the entire turnover achieved with Michelin (thus including 
many different products) if the dealer achieved a pre-determined turnover target in the 
                                                 
47  See id. ¶ 90. 
 
48  See id. ¶¶ 110–11. 
 
49  See Case 322/81, NV Nederlandsche Banden-Industrie Michelin v. Comm’n 
(Michelin I), 1983 E.C.R. 3461 (Eur. Ct. Justice); Case T-203/01, Manufacture Française 
des Pneumatiques Michelin v. Comm’n (Michelin II), 2003 E.C.R. II-4071 (Ct. First 
Instance); Case T-219/99, British Airways plc v. Comm’n, 2003 E.C.R. II-5917 (Ct. First 
Instance); Case C-95/04, British Airways plc v. Comm’n, 2007 E.C.R. I-2331 (Eur. Ct. 
Justice). 
 
50  See British Airways, 2007 E.C.R. I-2331, ¶¶ 68–69. 
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reference period from a number of targets set according to a grid. It was difficult for the 
dealers to determine the actual unit purchase price of the tires before making the last 
orders of the year. This uncertainty induced them to purchase wholly or mainly from 
Michelin. The variations in the final steps of the grid calculation created a weighted 
effect, as this affected the dealers’ profit margins for the entire year, thus creating 
additional pressure to buy Michelin tires. Michelin’s competitors not only had to offer a 
price on a customer’s marginal requirements that matched Michelin’s price for that 
quantity, but also had to propose a price so low as to offset the loss that the dealer would 
have made on all his purchases from Michelin during the reference period. 
The purpose of the system was effectively to tie dealers to Michelin. The CFI 
found irrelevant the fact that the market shares and sales of Michelin fell during the 
period in question; the fall would have been greater had Michelin not adopted the specific 
rebate scheme.51 The court emphasized the need for multi-product dominant firms to 
compete on the merits with their rivals and to grant discounts only if economically 
justified — for example, because the specific dealers bring an important volume of 
business, which in turn provides economies of scale to the producer that passes them to 
the dealers in the form of discounts.  It is a central element of the decision that “[n]ot all 
competition on price can be regarded as legitimate.”52 In this respect, Michelin II seems 
to depart from the generally positive view of this type of “price” competition, 
highlighting a strong contrast between EU and U.S. treatment of dominant firms or 
monopolies. 
                                                 
51  Michelin II, 2003 E.C.R. II-4071, ¶ 245. 
 
52  Id. ¶ 97. 
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For example, in Cascade Health Solutions v. PeaceHealth, the Ninth Circuit 
relied on the fact that bundled discounts are a “pervasive practice” employed by both 
large and small corporations to substantiate the need for a more lenient approach under 
U.S. antitrust law.53 This assumption does not apply in EC competition law: dominant 
firms do not have the same freedom of action as non-dominant firms. This approach may 
be explained by the specific structure and the purpose of Article 82.  
In comparison, Section 2 of the Sherman Act prohibits monopolization. 
Therefore, in the view of the Ninth Circuit, a practice that also is used by non-dominant 
firms strongly undermines the likelihood that the conduct in question was intended to 
expand monopoly power. Article 82, however, enshrines a regulatory approach: it is “less 
concerned about the creation of dominant positions and more focused on regulating their 
behavior once dominance has been achieved.”54 The fact that a practice is pervasive in 
the economy will not be a relevant factor in the enforcement of Article 82, as dominant 
firms in the European Union have a special responsibility to preserve competition in the 
marketplace.55  
                                                 
53  Cascade Health Solutions v. PeaceHealth, 515 F.3d 883, 895 & n.5 (9th Cir. 
2007). 
 
54  Herbert J. Hovenkamp, The Legal Periphery of Dominant Firm Conduct 4 (Univ. 
of Iowa, Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Research Paper No. 07-21, 2007), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1014426.  
 
55  Michelin I, 1983 E.C.R. 3461, ¶ 57; Case T-201/04, Microsoft Corp. v. Comm’n, 
2007 E.C.R. II-3601, ¶ 775 (Ct. First Instance); Michelin II, 2003 E.C.R. II-4071, ¶ 97; 
see also British Airways, 2007 E.C.R. I-2331, ¶ 23. In British Airways Advocate General 
Kokott wrote: 
 
 Within the scope of the application of Article 82 EC, a dominant 
undertaking is subject to certain limitations that do not apply to other 
undertakings in the same form. Because of the presence of the dominant 
undertaking, competition on the market in question is weakened. Therefore — 
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It follows that the scope of Article 82 is broader than the scope of Section 2 of the 
Sherman Act, if an undertaking has a dominant position. First, Article 82 reaches 
significantly lower market shares: a dominant position may be found with a market share 
as low as 40 percent.56 Second, the fact that non-dominant firms also use the same 
practice is irrelevant, as the purpose of Article 82 is to impose specific responsibilities on 
dominant undertakings. The CFI thus found in Michelin II that “discounts granted by an 
undertaking in a dominant position must be based on a countervailing advantage which 
may be economically justified.”57 In comparison, non-dominant undertakings are able to 
grant discounts even if these are not based on the economic justifications envisioned by 
the court, such as economies of scale, and even if the result of these discounts will be the 
acquisition of a dominant position. Nevertheless, once the threshold of dominance has 
been reached, the undertaking will not be able to maintain these rebates, unless they 
provide an economic justification for “the discount rates chosen for the various steps in 
                                                                                                                                                 
whatever the causes of its dominant position — that undertaking has a particular 
responsibility to ensure that its conduct does not undermine effective and 
undistorted competition in the common market. A practice which would be 
unobjectionable under normal circumstances can be an abuse if applied by an 
undertaking in a dominant position. 
 
British Airways, 2007 E.C.R. I-2331, ¶ 23 (footnotes omitted). This constitutes one of the 
main factors explaining the “divide” between Article 82 and Section 2 of the Sherman 
Act. See Eleanor M. Fox, Monopolization, Abuse of Dominance, and the Indeterminacy 
of Economics: The U.S./E.U. Divide, 2006 UTAH L. REV. 725, 728. 
 
56  Case T-219/99 found that British Airways had a dominant position with a market 
share of 39.7 percent, which was moreover declining. Case T-219/99, British Airways plc 
v. Comm’n, 2003 E.C.R. II-5917, ¶¶ 183, 225 (Ct. First Instance). However, this case 
should be put in the context of the liberalization of the airways sector in the UK and the 
need to protect a new entrant, Virgin, from the incumbent monopolist, which was 
previously state owned. See GIORGIO MONTI, EC COMPETITION LAW 169 (2007). 
 
57  Michelin II, 2003 E.C.R. II-4071, ¶ 100 (emphasis added). 
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the rebate system in question” (quantity discounts).58 The position of the Michelin II 
court seems to indicate that all loyalty-inducing discounts by dominant firms in the 
European Union are anticompetitive by their object or, in the context of Article 82, 
practically illegal per se.59 
The restrictive position of the Michelin II court was slightly reformulated in 
British Airways v. Commission,60 where the ECJ adopted an approach that balances the 
anticompetitive foreclosure effect61 of the rebate system against the advantages it 
provided to consumers in terms of efficiency.62 Both the CFI and the ECJ upheld the 
decision of the Commission to condemn BA’s reward system with travel agents because 
of the powerful loyalty-inducing effect of the system: (a) the reward schemes were drawn 
up by reference to individual sales objectives; and (b) the rewards extended to the whole 
of the turnover made by the agents during the period under consideration and not just on 
                                                 
58  Id. ¶ 109. 
 
59  See John Kallaugher & Brian Sher, Rebates Revisited: Anti-Competitive Effects 
and Exclusionary Abuse Under Article 82, 25 EUR. COMPETITION L. REV. 263, 266 
(2004); Denis Waelbroeck, Michelin II: A Per Se Rule Against Rebates by Dominant 
Companies?, 1 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 149 (2005); RICHARD WHISH, COMPETITION 
LAW 196 (6th ed. 2009) (noting that there is no need to prove the anticompetitive effects 
of the conduct but that these are inferred by the existence of a loyalty-inducing rebate 
system). 
 
60  British Airways, 2003 E.C.R. II-5917; British Airways, 2007 E.C.R. I-2331; see 
also Kelyn Bacon, European Court of Justice Upholds Judgment of the Court of First 
Instance in the British Airways/Virgin Saga, 3(2) COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L 227 (2007); 
Okeoghene Odudu, British Airways plc v. Comm’n, 44 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 1781 
(2007). 
 
61  This standard is similar to the standard applied to exclusive dealing in U.S. 
antitrust law. See Jonathan M. Jacobson, Exclusive Dealing, “Foreclosure,” and 
Consumer Harm, 70 ANTITRUST L.J. 311, 322 (2002). 
 
62  British Airways, 2007 E.C.R. I-2331, ¶ 86. 
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the incremental sales above the target. The Court found no possible economic 
justification for the system of. However, the ECJ’s language was more explicit than the 
CFI’s in Michelin II on the possibility of being able to “counterbalance” or “outweigh” 
the exclusionary effects by “advantages in terms of efficiency which also benefit the 
consumer.”63 
The position of the court in British Airways is remarkable not only because the 
court applied an anticompetitive foreclosure test, but also because in a quite similar case 
involving the same parties the U.S. Second Circuit rejected Virgin’s attempted 
monopolization claim based on British Airways’ bundling of its ticket sales for corporate 
customers on routes between the United Kingdom and the United States.64 The plaintiff’s 
expert advanced a “predatory foreclosure” theory, according to which British Airways 
had priced below its own costs in certain routes by adding additional flights to deter or 
delay its rival Virgin’s expansion and the costs incurred by British Airways were 
immediately recouped by setting prices substantially above costs on other routes.65  
Highlighting once again the differences between the EU and U.S. approaches, the 
Second Circuit found that Virgin failed to bring evidence of below cost pricing because, 
inter alia, the correct measure of costs was average avoidable costs (AAC) calculated on 
all of the British Airways routes in the geographical market (and not only an incremental 
                                                 
63  Id. 
 
64  See Virgin Atl. Airways Ltd. v. British Airways plc, 257 F.3d 256 (2d Cir. 2001). 
 
65  Id. at 266. 
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sales test as was argued by Virgin’s expert).66 The Second Circuit also refused to find that 
there was recoupment, as Virgin did not indicate how much above its costs British 
Airways priced the non-competitive routes.67 Thus, the court adopted a predatory 
standard test, noting that “low prices are a positive aspect of a competitive marketplace 
and are encouraged by antitrust laws,” and it considered that, “[a]s long as low prices 
remain above predatory levels, they neither threaten competition nor give rise to an 
antitrust injury.” 68 Indeed, this test imposes an even higher standard of proof on the 
plaintiff than the Ninth Circuit’s modified predatory pricing test.  In the latter case, the 
plaintiff must prove that the monopolist’s prices are below its average variable costs in 
the competitive segment of the market (and therefore not its AAC for all sales). 
A comparison of the antitrust standards used in the United States and the 
European Union for bundled discounts shows that there is an important divergence in the 
analogy employed for these practices. Whereas some U.S. courts examine these practices 
from the perspective of a modified version of a predatory pricing test, these practices are 
examined in Europe under the anticompetitive foreclosure standard. The European courts 
acknowledge that bundled discounts may, in some circumstances, have an equivalent 
                                                 
66  Id. at 267–69. The incremental sales test examines if the incremental revenue 
exceeds or not incremental cost. If this is the case, the bundled discount is found to be 
legal. 
 
67  Id. at 271–72. 
 
68  Id. at 269. 
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effect to tying.69 The European Commission has recently, however, initiated a different 
approach for mixed bundling.  
2. The Commission’s Approach: The Rise of the Price-Cost Test 
 
In this section, we will examine the approach suggested in the Commission’s staff 
Discussion Paper, which was finally adopted in the Guidance. 70 
 a. Analysis of Rebate Practices 
The Commission’s staff Discussion Paper rejected the distinctions among 
quantity, loyalty, and target rebates that were previously employed.71 Instead, it divided 
rebate practices into two categories. First, it focused on single-product rebate systems of 
dominant firms that have effects in the dominated market; these were considered a form 
of price-abuse and were mainly examined under a price/cost standard. The Discussion 
Paper suggested a predatory pricing test for these practices. This was an important shift 
from the current approach of the CFI and the ECJ on rebates, which employs the 
                                                 
69  Case T-201/04, Microsoft Corp. v. Comm’n, 2007 E.C.R. II-3601, ¶ 908 (Ct. 
First Instance). Although the court does not indicate if it will apply the same standard as 
that for tying, the language used indicates that the CFI embraces the tying analogy. 
 
70  European Comm’n, DG Competition Discussion Paper on the Application of 
Article 82 of the Treaty to Exclusionary Abuses (2005) [hereinafter Discussion Paper], 
available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/art82/discpaper2005.pdf. The 
Discussion Paper is a consultation document, prepared by the staff of DG Competition. It 
has not been published in the Official Journal of the European Communities and 
therefore does not have any legal effect. The Commission has recently adopted guidance 
on its enforcement priorities. European Comm’n, Guidance on the Commission’s 
Enforcement Priorities in Applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to Abusive Exclusionary 
Conduct by Dominant Undertakings, COM (2009) 864 final (Feb. 9, 2009) [hereinafter 
Guidance], available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/art82/guidance_en.pdf. 
 
71  On the position of the European Commission to bundled discounts and rebates 
having a tying effect prior to the Discussion Paper, see WHISH, supra note 59, at 727–29; 
JONATHAN FAULL & ALI NIKPAY, THE EC LAW OF COMPETITION §§ 4.317, 4.330–4.331 
(2d ed. 2007). The Commission applied a foreclosure test, and the practices were found 
to be either discriminatory or equivalent to tying practices. 
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anticompetitive foreclosure standard and does not provide for a safe harbor for discount 
practices. Second, the Discussion Paper separately categorized mixed bundling practices 
or bundled discounts that produce effects on other markets or on different products of the 
same market; these were analyzed in the section of the Discussion Paper devoted to tying 
practices,72 although the Commission also classified them as a pricing abuse.73  
Concerning bundled discounts (mixed bundling), the Discussion Paper 
acknowledged that these may have effects on competition similar to tying and that the 
distinction between mixed bundling and pure bundling is not “necessarily clear-cut” as 
mixed bundling may come close to pure bundling when the prices charged for the 
individual offerings are high.74 The Commission officials referred in some parts of the 
Discussion Paper to mixed bundling as “commercial tying.”75 Yet, in other parts of the 
Discussion Paper, the DG Comp’s staff remarked that there is a difference between these 
two practices in the sense that, in mixed bundling, none of the products is “‘tied’ in the 
traditional sense.”76 Nonetheless, the Discussion Paper recognized that both practices 
have similar foreclosure effects: mixed bundling constitutes an indirect measure to 
achieve the same result as contractual tying “by inducing customers to purchase the tied 
product through granting bonuses, rebates, discounts or any other commercial 
                                                 
72  Discussion Paper, supra note 70, ¶ 142. 
 
73  Id. ¶¶ 142–76. 
 
74  Id. ¶ 177 n.112. 
 
75  Id. ¶ 182. 
 
76  Id. ¶ 181 n.113. 
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advantage.”77 In this sense, the Discussion Paper seemed to recognize that coercion and 
inducement may produce the same effects on customer choice. However, the Discussion 
Paper differentiated between commercial tying and contractual tying when it examined 
the existence of a market-distorting foreclosure effect.  It is only if the discount was so 
large that “efficient competitors offering only some but not all of the components, cannot 
compete against the discounted bundle” that a bundled discount was found to infringe 
Article 82.78 
The Commission’s Guidance follows a similar approach by including “multi-
product rebates” within the tying/bundling category.79 This does not imply, however, that 
both practices are subject to a similar antitrust regime. In this case, the distinction is not 
between commercial and contractual tying but between price-based and non-price-based 
exclusionary conduct. For price-related conduct, only the exclusion of competitors at 
least equally as efficient as the dominant firm triggers antitrust intervention.80 The 
Commission recognizes that “in certain circumstances a less efficient competitor may 
also exert a constraint which should be taken into account when considering whether a 
particular price-based conduct leads to anticompetitive foreclosure,”81 but this possibility 
is given less weight than in the staff Discussion Paper.82 The Commission applies a 
                                                 
77  Id. ¶ 182 (emphasis added). 
 
78  Id. ¶ 189. 
 
79  Guidance, supra note 70, ¶¶ 59–61. 
 
80  Id. ¶ 27. 
 
81  Id. ¶ 24. 
 
82  See Discussion Paper, supra note 70, ¶ 67. The Discussion Paper included it as a 
possible exception to the operation of the cost-based test and accepted that “it may be 
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price/cost test, which identifies the competitors “worthy” of competition law protection, 
before moving to the examination of the existence of an anticompetitive foreclosure.  
The price/cost test operates, therefore, as an efficiency filter, mainly for 
administrability reasons. The exclusion of less-efficient competitors remains nevertheless 
an important concern for non-price based exclusionary conduct, such as tying. Indeed, the 
Guidance does not exclude further analysis of the practice to detect anticompetitive 
foreclosure once the other two conditions for the application of Article 82 are fulfilled, 
which are (i) the undertaking is dominant in the tying market, and (ii) the tying and the 
tied product are distinct products.83 
It is important here to be precise in distinguishing between different types of 
rebates. These may first take the form of conditional rebates, which are “rebates granted 
to customers to reward them for a particular form of purchasing behaviour.”84 
Conditional rebates provide the customer a rebate if her purchases over a defined 
reference period exceed a certain threshold. This could be a turnover threshold covering 
several products. According to the Commission’s Guidance, these rebates have effects 
similar to exclusive purchasing obligations. They should be distinguished from multi-
product rebates (or mixed bundling), where two distinct products are made available 
together at a lower price than the sum of their prices when made available separately. 
                                                                                                                                                 
possible to show that the rival was actually excluded or marginalised following the 
bundling by the dominant company” and then leave to the dominant undertaking “the 
possibility to rebut the findings by using its own incremental costs.” Id. ¶ 191. 
 
83  Guidance, supra note 70, ¶¶ 52–58. 
 
84  Id. ¶ 37. 
 
 
 
31 
These rebates have effects similar to tying.85 Second, there are unconditional rebates, 
which were mentioned in the Discussion Paper but were not examined by the Guidance, 
as they do not produce anticompetitive effects. 
According to the Commission’s Guidance, multi-product rebates are 
anticompetitive if they are so large that “equally efficient competitors offering only some 
of the components cannot compete against the discounted bundle.”86 For unconditional 
multi-product rebates the Commission takes into account the incremental price that 
customers pay for each of the dominant undertaking’s products in the bundle and assesses 
whether this price remains above the Long Run Average Incremental Costs (LRAIC) of 
the dominant undertaking when this product is included in the bundle.87 If this is the case, 
the Commission will not intervene “since an equally efficient competitor with only one 
product should in principle be able to compete profitably against the bundle.”88  
The Commission’s Guidance also advances a safe harbor for “conditional 
rebates,” when the “effective price” over the “relevant range” (which could be either the 
incremental purchases for incremental rebates or the contestable share (portion) for 
retroactive rebates), remains consistently above the LRAIC of the dominant 
                                                 
85  Id. ¶¶ 59–61. In contrast, the recent OECD report on rebates does not make this 
distinction and groups all forms of bundled rebates and loyalty-inducing single product 
rebates under the category of “conditional discounting.” See OECD, POLICY 
ROUNDTABLES: FIDELITY AND BUNDLED REBATES AND DISCOUNTS 2008 at 7 (2008), 
available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/41/22/41772877.pdf; see also id. at 121 
(submission of the UK). 
 
86  Guidance, supra note 70, ¶ 59. 
 
87  Id. ¶ 60. The Commission’s Guidance modified the cost standard applicable to 
single product rebates to align it with the cost standard the staff Discussion Paper 
advocated for multi-product rebates (LRAIC). 
 
88  Id. 
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undertaking.89 This would normally allow an equally efficient competitor profitably to 
compete notwithstanding the rebate. If the effective price is between AAC and LRAIC, 
the Commission will proceed to a more detailed competition law assessment and examine 
the existence of an anticompetitive foreclosure. Of particular importance in this case will 
be the existence of “realistic and effective counterstrategies” at the disposal of the 
dominant firm’s competitors.90 If the effective price is below AAC, which is the cost 
benchmark for predatory pricing,91 there is a presumption of anticompetitive 
foreclosure.92  
The Commission’s Guidance paper adopts a variation of the attribution test that 
closes the gap between EC competition law and the positions adopted in Cascade Health 
Solutions but with some important differences still remaining. The test attributes the 
discounts only to the contestable share of the non-monopolized product sold by the 
competitor93 and not to all units sold, as is the case in the Cascade Health Solutions and 
                                                 
89  Id. ¶ 43. 
 
90  Id. ¶ 44. According to the Commission, this could include, for instance, “their 
capacity to also use a ‘noncontestable’ portion of their buyers’ demand as leverage to 
decrease the price for the relevant range.” Id. However, “[w]here competitors do not have 
such counterstrategies at their disposal, the Commission will consider that the rebate 
scheme is capable of foreclosing equally efficient competitors.” Id. 
 
91  Id. ¶ 64. 
 
92  Id. ¶¶ 23–26, 40–43. 
 
93  This is established for existing competitors by looking to the specific market 
context: “how much of a customer’s purchase requirements can realistically be switched 
to a [rival].” Id. ¶ 42. For potential competitors, the Commission will assess “the scale at 
which a new entrant would realistically be able to enter.” Id. This will be done by taking 
into account “the historical growth pattern of new entrants in the same or in similar 
markets.” Id. 
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the AMC test94 and it employs LRAIC as the relevant cost benchmark (and not AAC as 
in U.S. antitrust law). It is therefore easier for the plaintiff to prove that the discount is an 
antitrust infringement in EC competition law, although the Commission’s Guidance 
standard is more restrictive than the test applied by the Third Circuit in 3M.95 
However, the Commission adopts the lower predatory standard (prices below 
AAC) as the threshold for bundled rebates — if the dominant undertakings' competitors 
are selling identical bundles or could do so in a timely way without being deterred by 
possible additional costs — which is also similar to the standard suggested by the DOJ 
Section 2 Report.96  
The Commission has recently applied the price-cost test in the decision 
condemning Intel to a record fine of € 1.06 billion on the grounds that it had abused its 
dominant position on the CPU market by granting conditional rebates and payments to a 
number of OEMs (Original Equipment Manufacturers), and by making payments to 
OEMs in order to delay and restrict the commercialization of specific products based on 
                                                 
94  It does not therefore include the portion of the monopolist’s sales that are not 
contested and would have remained with the monopolist in the absence of the conditional 
discount. The discount is thus applied to a relatively small number of units while the 
AMC and Cascade Health Solutions standards apply the discounts to all units, with the 
consequence that fewer antitrust violations are discovered. For an analysis and example, 
see Nicholas Economides, Loyalty/Requirement Rebates and the Antitrust Modernization 
Commission: What is the Appropriate Liability Standard?, 54 ANTITRUST BULL. at 259, 
274–75 (2009). 
 
95  LePage’s Inc. v. 3M, 324 F.3d 141 (3d Cir. 2003) (adopting a rule of reason 
approach without any price/cost-based test). 
 
96  Guidance, supra note 70, ¶ 60 & n.38; DOJ SECTION 2 REPORT, supra note 12, at 
101. 
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its rival AMD’s technology.97 In addition Intel offered conditional rebates and funding to 
a large retailer of consumer electronics, which purchased assembled desktop and mobile 
PCs from OEMs for end customers, on the condition that it sold exclusively Intel-based 
PCs. While the Commission conducted an “efficient competitor” test” to determine 
whether the pricing regime was capable of foreclosing competition, it also noted that the 
guidance paper did not apply in this case, as it was published after the proceedings 
against Intel were initiated.98 The frequent references to the case law of the European 
Court of Justice and the Court of First Instance in the Commission’s decision create 
uncertainty about the application of the price-cost test in future cases. Indeed, the 
Commission observed in the Intel decision that  “(a)lthough not indispensable for finding 
an infringement under Article 82 of the Treaty according to the case law,” the efficient 
competitor analysis is only “one possible way of showing whether Intel’s rebates and 
payments were capable of causing or likely to cause anticompetitive foreclosure,”99 thus 
indicating that the “efficient competitor” filter does not immunize rebates from antitrust 
challenges based on the foreclosure test developed in the case law of the European Court 
of Justice and the Court of First Instance. 
                                                 
97  See Case COMP/C-37.990 ─ Intel, Comm’n Decision (May 13, 2009) (summary 
at 2009 O.J. (C227) 13) [hereinafter Intel, Comm’n Decision], available in full at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/cases/decisions/37990/provisional_decision_en.
pdf. 
 
98  Id. at para 916. 
 
99  Id. at para 925. 
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 Subsequent to the Intel EU decision, the Attorney General of New York (AGNY) 
sued Intel on November 4, 2009 with similar allegations.100 The AGNY alleges that Intel 
used its monopoly power to foreclose its competitor AMD from the market. The 
allegations include (i) Intel providing payments to a buyer (Dell) if it sold only Intel PCs, 
as well as various threats if it did not do so;101 (ii) Intel retaliating against Dell when it 
started selling some AMD-based PCs;102 (iii) a loyalty-requirement contract that required 
HP to sell at least 95% of business desktop PCs based on Intel chips with payments if the 
requirement was met and significant punishments if it was not;103 and (iv) various threats 
to IBM not to sell high-performance AMD servers.104 
b. Criticism of Commission’s Test for Bundled Rebates 
One could criticize the test introduced by the Commission’s Guidance for the 
following reasons: First, the underlying principle of the price-cost standard is that price-
related abuses should be dealt with more leniently than non-price related abuses: the 
“efficient competitor” filter does not apply to non-price restraints. However, from an 
economic perspective there is no explanation for such a distinction. Some authors have 
advanced the view that enforcing Article 82 to price-related behavior leads to a high risk 
of false positives, while prohibiting exclusionary contracts does not have the same effect: 
                                                 
100  See STATE OF NEW YORK v. INTEL CORPORATION, at 
http://www.oag.state.ny.us/media_center/2009/nov/NYAG_v_Intel_COMPLAINT_FIN
AL.pdf. 
 
101  Id. at 26- 44. 
 
102  Id. at 45-47. 
 
103  Id. at 2, 14, 48-63. 
 
104  Id. at 64-75. 
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“unlike low prices, exclusionary contracts do not always benefit consumers in the short 
term, regardless of their long-term effect on competition.”105 This assumption is 
questionable. Competition based on quality (Q) or variety (V) that increases investment is 
equally important.  
The importance of this type of competition has been recognized by the ECJ in 
Metro.106 It may have also justified the more lenient antitrust regime for vertical 
restraints, which could be viewed as contract enforcement mechanisms that ensure the 
quality of distribution services provided to consumers, even if this also reduces intra-
brand price competition.107 There is no specific reason advanced by the Commission to 
explain why price competition is more important as an antitrust concern than QV 
investment competition. Administrability concerns constitute generally the main 
explanation for this price/non-price dichotomy, such as that  the courts are unable to 
assess complex pricing schemes, or the risk of error would be too high and could affect 
the incentives of dominant firms to provide better pricing deals to their customers.108 
One could, however, raise several objections to these concerns over the 
administrability of a rule of reason analysis for price-related exclusionary practices. The 
                                                 
105  M. Laurence Popofsky, Drawing a Line Between Bundling and Contractual 
Exclusion Under the Sherman Act, GCP, June 2008, at 5–6. 
 
106  Case 26/76, Metro SB-Großmärkte GmbH & Co. KG v. Comm’n, 1977 E.C.R. 
1875, ¶ 21 (Eur. Ct. Justice). 
 
107  Benjamin Klein & Kevin Murphy, Vertical Restraints as Contract Enforcement 
Mechanisms, 31 J.L. & ECON. 265 (1988). 
 
108  For a similar argument see DOJ SECTION 2 REPORT, supra note 12, at 46. The 
DOJ wants to develop different tests for different types of conduct, “depending upon, 
among other things, the scope of harm implicated by the practice; the relative costs of 
false positives, false negatives, and enforcement; the ease of application; and other 
administrability concerns.” Id. 
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“risk of private litigation” may explain the need to establish efficiency and “worthy of 
antitrust protection” filters in the context of U.S. antitrust law but it omits the fact that 
public enforcement by regulatory agencies covers the most important part of the 
enforcement of Article 82.109 One could also devise a system that would separate the 
issue of liability (is there a violation of Article 82?) from the issue of remedies (what is 
the adequate remedy to address this violation?) and also one in which  courts could 
delegate to competition or regulatory authorities the enactment and supervision of the 
remedial phase. If courts are generally found able to adopt decisions that fix royalties in 
other contexts, such as intellectual property law infringement and damages actions, there 
is no reason why, with some additional support and resources, they would not be able to 
perform the same task in competition law.110  
Second, one could further the adoption of a cost-based test for pricing abuses as 
compensation for the asymmetrical standard of proof in EC competition law for 
efficiency gains.111 In the absence of a price-cost test, dominant undertakings would have 
had to substantiate the efficiency gains for every rebate/discount that could have 
produced an exclusionary effect — a “mission impossible” in terms of litigation costs. 
This would have also seriously affected incentives to provide discounts that may benefit 
                                                 
109  The relatively short history of private litigation in Europe and the filtering role of 
the European Commission in the context of public enforcement show that this risk is far 
lesser in Europe. 
 
110  In the U.S. context, see, for example, the Georgia-Pacific valuation factors case 
law, Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), 
under the U.S. Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. § 284 (damages for patent infringements). For a 
useful introduction, see WESTON ANSON, DONNA SUCHY & CHAITALI AHY, 
FUNDAMENTALS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY VALUATION: A PRIMER FOR IDENTIFYING 
AND DETERMINING VALUE (2005). 
 
111  On this asymmetry see our discussion infra Part II.A. 
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consumers. This is, however, a second-best solution in comparison to a cost benefit 
analysis approach that would impose a symmetrical standard of proof for anticompetitive 
effects and possible justifications.  
Third, the link between the classification of price and non-price related conduct 
and the interpretation of the concept of consumer harm (which is the reference point to 
measure anticompetitive effects) is missing. The Commission defines the concept of 
consumer harm broadly as covering not only restraints that affect competition through 
lower prices, but also those affecting the possibility for consumers to benefit from better 
quality products and wider choice of new or improved goods and services.112 The 
underlying objectives of Article 82, in particular its emphasis on preserving consumer 
choice, may explain the relatively strict antitrust standards that apply to technical tying, 
in comparison to contractual tying.113 It is clear that the Commission does not establish a 
hierarchy between these different aspects of consumer harm.  
Fourth, the introduction of the price/non-price dichotomy in EC competition law 
is also at odds with recent developments in U.S. antitrust law. In Pacific Bell v. linkLine, 
the U.S. Supreme Court made clear that “there is no reason to distinguish between price 
and nonprice components of a transaction” and consequently found that its reasoning in 
Trinko (involving an insufficient assistance claim by a competitor) applied “with equal 
force to price-squeeze claims.”114 What counts is the effect of the specific conduct on 
                                                 
112  Guidance, supra note 70, ¶ 5. 
 
113  Id. ¶ 53. The main justifications provided for this classification is that technical 
tying is costly to reverse and that it also reduces the opportunities for resale of individual 
components. 
 
114  Pacific Bell Tel. Co. v. linkLine Commc’ns, Inc, 129 S. Ct. 1109, 1119 (2009). 
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consumers, not the price or non-price label attached to it by the plaintiff/claimant or the 
defendant.  
Fifth, as we have previously observed, the Commission’s Guidance does not take 
into consideration that even an inefficient competitor can constrain a dominant firm’s 
pricing and thereby increase consumer surplus. The test, therefore, runs the high risk of 
being under-inclusive.115 This is certainly not a concern for those advancing the need for 
a safe harbor for bundling because they focus primarily or entirely on productive 
efficiency.116 However, this is certainly neither the case in EC competition law117 nor in 
U.S. antitrust law.118  
                                                 
115 See the analysis in Economides, supra note 94, at 268–69, 278. 
 
116 See Dennis W. Carlton, Does Antitrust Need to Be Modernized? 2 (Econ. 
Analysis Group, Discussion Paper No. 07-3, 2007), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=956930; Dennis W. Carlton & 
Michael Waldman, Safe Harbors for Quantity Discounts and Bundling (Econ. Analysis 
Group, Discussion Paper No. 08-1, 2008), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1089202; Dennis W. Carlton & Ken 
Heyer, Appropriate Antitrust Policy Towards Single-Firm Conduct (Econ. Analysis 
Group, Discussion Paper No. 08-2, 2008), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1111665. 
 
117  Case T-168/01, GlaxoSmithKline Servs. Unlimited v. Comm’n, 2006 E.C.R. II-
2969, ¶ 118 (Ct. First Instance) (the protection of the welfare of final consumers 
constitutes the objective of Article 81(1)); But see, Joined cases C-501, 513, 515 & 
519/06, GlaxoSmithKline Servs. Unlimited v. Comm’n, 2009 E.C.R. [00] ¶ 63 (on 
Article 81: “there is nothing in that provision to indicate that only those agreements 
which deprive consumers of certain advantages may have an anti-competitive object. 
Secondly, it must be borne in mind that the Court has held that, like other competition 
rules laid down in the Treaty, Article 81 EC aims to protect not only the interests of 
competitors or of consumers, but also the structure of the market and, in so doing, 
competition as such. Consequently, for a finding that an agreement has an anti-
competitive object, it is not necessary that final consumers be deprived of the advantages 
of effective competition in terms of supply or price”), available at 
http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/jcms/j_6/.. ; This case law is not incompatible with emphasis 
on long term consumer interest: See, Joined cases C-468/06 to C-478/06, Sot. Lelos kai 
Sia EE v. GlaxoSmithKline AEVE Farmakeftikon Proionton, 2008 E.C.R. [00], ¶ 66 
(Eur. Ct. Justice), available at http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/jcms/j_6/..(noting that “there 
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Sixth, in the presence of product differentiation (either in variety or in quality) the  
Guidance’s test makes little sense. Because a rival to the dominant firm does not offer the 
same products, why should courts use the dominant firm’s costs to evaluate the survival 
of the rival’s products that differ in quality and variety from those of the dominant 
firm?119 Moreover, when the products are differentiated, consumers may gain from the 
presence of additional varieties and qualities offered by the rival even if the rival prices 
higher than the dominant firm.120 The protection of variety and quality are important 
objectives of EC competition law, according to the Commission’s Guidance.121 
Finally, the Guidance’s test is based on a mistaken distinction between 
contractual/technological tying and bundled discounts, which, as previously explained, is 
                                                                                                                                                 
can be no escape from the prohibition laid down in Article 82 EC for the practices of an 
undertaking in a dominant position which are aimed at avoiding all parallel exports from 
a Member State to other Member States, practices which, by partitioning the national 
markets, neutralise the benefits of effective competition in terms of the supply and the 
prices that those exports would obtain for final consumers in the other Member States”. 
Emphasis added).This focus on consumer interest explains also the strict pass-on 
requirement to consumers for any efficiency gains that the defendant advances as a 
justification for anticompetitive effects. Commission Notice on the Guidelines on the 
Application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty, 2004 O.J. (C 101) 97, ¶¶ 85–86. The same 
principle applies in the context of Article 82. See Guidance, supra note 70, ¶ 30. 
 
118  See the analysis in Elhauge, supra note 8, at 37–41. 
 
119  See the analysis in Economides, supra note 94, at 269. 
 
120  See Steven C. Salop, Question: What Is the Real and Proper Antitrust Welfare 
Standard? Answer: The True Consumer Welfare Standard (Nov. 4, 2005) (statement to 
the AMC), available at 
http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/amc/public_studies_fr28902/exclus_conduct_pdf/051104_S
alop_Mergers.pdf; Steven C. Salop, Exclusionary Conduct, Effect on Consumers, and the 
Flawed Profit-Sacrifice Standard, 73 ANTITRUST L.J. 311 (2006); Nicholas Economides, 
Quality Variations in the Circular Model of Variety-Differentiated Products, 23 
REGIONAL SCI. & URB. ECON. 235 (1993). 
 
121  Guidance, supra note 70, ¶¶ 5–6. 
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not compatible with the objectives of EC competition law and leads to the application of 
different standards, although both practices may produce similar anticompetitive effects. 
The test suggested in the Commission’s Guidance does not make clear how mixed 
bundling is different from tying. This is an important consideration, as the equally 
efficient competitor test does not apply to tying, while it would apply to mixed bundling. 
This raises the issue of the existence of an effective and practical tool to distinguish 
between the two practices. It would make no sense to have a price/cost test for mixed 
bundling if the same practice also could be analyzed under the anticompetitive 
foreclosure approach of tying.  
As will become clear from the analysis in the following section, U.S. and EC 
competition law employ two criteria to distinguish between tying and single-product 
discount practices and between tying and mixed bundling — respectively, the 
requirements of the existence of distinct products and that of coercion. 
 
C. THE CASE FOR AN ANTICOMPETITIVE FORECLOSURE TEST: A UNIFIED STANDARD FOR 
BUNDLED DISCOUNTS AND TYING 
 
There are a number of economic and legal arguments that, in our view, shift the 
balance in favor of an anticompetitive foreclosure test for all bundling practices. The 
economic arguments relate to the anticompetitive harm of bundled discounts and to the 
need for inclusive antitrust standards. The legal arguments relate essentially to the 
difficulty of distinguishing between bundled discounts and tying, which is an argument in 
favor of a unified approach to these practices. 
 
1. The Case for an Anticompetitive Foreclosure Test from an Economic Perspective 
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As a matter of economics, the modified predatory pricing test of the Ninth Circuit 
can result in a finding of no liability even when there are anticompetitive effects. First, 
even if one believes that bundling will be anticompetitive only when allocating the 
discount from all products to the competitive product(s) results in an effective price 
below some measure of unit cost, average variable cost is not the appropriate measure of 
cost. Firms need to cover their fixed costs as well to stay in business. Thus, the 
appropriate measure of cost should be average total cost, which includes a per unit 
(average) allocation of fixed cost. For example, to say an action is not anticompetitive 
when a firm prices above average variable cost but below average total cost, makes no 
sense because a firm will not be able to survive in business in the long run under this 
pricing. Such pricing involves a short-run profit sacrifice, is not part of normal firm 
behavior, and is highly suspect as to its anticompetitive motive. An antitrust standard 
should not condone a dominant firm’s behavior that imposes pricing on equally efficient 
competitors that does not allow them to survive in the long run. 
Second, an entrant may have higher unit costs because foreclosure as a result of 
bundling reduced its scale of operations. Thus, specifying a test that relies on the unit 
costs of the dominant firm (given the higher scale of its operations) can easily result in an 
incorrect finding of no liability and false negatives. 
Third, attention should be paid to the effects of the bundling strategies on 
consumer surplus. Use of bundling strategies can lead to the exclusion of one or more 
competitors. In turn, this can decrease consumer surplus, even when the excluded entrant 
is less efficient than the incumbent. Entry constrains pricing, and even entry by less 
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efficient entrants can lead to lower prices.122 Thus, excluding entrants on the grounds of 
productive inefficiency (or creating tests that would exclude less efficient entrants out of 
hand) can reduce consumer surplus and increase allocative inefficiency (divergence of 
prices from costs).123 
Fourth, even starting from monopoly in one product and competition or oligopoly 
in a second product (or in more products), the introduction of mixed bundling strategies 
— where products are offered undiscounted a la carte as well as at a discounted price 
only to a customer committing to buy at least x percent of his needs in all the bundled 
products from the same firm — can lead to a reduction in consumer surplus.124 The 
                                                 
122  See, e.g., Jonathan B. Baker, Predatory Pricing After Brooke Group: An 
Economic Perspective, 62 ANTITRUST L.J. 585, 591 (1994) (“A firm can deter aggressive 
competition with a low price, even if the low price exceeds the price-cutter’s average 
cost, so long as the price is sufficiently low relative to its rivals’ cost. Hence, it is possible 
that competition can be harmed by low prices even if those prices are not below the price-
cutter’s cost.” (footnote omitted)). 
 
123  This can be true in a variety of situations. For example, the “Efficient 
Components Pricing Rule” (ECPR) that determines prices for components in systems was 
proposed as way to keep inefficient entrants out of the market. See William J. Baumol, 
Some Subtle Pricing Issues in Railroad Regulation, 10 INT’L J. TRANSPORT ECON. 341 
(1983); Robert D. Willig, The Theory of Network Access Pricing, in ISSUES IN PUBLIC 
UTILITY REGULATION 109 (Harry M. Trebing ed., 1979). However, it has been shown 
that allowing even (moderately) inefficient entrants to enter the market increases 
consumers’ surplus because it decreases prices and reduces the allocative inefficiency of 
monopoly. See Nicholas Economides & Lawrence J. White, Access and Interconnection 
Pricing: How Efficient Is the ‘Efficient Component Pricing Rule’?, 40 ANTITRUST BULL. 
557 (1995); Nicholas Economides & Lawrence J. White, The Inefficiency of the ECPR Yet 
Again: A Reply to Larson, 43 ANTITRUST BULL. 429 (1998); Nicholas Economides, The 
Tragic Inefficiency of M-ECPR, in DOWN TO THE WIRE: STUDIES IN THE DIFFUSION AND 
REGULATION OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGIES 142 (Allan L. Shampine ed., 
2003). 
 
124  See, e.g., Greenlee et al., supra note 9. This paper shows how a monopolist can 
extend his monopoly in the first market to the second market through offering a bundling 
scheme with a requirement that all or almost all purchases are made from the monopolist, 
and simultaneously increase the price of the monopolized product when it is offered on a 
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monopolist can set an a la carte price above the monopoly price and charge 
approximately the monopoly price for the monopolized good under the 
bundle/requirements contract. The introduction of the bundle can make consumers worse 
off even where they have the choice of whether or not to accept the terms of the bundle. 
Even where, after the introduction of the bundle, each consumer is better off buying the 
bundle rather than buying at the a la carte prices available in the presence of the bundle, 
the aggregate effect of these decisions to buy the bundle allows the monopolist to set 
pricing so that it extracts more surplus than in unbundled monopoly.125  
Fifth, bundling also can be used to create threats of higher a la carte prices, even if 
all consumers buy under the bundle and therefore the threat of buying at higher a la carte 
prices is not enforced at equilibrium.126 
Sixth, the “discount” in the price of the bundle can be illusory as the a la carte 
price can be increased simultaneously with the offer of the bundle by more than the 
discount so that, in the end, the consumer who buys the bundle pays more than before the 
                                                                                                                                                 
stand-alone basis. Greenlee et al. show in Theorem 2, id. at 11, that the application of this 
bundling scheme reduces consumers’ welfare. They show that consumers can be made 
worse off even when they have the choice of whether or not to take the bundle. 
Moreover, Greenlee et al. devise a test to ascertain if there are consumer losses: 
“[I]f the firm maximizes profits and the standalone price of A exceeds the initial price of 
A, then we can infer that the bundled rebate reduces consumer welfare.” Id. at 23. 
 
 Id. at 32; see also Barry J. Nalebuff, Bundling as a Way to Leverage Monopoly 
14–15 (Yale Sch. of Mgmt., Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. ES-36, 2004), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=586648. 
 
125  Because the prices for some bundles under the commitment contract are better 
than the a la carte ones, it is individually rational for some consumers to buy under the 
bundle. However, collectively these actions of consumers strengthen the monopolist and 
allow him to increase both the a la carte and bundle prices.  
 
126  See, e.g., Barry Nalebuff, Tried and True Exclusion, 1 COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L 
41 (2005).  
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bundle was offered.127 This strategy results in consumers buying the competitive good 
from the monopolist (of the first good) under the bundle, leading to (i) lower consumer 
surplus; and (ii) foreclosure of competitors in the “competitive” good(s). The fact that 
some buyers may agree to buy under the bundling contract does not contradict the 
illusory nature of the discount or that consumers may be worse off after the introduction 
of the bundling scheme. A buyer faced with an a la carte price and an effectively lower 
price for some bundles under the requirement contract may choose to buy under the 
bundling/requirement contract. As more buyers buy under the bundling/requirement 
contract, the market power of the dominant firm increases. As a result, the dominant firm 
is able to increase price above the ex ante pre-bundling price (even if that price was the 
original monopoly price) so that buyers buying under the bundling contract pay more 
than before the bundling scheme was introduced, and therefore the “discount” offered by 
the bundle is illusory. Buyers who do not buy under the bundling contract are even worse 
off.128  
From the point of view of the buyers, this is similar to the classic “prisoner’s 
dilemma”, in which each of two prisoners is offered a chance to talk about the other 
                                                 
127  Daniel Rubinfeld calls such a discount a ‘“sham’ discount.” Rubinfeld, supra 
note 9, at 252. 
 
128  When a buyer buys more than one unit, he has positive consumer surplus left 
even at monopoly pricing. The bundling/requirement contract allows the dominant firm 
to take away from consumers some of this surplus. This fact was missed by the Chicago 
School analysis, which advanced that a firm with a monopoly in one product cannot 
increase its monopoly profit by leveraging through bundling/tying its monopoly into a 
second monopoly in another product [See, Aaron Director & Edward H. Levi, Law and 
the Future: Trade Regulation, 51 NW. U. L. REV. 281, 290-92 (1956); Ward S. 
Bowman, Jr., Tying Arrangements and the Leverage Problem, 67 YALE L.J. 19, 20–23 
(1957); ROBERT BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 372-375, 380-381 (1978); RICHARD 
POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 198-199 (2d ed. 2001)] because it 
typically assumed single-unit purchasers. 
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prisoner’s crimes in exchange for a lighter sentence. No matter what the other prisoner 
does, each prisoner would like to talk to make his sentence lighter. However, if both 
prisoners talk, they end up with heavier sentences than if they had both stayed silent. 
Here, a buyer offered the bundling/requirement scheme may be willing to accept it 
because he gets a lower price for some bundles compared to a la carte from the dominant 
seller — this is akin to the prisoner talking to reduce his sentence. However, as more 
buyers accept the bundling/requirement scheme, the dominant firm’s market power 
increases. As a result, it is able to charge even higher prices. Like the prisoners, the 
buyers are worse off after more of them accept the deal. 
Seventh, the bundling strategy will tend to foreclose competitors in the second 
(non-monopolized) market, so that in the long run they are eliminated from the second 
market, and, to the extent that re-entry is not easy, the monopolist will have a free reign 
to set an even higher price in the second market in the future. Thus, foreclosure of 
competitors can further reduce consumer surplus in the medium and long run.  
Eighth, bundling may be used as an entry-deterring device by making it 
economically unprofitable for an entrant to enter one market without simultaneously 
entering the second market.129 
As a matter of principle, a major implication of what we refer to here as a 
predatory bundling analogy for all bundling practices would be to allow for a safe harbor 
test for dominant firms based on an “equally efficient” principle and make it more 
difficult for the plaintiff to bring a case. The significant part of the debate is about 
                                                 
129  See, e.g., Nalebuff, supra note 9; Rubinfeld, supra note 9, at 257; Aaron S. Edlin 
& Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Exclusion or Efficient Pricing? The “Big Deal” Bundling of 
Academic Journals, 72 ANTITRUST L.J. 119 (2004). 
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allocating the burden of proof that the defendant is at least as efficient a producer as the 
plaintiff and that therefore the exclusion of the latter is the consequence of business 
acumen and superior efficiency. One could consider that an anticompetitive foreclosure 
test assumes that this is the case: if the defendant were as efficient as the plaintiff in the 
market of the competitive product, then there is no need to bundle the sale of this product 
with discounts in lines of products that are not within the plaintiff’s product range. The 
defendant could have simply offered, as a least restrictive to competition alternative, 
single product discounts for the competitive product that could match or even be lower 
than the price charged by his rival. 
Certainly, there may be efficiency reasons that could explain the decision of a 
firm to bundle products, such as cost savings in production (e.g., joint costs), distribution, 
or price discrimination.130 Tying is a common practice in competitive markets as firms 
often compete with bundles of products and consumers are offered discounts if they buy 
the products that are part of the bundle. Evidence from the pervasive use of bundling in 
competitive markets would thus require the competition authorities or courts to adopt 
prima facie a positive view of such practices, unless they are used by firms with a 
dominant position and may exclude competitors that cannot offer the same bundle of 
items. The analysis of the practice under a rule of reason that would balance pro-
competitive and anticompetitive effects would thus be an adequate antitrust standard.131 
This is the position taken by the Third Circuit in LePage’s.  
                                                 
130  David S. Evans & Michael Salinger, Why Do Firms Bundle and Tie? Evidence 
from Competitive Markets and Implications for Tying Law, 22 YALE  J. ON REG. 37, 41–
42 (2005). 
  
131  In this case, the legal burden of proof will rest on the plaintiff, while the 
defendant will bear the evidentiary burden of substantiating the procompetitive efficiency 
 
 
48 
Some authors nevertheless have advanced the view that the application of the rule 
of reason anticompetitive foreclosure test to bundled discounts could still lead to false 
positives, in view of the difficulty of documenting efficiencies.132 They suggest the 
adoption of a cost-based standard that would operate as a safe harbor for bundled 
discounts.133 It is only if a rival as efficient as the dominant firm would be excluded from 
the market that the necessary costs of an extensive rule of reason inquiry should be 
incurred.134 The underlying assumption is that firms should be free in defining their 
pricing strategies. It also is based on the belief that pricing restraints should be subject to 
the more restrictive (for plaintiffs) antitrust analysis for predatory pricing. The inquiry 
would be whether the incremental price for the tied product (that is price under the 
bundle reduced by the allocation of the total discount for the whole bundle to the tied 
product) is below the defendant’s average variable cost of producing the tied product.135 
The assumption is that lower prices indicate superior efficiency and that they will 
presumptively benefit consumers. Such an assumption is more difficult to substantiate in 
contractual restraints, such as exclusive dealing or tying.136 It is worth noting, however, 
                                                                                                                                                 
justifications for the bundled discount, after the plaintiff brought evidence of an 
anticompetitive foreclosure effect. 
 
132  See, e.g., Evans & Salinger, supra note 125, at 83.  
 
133 See, e.g., Hovenkamp, supra note 9, at 854. 
 
134  Cascade Health Solutions v. PeaceHealth, 515 F.3d 883, 909 (9th Cir. 2007). 
 
135  Id. at 912–13. 
 
136  See Popofsky, supra note 100. 
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that most of these bundled rebates are offered to distributors, not to the final consumer.137 
There is no reason to presume that distributors will not increase their margins instead of 
reducing the prices to the final consumer, in the absence of potential or actual 
competition in the downstream market. Furthermore, in practically all the cases on 
bundled rebates the discount was granted only through a commitment to buy a certain 
market share from the dominant supplier, which was done by contract. 
Critics also assert that a predatory bundling test does not take into account the fact 
that bundled discounts may be a way for a dominant firm to impair the efficiency of its 
rivals because rivals that have a long run cost curve that is as low as the defendant’s (and 
therefore are equally efficient in the long run) would be “unable to achieve a price as low 
as the defendant’s [average] total costs precisely because the foreclosure has relegated 
them to the high cost portion of their cost curve.”138  
Furthermore, they impose on the plaintiff an important hurdle, as cost data of 
rivals may be hard to find. Indeed, one of the implications of a price-cost test is to reverse 
the allocation of the burden of proof for efficiencies. In the anticompetitive foreclosure 
test, the defendant should establish efficiency gains after the plaintiff has substantiated 
consumer harm. In the modified predatory price test, the plaintiff should prove from the 
outset that the excluded rival is at least as efficient as the dominant firm. Is this second 
screen necessary? It is generally argued that the cost/price test increases the predictability 
                                                 
137  See Benjamin Klein, Bundled Discounts as Competition for Distribution, GCP, 
June 2008, http://www.globalcompetitionpolicy.org. 
 
138  EINER ELHAUGE & DAMIEN GERADIN, GLOBAL COMPETITION LAW AND 
ECONOMICS 576 (2007). 
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of antitrust rules for business.139 This is certainly a valid argument, which can be 
extended to any type of antitrust violation examined under the rule of reason.140 Does this 
mean that we should introduce a cost/price test for all rule of reason antitrust cases? We 
do not think so. 
Finally, we question the position that antitrust concerns should be limited to 
practices that exclude equally efficient firms. Excluding less efficient rivals may also 
produce a negative consumer welfare effect if it removes a competitive constraint on the 
market power of the defendant and thus allows the defendant to raise prices and reduce 
consumer surplus while the effects on total surplus are ambiguous, as discussed earlier.141 
Indeed, the protection of the final consumer from wealth transfers may be the primary 
objective of antitrust law,142 imposing a strict pass-on requirement for any efficiency 
gains that the defendant advances as a justification for the adoption of a specific practice. 
 
2. The Case for an Anticompetitive Foreclosure Test from a Legal Perspective  
 
The analysis of bundled discounts under a predatory pricing standard in the 
United States and the Commission’s Guidance paper’s use of a cost/price standard for 
rebates are in sharp contrast to the foreclosure test applied to tying practices in the United 
States and Europe.. This confirms that the threshold process of characterization of the 
                                                 
139  See DOJ SECTION 2 REPORT, supra note 12, at 97. 
 
140  See Maurice E. Stucke, Does the Rule of Reason Violate the Rule of Law?, 42 UC 
DAVIS L. REV. (forthcoming 2009), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1267359. 
 
141  See Elhauge, supra note 8; Einer Elhauge, Defining Better Monopolization 
Standards, 56 STAN. L. REV. 253, 320–23 (2003). 
 
142  See Robert H. Lande, Wealth Transfers as the Original and Primary Concern of 
Antitrust: The Efficiency Interpretation Challenged, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 65 (1982). 
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specific facts — as constituting tying or multi-product rebates (mixed bundling) — 
should precede the step of examining the anticompetitive effects of the practice under 
either the foreclosure or the cost/price based test. One, however, could advocate a 
common standard for all bundling practices, whether or not traditionally characterized as 
tying. Jean Tirole suggests a predation test for tying practices that would include the 
analysis of the likelihood of tying to reduce competition in the tied market (step 1), the 
likelihood of tying to hurt consumers (step 2), as well as a recoupment test (step 3).143 
According to this view, tying is a tool for non-price predation, which is defined as “a 
voluntary and temporary loss in profit that can be rationalized only through a 
contemplated and substantial increase in the rival’s probability of exit and the subsequent 
ability to recoup losses.”144 This proposal is not, however, clear as to which criterion 
should be used to measure loss (and the adequate measure of costs) in this circumstance. 
Interestingly, both the European Commission and the U.S. courts that advocate a 
cost/price-based standard for bundled discounts continue to employ a specific 
anticompetitive foreclosure standard for tying. Although this may be driven by prior case 
law, analytically, from a consumer welfare perspective, it seems to be an inconsistent 
approach; if a predatory cost/price test should be the standard for bundled discounts, there 
is no reason why the same should also not be true for tying.145 The application of a 
                                                 
143  Jean Tirole, The Analysis of Tying Cases: A Primer, 1 COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L 
1 (2005). 
 
144  Id. at 20. For a different definition of non-price predation that emphasizes the 
probability of raising rivals costs strategies even in the absence of a profit sacrifice in the 
short run, see Thomas G. Krattenmaker & Steven C. Salop, Anticompetitive Exclusion: 
Raising Rivals’ Costs to Achieve Power over Price, 96 YALE L.J. 209, 224 (1986). 
 
145  Although the DOJ Section 2 Report stated that it “believes that the potential 
competitive harm of bundled discounting more closely resembles that from tying than 
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predation test to tying practices would, of course, likely be controversial as it would lead 
to under-enforcement and false negatives, and it would conflict with well-established 
case law of the U.S. Supreme Court and the European Courts. Such a test has not yet 
been suggested by either the EU or the U.S. antitrust authorities. 
With the uniform foreclosure standard we are proposing  for assessing both 
bundling and tying, several of the historical tying elements take a different meaning or 
become superfluous. For example, under our proposed uniform foreclosure standard 
approach, the distinct/separate product rule, which is the first step of the antitrust analysis 
of tying cases in the European Union and the United States, would operate as a 
distinguishing criterion between bundling and single-product rebates, should the latter be 
subject to a different antitrust standard. Likewise, a careful consideration of the coercion 
test, which has traditionally been the second step of an antitrust claim in both 
jurisdictions, shows that it is redundant and should not form a separate step in the 
competition assessment of tying but rather be integrated in the analysis of the existence of 
an anticompetitive foreclosure, as we will argue in our last section. 
3.  The Rationale of the Separate Products Test: Establishing the Boundaries 
of the Bundling Antitrust Category  
 
The judicial test for tying practices in Europe follows similar steps to that for 
tying in the United States. There is anticompetitive tying if (i) the tying and the tied 
products are two separate (distinct) products; (ii) the undertaking concerned is dominant 
                                                                                                                                                 
that from predatory pricing” when bundle-to-bundle competition is not reasonably 
possible “because of the inability of any substantial competitor or group of competitors to 
provide a similar range of items,” it advocates an anticompetitive foreclosure approach 
for tying, without suggesting any additional safe harbor. No clear explanation is given for 
this conceptual inconsistency. DOJ SECTION 2 REPORT, supra note 12, at 101; see also id. 
at 90 (tying). 
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(or has market power) in the market for the tying product (there is market power in the 
market for the tying product;146 (iii) the practice (an agreement or technological 
integration) does not give customers a choice to obtain the tying product without the tied 
product (coercion); and (iv) the practice in question forecloses competition (there are 
anticompetitive effects in the tied market). The CFI also accepted in Microsoft that the 
Commission correctly examined the objective justifications of the conduct that were 
advanced by Microsoft147 and referred to this condition as the fifth step of the analysis.148  
The separate/distinct product test fulfills two objectives: first, it is a proxy for 
efficiency gains, thus excluding from further antitrust assessment practices that have an 
obvious efficiency justification that benefits consumers; and second, it sets the 
boundaries of the bundling antitrust category as opposed to practices involving a single 
product. While the first reason may still be valid, if the antitrust standards for bundled 
rebates are similar to those applying to single-product rebates, the second rationale for the 
distinct product test may be questioned in this case.  
                                                 
146  Although the CFI and the U.S. courts consider that the requirement of two 
distinct products constitutes the first step of the competition assessment of tying, the 
Discussion Paper, supra note 70, reverses the order and requires first evidence of a 
dominant position before moving to the separate products requirement. The CFI’s 
approach in Microsoft has the benefit of unifying the standard for tying for Article 81 and 
Article 82 cases because the existence of market power in the tying product market also 
constitutes a prerequisite for the application of Article 81 since the adoption of the 
Guidelines on Vertical Restraints. See Commission Notice on the Guidelines on Vertical 
Restraints, 2000 O.J. (C 291) 1, ¶¶ 219–20. Furthermore, it makes more sense to 
determine if the alleged tying and tied products are distinct before analyzing the existence 
of a dominant position or market power on the tying product market. 
 
147  Case T-201/04, Microsoft Corp. v. Comm’n, 2007 E.C.R. II-3601, ¶ 858 (Ct. 
First Instance) (Microsoft CFI Decision). 
 
148  Id. ¶ 869; see also Guidance, supra note 70, ¶ 62. 
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As concerns the utility of the coercion requirement, its function is merely to 
distinguish between different forms of bundling practices, such as technological tying, 
contractual tying, and mixed bundling (commercial tying). We argue that the coercion 
criterion should be abandoned because it offers little information in terms of 
anticompetitive effects and consumer harm, in particular if one rejects, as we do, the 
assumption that price competition is more valuable to consumers than non-price 
competition. . 
a. The Separate Product Test in EC Competition Law 
The separate product test is the first step of the analysis of anticompetitive tying 
for the purposes of Articles 81 and 82 . It also is a requirement in U.S. antitrust law for 
tying arrangements. This derives from Jefferson Parish, a Section 1 Sherman Act case, 
although the case law does not seem to require a separate products test for non-
contractual tying under Section 2 of the Sherman Act.149 This approach presents 
important advantages, as our analysis will demonstrate. 
The main function of the two distinct products requirement is to serve as a 
screening device to take into account apparent efficiency gains that follow from the 
bundling of two separate products. Two items may be considered to be a single product 
for the purposes of the law of tying when they are subject to certain economies of joint 
production or distribution that can be achieved only if all customers can be forced to take 
                                                 
149  See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY 306 & n.25 (3d ed. 
2005) (“[T]he § 2 decisions on forced bundling generally do not discuss the ‘separate 
product’ requirement in tying cases, because they do not follow the tying logic at all; 
rather they go straight to the question whether the practice is exclusionary under the 
circumstances.”). 
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the entire package.150 In Tetra Pak II, the ECJ observed that “even where tied sales of 
two products are in accordance with commercial usage or there is a natural link between 
the two products in question [therefore they are single products in the sense of consumer 
demand], such sales may still constitute abuse within the meaning of Article [82] unless 
they are objectively justified.”151 This arguably suggests that even if the two items are 
considered to be a single product for the purposes of tying, it is still possible that Article 
82 will apply if the other conditions of anticompetitive tying are fulfilled. This 
interpretation finds support in Microsoft, where the CFI remarked that it is difficult to 
speak of “commercial usage or practice in an industry that is 95% controlled by 
Microsoft.”152 The condition of the existence of two separate products will become 
devoid of purpose if the commercial usage is defined by the practice of a dominant firm 
in the market. It seems, therefore, that if this requirement also applies for the application 
of Article 82 in situations of “super dominant position,”153 such as in Microsoft, it is 
because it fulfills an additional objective other than simply being a screening device for 
the efficiency of the bundling practice. 
The definition of what constitutes a distinct product may shed light on the real 
objective of this element. The Commission officials advanced the position in the 
                                                 
150  See Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 40–41 (1984) 
(O’Connor, J., concurring),; Jack Walters & Sons Corp. v. Morton Bldg., Inc., 737 F.2d 
698, 703 (7th Cir. 1984). 
 
151  Case C-333/94, Tetra Pak Int’l SA v. Comm’n, 1996 E.C.R. I-5951, ¶ 37 (Eur. 
Ct. Justice). 
 
152  Microsoft CFI Decision, 2007 E.C.R. II-3601, ¶ 910. 
 
153  The expression refers to a situation of a firm benefiting from an overwhelming 
dominant position in the market. See Case C-395/96, Compagnie Maritime Belge 
Transports SA v. Comm’n, 2000 E.C.R. I-1365, ¶¶ 114–20 (Eur. Ct. Justice). 
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Discussion Paper, as well as in the Microsoft decision, that “products are distinct if, in 
the absence of tying or bundling, from the customers’ perspective, the products are or 
would be purchased separately.”154 The distinct product test does not necessarily 
constitute a relevant market test.155 In the Discussion Paper, the Commission’s staff 
relied on direct evidence of consumer demand for this requirement, such as the fact that 
the consumers purchase the products separately when given a choice, or indirect 
evidence, such as the fact that firms in competitive markets tend to tie the products 
together. The Commission’s Guidance also relies on direct evidence of the 
distinctiveness of the products, such as “when given a choice, customers purchase the 
tying and the tied products separately from different sources of supply.”156 According to 
the CFI in Microsoft, the distinctness of products for the purpose of applying Article 82 
“has to be assessed by reference to customer demand,” and “in the absence of 
independent demand for the allegedly tied product, there can be no question of separate 
products and no abusive tying.”157  
Nevertheless, in Microsoft, the Commission did not focus only on customer 
demand but accorded at least equal importance to the supply side of the tied product’s 
market: 
                                                 
154  Discussion Paper, supra note 70, ¶ 185. 
 
155  Id. (“It is, however, not necessary that the two products belong to two separate 
product markets. In a market with differentiated products, two products may be 
sufficiently differentiated that a company can be said to tie or bundle two distinct 
products.”). 
 
156  Guidance, supra note 70, ¶ 51. 
 
157  Microsoft CFI Decision, 2007 E.C.R. II-3601, ¶¶ 917–918. 
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The distinctness of products for the purposes of an analysis under Article 
82 therefore has to be assessed with a view to consumer demand. If there 
is no independent demand for an allegedly “tied” product, then the 
products at issue are not distinct and a tying charge will be to no avail. 
 
The fact that the market provides media players separately is evidence for 
separate consumer demand for media players, distinguishable from the 
demand for client PC operating systems. There is, therefore, a separate 
market for these products. There are vendors who develop and supply 
media players on a stand-alone basis, separate from PC operating 
systems.158 
 
The CFI refused Microsoft’s argument that the Commission should have 
examined instead if the tying product was regularly offered without the tied product or 
whether customers wanted Windows without media functionality. If this were the case, 
complementary products could not constitute separate products for the purposes of 
Article 82.159 The court noted that “it is quite possible that customers will wish to obtain 
the products together, but from different sources.”160 The existence of different sources of 
supply and, in particular, of competing suppliers of the alleged tied product were 
influential factors in concluding that the products were distinct.161 The CFI followed 
previous case law of the ECJ holding that the presence in the market of independent 
companies specializing in the manufacture and sale of the tied product constitutes serious 
                                                 
158  Microsoft Comm’n Decision, supra note 3, ¶¶ 803–804 (footnote omitted) 
(emphasis added). 
 
159  Microsoft CFI Decision, 2007 E.C.R. II-3601, ¶ 921. 
 
160  Id. ¶ 922 (emphasis added). 
 
161  Although the CFI also noted that “a not insignificant number of customers 
continue to acquire media players from Microsoft’s competitors, separately from their 
client PC operating system, which shows that they regard the two products as separate.” 
Id. ¶ 932. 
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evidence of the existence of a separate market for that product.162 In contrast, the 
Discussion Paper embraced a demand-oriented test: although the existence of 
independent suppliers constituted indirect evidence of a separate consumer demand, this 
factor did not in itself play a decisive role in the inquiry on the existence of a distinct 
product.163 The Commission’s Guidance retreats from this more demand-oriented test 
and emphasizes again the supply side: “Two products are distinct if, in the absence of 
tying or bundling, a substantial number of customers would purchase or would have 
purchased the tying product without also buying the tied product from the same supplier, 
thereby allowing stand-alone production for both the tying and the tied product.”164 
Again, the presence of undertakings specialized in the manufacture and sale of the tied 
product without the tying product constitutes indirect evidence of the distinctness of the 
products. 
The approach of the CFI makes sense if one considers this element in light of the 
interpretation by the court of the fourth condition of tying: foreclosure of competition. 
The court assumed that the foreclosure of competitors in the specific circumstances of 
this case led to consumer detriment, in the sense that consumers’ choice and innovation 
were restricted. A focus on consumer demand — at least as this concept is perceived in 
defining a relevant market — simply does not address this type of anticompetitive harm 
as it generally centers on cross-price elasticity of demand. 
                                                 
162  See Case C-333/94, Tetra Pak Int’l SA v. Comm’n, 1996 E.C.R. I-5951, ¶ 36 
(Eur. Ct. Justice). 
 
163  Discussion Paper, supra note 70, ¶ 186. 
 
164  Guidance, supra note70, ¶ 51 (emphasis added). 
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The CFI also noted that IT and communications industries develop rapidly and, 
over time, separate products might become unified.165 This did not impede the court from 
assessing the existence of distinct products “by reference to the factual and technical 
situation that existed at the time when . . . the impugned conduct became harmful.”166 
The supply-oriented character of the distinct product test is directly related to the 
emphasis the court put on the exclusion of rival suppliers of streaming media players, and 
it constitutes one of the main points of difference with the interpretation of this test in 
U.S. antitrust law. 
b. A Comparison with the Distinct Product Test in U.S. Antitrust Law  
In U.S. antitrust law, the tying and tied products are separate if “the tying item is 
commonly sold separately from the tied item in a well functioning market.”167 The test is 
whether there is sufficient consumer demand in the marketplace to support independent 
markets despite any efficiencies tying may bring. The D.C. Circuit mentioned in United 
States v. Microsoft that “perceptible separate demand is inversely proportional to net 
efficiencies.”168 Separate demand for the tied product indicates that the efficiencies 
provided by the bundling practice to consumers are limited. However, the existence in the 
market of independent companies specializing in the manufacture and sale of the tied 
product does not by itself constitute adequate evidence of a distinct product under U.S. 
                                                 
165  Microsoft CFI Decision, 2007 E.C.R. II-3601, ¶ 913. The court accepted that 
“consumers want to find a media player pre-installed on their computers.” Id. ¶ 904. 
 
166  Id. ¶ 914. 
 
167  HOVENKAMP, supra note 144, at 415 (emphasis omitted). 
 
168  United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 87–88 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (Microsoft 
D.C. Circuit 2001).  
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antitrust law, as it is the case in Europe. Bundling can be efficiency enhancing if the tying 
and the tied products are used in fixed proportions and have no separate utility, as the 
dominant firm has the incentive to tie into the competitive market only if the combination 
is more efficient.169 By contrast, tying with variable proportions may be a vehicle for 
price discrimination and thus lead to a reduction of consumer surplus by profitably 
extracting consumer surplus from individual buyers.170 
This explains why in United States v. Microsoft, where Internet Explorer and 
Windows were used in fixed proportions, the D.C. Circuit found merit in Microsoft’s 
argument that, in the circumstances of the case, an abstract consumer demand test would 
chill innovation to the detriment of consumers by preventing firms from integrating into 
their products some new functionality that was previously provided by stand-alone 
products — and hence, by definition, subject to separate consumer demand. In a 
frequently-cited passage, the D.C. Circuit found the Jefferson Parish separate products 
test to be inappropriate: 
The per se rule’s direct consumer demand and indirect industry custom 
inquiries are, as a general matter, backward-looking and therefore 
systematically poor proxies for overall efficiency in the presence of new 
and innovative integration. The direct consumer demand test focuses on 
historic consumer behavior, likely before integration, and the indirect 
industry custom test looks at firms that, unlike the defendant, may not 
have integrated the tying and tied goods. Both tests compare 
incomparables — the defendant’s decision to bundle in the presence of 
                                                 
169  This should not however exclude antitrust liability if the objective of tying is to 
maintain or protect the degree of tying market power. See Elhauge, supra note 8, at 54 
(citing Microsoft Corp. v. Commission as an example of tying with fixed proportions and 
no separate utility which could help to preserve tying market power). In this case, the 
distinct product rule should not constitute a filter avoiding a more detailed competition 
law assessment under the rule of reason.  
 
170  See Ward S. Bowman, Jr., Tying Arrangements and the Leverage Problem, 67 
YALE L.J. 19, 20–23 (1957).  
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integration, on the one hand, and consumer and competitor calculations in 
its absence, on the other. . . . Because one cannot be sure beneficial 
integration will be protected by the other elements of the per se rule, 
simple application of that rule’s separate-products test may make 
consumers worse off.171 
 
In contrast to the U.S. view, the position of the CFI in Microsoft can hardly be 
explained by the objective to protect market innovation through product integration. If 
this were the case, the CFI should have balanced the benefits, from the point of view of 
the consumers, of having a new integrated product and the costs of the immediate 
reduction of consumer choice that the bundling of the alleged “distinct products” would 
have brought. This test could essentially be performed under the step of the analysis of 
anticompetitive effects (foreclosure of competition). The negative effects on consumers 
should be balanced against efficiency gains that could be passed on to consumers in the 
form of new products or better quality. The existence of a full rule of reason test for 
technological tying in the United States makes possible the full consideration of these 
efficiencies without necessarily applying the distinct products test. The D.C. Circuit did 
not refer to the distinct product test in United States v. Microsoft. The decision to 
abandon this condition was intrinsically related to the adoption of a rule of reason instead 
of a per se approach. The separate product test is transformed to an obvious and 
significant efficiency inquiry, a position defended by Justice O’ Connor in her concurring 
opinion in Jefferson Parish172 and by the Seventh Circuit.173 
                                                 
171  Microsoft D.C. Circuit 2001, 253 F.3d at 89 (citations omitted). 
 
172  Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 40 n.8 (1984) (O’Connor, 
J., concurring) (“When the economic advantages of joint packaging are substantial the 
package is not appropriately viewed as two products, and that should be the end of the 
tying inquiry.”). 
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If the CFI adopted a supply-oriented definition of the distinct product test in 
Microsoft, it is because the main focus of the enquiry was to establish if competitors 
could viably (profitably) operate in the tied product market. This is relatively easy to 
prove as the presence in the tied product market of companies that offer only the tied 
product indicates that there is sufficient consumer demand for the tied product (without 
the tying product) and therefore that the two products are distinct. It is also clear that a 
quasi per se illegality test applies for tying practices in EC competition law. Indeed there 
is no point in having a distinct product test if the benefits of the single product for the 
consumers would in any case be examined in the next step of the analysis under a rule of 
reason standard.174 
A bundling/tying standard that discards the distinct product inquiry certainly 
would have its detractors. One might argue, for example, that this approach is not an 
optimal allocation of the burden of proof between the plaintiff and the defendant, which 
typically would require that the former bring evidence of the absence of any obvious 
efficiency in bundling the products as well as of an anticompetitive effect before the 
burden of proof shifts to the dominant firm. But this interpretation is valid only if one 
considers that the distinct product test focuses on consumer demand and operates as a 
proxy for examining the obvious and significant efficiencies that the single product 
would bring to consumers. This interpretation does not fit well, however, with the CFI’s 
                                                                                                                                                 
173 Jack Walters & Sons Corp. v. Morton Bldg., Inc., 737 F.2d 698, 703 (7th Cir. 
1984) (“[I]f there are not separate markets, this is evidence that the economies of joint 
provision are overwhelming.”). 
 
174  See Microsoft D.C. Circuit 2001, 253 F.3d at 96 (“Because courts applying the 
rule of reason are free to look at both direct and indirect evidence of efficiencies from a 
tie, there is no need for a screening device as such . . . .”). 
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assumption that the presence of independent suppliers of the alleged tied product 
indicates the existence of two distinct products. In this sense, the presence of rivals in the 
tied market constitutes a proxy for potential anticompetitive foreclosure. This explains 
why the CFI did not focus only on identifying an independent consumer demand for the 
tied product but instead looked for evidence that the market included independent 
companies specializing in the manufacture and sale of the tied product that could have 
been marginalized or excluded with the tying practice. The distinct product test is 
therefore intrinsically linked to the CFI’s specific approach in interpreting the 
requirement of anticompetitive foreclosure (an issue we examine in the following 
section). It follows that although the distinct product test in Europe operates as a proxy 
for anticompetitive effects, the similar test in the United States indicates the presence of 
efficiency gains. 
c. The Distinct Product Test and the Boundaries of the Bundling Antitrust Category 
 
This is not the only function of the distinct product inquiry. The Commission’s 
staff Discussion Paper employed the requirement of distinct products to distinguish 
single branding obligations from bundled discounts and mixed bundling strategies.175 
Rebates that were applied by a dominant company for a particular product and had their 
possible negative effects in the market where the firm was dominant were considered 
under the rubric of “single branding and rebates” and were subject to a variety of tests, 
including a predatory cost/price standard for certain types of unconditional rebates. By 
                                                 
175  Discussion Paper, supra note 70, ¶ 185 n.118 (“Practices involving two or more 
units of the same product, such as imposing minimum purchasing requirements and 
giving loyalty rebates, may also be abusive; such practices are analyzed in section 7 on 
single branding and rebates.”). 
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contrast, single branding obligations and rebates that had effects in other markets were 
considered to be a form of tying/bundling. This implied, as we previously mentioned, that 
the existence of distinct products would lead to the analysis of the practice under the 
tying/bundling rubric rather than under the single branding one.176 The Commission’s 
recent Guidance also classifies multi-product rebates as a form of tying/bundling, and the 
distinct product test constitutes the first step of the analysis under Article 82.177 The 
Guidance does not, however, distinguish between single branding and multi-product 
rebates, as was the case in the Discussion Paper, probably because the Guidance focuses 
on conditional rebates and ignores single-product unconditional rebates that produce 
merely exploitative effects. The Guidance only refers to two broad categories of 
exclusionary practices: exclusive dealing and tying/bundling. 
                                                 
176  The distinction suggested by the DOJ Section 2 Report between situations where 
bundle-to-bundle competition is reasonably possible (subject to a predatory-pricing safe 
harbor) and those where bundle-to-bundle competition is not reasonably possible because 
of the inability of any substantial competitor or group of competitors to provide a similar 
range of items (subject to the discount-allocation standard) seems to be inspired by the 
same principle. Contrary to the separate products test of the European Courts, the 
distinction focuses, however, on the existence of different sources of supply for the tying 
good (and not the tied good) as an indication of a possibility of bundle-to-bundle 
competition. The more lenient, for the defendant, predatory pricing standard will apply in 
this case. The possibility of bundle-to-bundle competition will indicate the existence of a 
single product. If, however, bundle-to-bundle competition is not reasonably possible, “the 
discounting more closely resembles that from tying than that from predatory pricing,” 
which indicates the existence of two separate products. Another notable difference with 
the European supply-oriented separate product test is that it considers that a group of 
competitors may provide a similar range of items, thus including within the scope of the 
predatory pricing standard situations where only the dominant firm offers the different 
items and it faces competition from firms that are present either in the tying or the tied 
product market, but not both markets. The European separate product test would have in 
this case identified two separate products and would have applied the tying standard. See 
DOJ SECTION 2 REPORT, supra note 12, at 101–02. The current administration has 
withdrawn the DOJ Section 2 Report.  See supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
 
177  Guidance, supra note 70, ¶¶ 50–51. 
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This is also the approach followed by the D.C. Circuit in United States v. 
Microsoft, when it examined the price bundling claim of Windows and Internet 
Explorer.178 According to the D.C. Circuit, to establish a valid claim for illegal price 
bundling,179 the plaintiffs must demonstrate that: 
the anti-competitive effects of Microsoft’s price bundling outweigh any 
procompetitive justifications the company provides for it. In striking this 
balance, the District Court should consider, among other things, indirect 
evidence of efficiency provided by the “competitive fringe.” Although this 
inquiry may overlap with the separate-products screen under the per se 
rule, that is not its role here. . . . [T]hus, the separate-products inquiry 
serves merely to classify arrangements as subject to tying law, as opposed 
to, say liability for exclusive dealing.180 
 
The main function of the distinct product test in mixed bundling cases is therefore 
to establish the frontiers of the bundling antitrust category, as opposed to other antitrust 
categories.  In examining the anticompetitive effect of the price bundling, the court 
affirmed that “there is no claim of price predation,” thus indicating that price predation is 
a separate claim than “price bundling.”181 The distinct product rule thus could indicate the 
applicable antitrust standard if single product pricing and multi-product rebates or 
bundling were subject to different standards of antitrust liability: a predatory pricing 
standard versus an anticompetitive foreclosure standard. The utility of the distinct product 
                                                 
178  Microsoft D.C. Circuit 2001, 253 F.3d at 96–97. 
 
179  The allegation of such a claim will depend on evidence that Microsoft charged a 
price increment for Internet Explorer in Windows. The enquiry is if the price charged for 
Windows and Internet Explorer was higher than what would have been the price for 
Windows alone. 
 
180  Id. (emphasis added) (citation omitted). 
 
181  Id. at 96. It follows that there is no need to bring evidence that the price of the 
bundle is lower than a specific measure of costs to bring a “price bundling” claim. 
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requirement would, however, be limited if similar antitrust standards applied to both of 
these practices.  
From a consumer welfare perspective, it makes sense to apply the same antitrust 
standard for discounts on loyalty/requirement practices irrespective of whether it is a 
single-product or multiproduct case. In the former case, the demand is divided between 
an uncontested part that is always purchased from the dominant firm and a contested part 
where the customer may buy from any firm. In both the multi- and single-product cases, 
the dominant firm leverages its monopoly or dominant position to obtain higher sales in 
the remaining market. The only difference is that in the multiproduct case, sales in market 
A are leveraged to obtain higher sales in market B, while in the single-product case, the 
uncontested sales in market A are leveraged to obtain the contested sales also in market 
A. Both practices reward consumers. Conditional product rebates may produce 
anticompetitive effects even if the discounted and rival prices are above cost, as they can 
raise rivals’ costs above but-for levels and may discourage price cutting by the firms that 
use them and their rivals.182 The most appropriate standard for both practices is a 
structured rule of reason that would look at a number of variables to ascertain whether a 
loyalty/requirement program violates antitrust law, with the central question being 
whether the introduction of the loyalty/requirement program reduces consumer surplus.183 
The distinct product rule would in this case be superfluous. 
One could nonetheless maintain the distinct product rule as an indication of 
possible anticompetitive effects (or absence of significant efficiency gains) that would 
                                                 
182  See Einer Elhauge, How Loyalty Discounts Can Perversely Discourage 
Discounting, 5 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 189 (2009). 
 
183  See Economides, supra note 94, at 276–77. 
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require further analysis under a rule of reason standard. As it is clear from the position of 
the D.C. Circuit on price bundling, the success of such a claim requires evidence that 
competing suppliers of the alleged tying product do not sell the bundled (tying and tied) 
product “exclusively at a bundled price.”184 Indeed, if the firms at the competitive fringe 
were able to offer an unbundled version of the tying product at a lower price than the 
bundled version, this would indicate that the two products could profitably be offered 
separately (to the benefit of consumers) and that “at least” for these rivals, the efficiency 
gains from bundling would “be outweighed by those from separate choice.”185 That 
finding also would indicate that offering a bundled version is a direct impediment to 
consumer choice.186 The court does not explain though if this (more supply-oriented) 
separate product test obviates the need to prove coercion, which is a requirement for 
bringing a tying claim, and how the rule of reason would apply in that circumstance. 
 
4.  The “Coercion” Test: Blurring the Lines Between Tying and Mixed 
Bundling? 
 
It is a common feature in both EC and U.S. antitrust law that bundling of two 
distinct products does not constitute tying unless there has been an effective limitation of 
the consumers’ choice (or coercion) to purchase the products separately. The main 
function of the coercion test is to distinguish between the different forms of bundling (by 
                                                 
184  Microsoft D.C. Circuit 2001, 253 F.3d at 97. 
 
185  Id. 
 
186  For an analysis of Microsoft’s procompetitive justifications in employing a zero-
price bundling of Internet Explorer with Windows, see Benjamin Klein, Microsoft’s Use 
of Zero Price Bundling to Fight the “Browser Wars,” in COMPETITION, INNOVATION AND 
THE MICROSOFT MONOPOLY: ANTITRUST IN THE DIGITAL MARKETPLACE 217 (Jeffrey A. 
Eisenach & Thomas M. Lenard eds., 1999). 
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contract, by technological integration, or by financial incentives) and their effects on 
consumers.187 It is however contended by the authors that the test is redundant if the 
standard for all forms of bundling is similar and should form part of the assessment of the 
anticompetitive foreclosure element of the tying/bundling abuse under Article 82. 
a. The Coercion Test in EC Competition Law 
 
In EC competition law, there is a tying violation if the undertaking concerned 
does not give customers a choice to obtain the tying product without the tied product. 
Coercion may arise from the refusal of the dominant firm to sell the tying product 
without the tied one (either as a contractual clause or de facto), from the unavailability of 
the products separately, from pressure exerted on the customer through the promise of 
favorable treatment to customers who take both products  or threats to those who do not, 
or from pricing incentives that may be so powerful that no rational customer would 
choose to buy the products separately.188 In Microsoft the CFI took the view that the 
analysis of whether the dominant undertaking does not give customers a choice to obtain 
the tying product without the tied product is “merely expressing in different words the 
concept that bundling assumes that consumers are compelled, directly or indirectly, to 
accept ‘supplementary obligations,’ such as those referred to in Article 82(d) EC.”189 It 
also held that the test in Article 82 is not exhaustive and that the Commission was 
                                                 
187  The terms “technological” and “technical” tying are used interchangeably. The 
European Commission refers to “technical tying” [see, Guidance, supra note 70, ¶ 48], 
while the US courts most frequently use the term “technological bundling” [see, 
Microsoft D.C. Circuit 2001, 253 F.3d at 84]. 
 
188  See HOVENKAMP, supra note 144, at 410–15. 
 
189  Case T-201/04, Microsoft Corp. v. Comm’n, 2007 E.C.R. II-3601, ¶ 864 (Ct. 
First Instance). 
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therefore right to rely in its decision on Article 82 in its entirety and not exclusively on 
Article 82(d).190 
For the CFI, Microsoft had contractually and technically coerced the original 
equipment manufacturers (OEMs). First, it was not possible for the OEMs to obtain a 
license on the Windows operating system without WMP. Second, it was not technically 
possible for the OEMs to uninstall WMP. The CFI also noted that coercion of OEMs 
indirectly restricted the choice of the end consumers.191 Although Microsoft alleged that 
customers were not required to pay anything extra for WMP, the court rejected this 
argument noting that the price of WMP was included in this case in the total price of the 
Windows client PC operating system. This argument seems paradoxical because the court 
had already accepted that the two products were distinct, and it should have therefore 
examined Microsoft’s arguments from that perspective. That also would have been 
consistent with the position of the CFI with regard to bundled discounts (in this case a 
discount of 100 percent on media players). 
The CFI adopted a broad definition of coercion, stating that “neither Article 82(d) 
EC nor the case law on bundling requires that consumers must be forced to use the tied 
product or prevented from using the same product supplied by a competitor of the 
dominant undertaking.”192 The theoretical possibility that consumers were not prevented 
from installing and using other media players instead of WMP was not sufficient to 
conclude that there was no coercion as the end consumers had a strong incentive to use 
                                                 
190  Id. ¶ 861. 
 
191  Id. ¶ 965. 
 
192  Id. ¶ 970. 
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WMP.193 The court seems to consider that the alternative offered to consumers to install 
media players other than WMP should be equivalent with regard to its effectiveness to 
the pre-installation of media players by the OEMs, which implies a rather strict standard 
for dominant firms.  
It is noteworthy that the requirement of coercion was not mentioned in the 
Discussion Paper for bundling/tying practices.194 One reason for omitting the 
coercion test is that the Commission examined together mixed bundling and tying 
practices and considered mixed bundling as a form of “commercial” tying. The 
main difference between tying and mixed bundling was therefore the form of 
restricting the choice for consumers to obtain the tying product without the tied 
product. In contractual and technical tying, coercion takes a direct form, while for 
mixed bundling, coercion is indirect and often takes the form of an inducement of 
the customers to purchase the tied product through granting bonuses, rebates, 
discounts or any other commercial advantage. (However, the Commission 
distinguished the two forms of bundling when it examined the foreclosure effect 
of these practices, as it advocated, wrongly in our view, a cost/price measure for 
mixed bundling practices.) 
                                                 
193  Id. ¶ 1042 (referring to the Commission’s analysis). 
 
194  Discussion Paper, supra note 70, ¶ 183 (footnote omitted): The Commission’s 
staff retained instead the following four criteria for the application of the bundling test: 
“(i) the company concerned is dominant in the tying market; (ii) the tying and tied goods 
are two distinct products; (iii) the tying practice is likely to have a market distorting 
foreclosure effect; (iv) the tying practice is not justified objectively or by efficiencies.”. 
 
 
 
71 
The recent Commission Guidance also does not mention the element of 
coercion,195 although it implicitly internalizes this condition when it treats technical tying 
more restrictively than contractual tying, by considering that the risk of anticompetitive 
foreclosure is expected to be greater in this case.196 In contrast, “technological” tying is 
subject to the rule of reason in U.S. law, whereas contractual tying falls under the quasi-
per se rule of Jefferson Parish.197 The position of the European Commission cannot be 
explained by the case law of the CFI, which does not establish such a distinction between 
contractual and technical tying. It is not also compatible with consumer welfare, as in 
most cases technical tying bundles products in fixed proportions and is thus more likely 
to be motivated by efficiency gains rather than by an anticompetitive aim. Overall, the 
European approach for bundling/tying seems inconsistent. The Commission adopts 
different standards for the various forms of bundling (contractual, technological, and 
commercial (bundled rebates), strict standards for contractual tying, stricter standards for 
technological tying, and lenient standards for bundled rebates (by introducing a price-cost 
test), all without clearly explaining how these fit with the overall objectives and aims of 
Article 82. 
b. A Comparison with the Coercion Test in U.S. Antitrust Law 
 
                                                 
195  See Guidance, supra note 70, ¶ 50. 
 
196  Id. ¶ 53. The recent challenge by the European Commission of the bundling of 
Microsoft’s Internet Explorer with Windows seems to have been inspired by this 
principle. See Press Release, European Comm’n, Antitrust: Commission Confirms 
Sending a Statement of Objections to Microsoft on the Tying of Internet Explorer to 
Windows (Jan. 17, 2009) (Memo/09/15). 
 
197  Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984). 
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The requirement of coercion also is present in U.S. antitrust law on tying. The 
buyer must somehow be forced to accept the tied product. According to Herbert 
Hovenkamp,  
This coercion should result from (1) an absolute refusal to sell the tying 
product without the tied product; (2) a discount, rebate or other financial 
incentive given to buyers who also take the tied product; (3) technological 
design that makes it impossible to sell the tying product without the tied 
product.198 
 
It follows that coercion does not cover only contractual or technological tying, but also 
situations of commercial tying. 
This does not fit well with the recent Ninth Circuit’s decision in Cascade Health 
Solutions v. PeaceHealth, where the court distinguished bundled discounts from tying 
practices by requiring evidence of coercion for tying but not for bundled discounts: 
 
“One difference between traditional tying by contract and tying via 
package discounts is that the traditional tying contract typically forces the 
buyer to accept both products, as well as the cost savings.” Conversely, 
“the package discount gives the buyer the choice of accepting the cost 
savings by purchasing the package, or foregoing the savings by purchasing 
the products separately.” The package discount thus does not constrain the 
buyer’s choice as much as the traditional tie. For that reason . . . “[a] 
variation of the requirement that prices be ‘below cost’ is essential for the 
plaintiff to establish one particular element of unlawful bundled 
discounting — namely, that there was actually ‘tying’ — that is, that the 
purchaser was actually ‘coerced’ (in this case by lower prices) into taking 
the tied-up package.”199 
 
                                                 
198  HOVENKAMP, supra note 144, at 410. 
 
199  Cascade Health Solutions v. PeaceHealth, 515 F.3d 883, 900–01 (9th Cir. 2007) 
(emphasis added) (alterations in original) (citations omitted). See Virgin Atl. Airways 
Ltd. v. British Airways plc, 257 F.3d 256, 270 (2d Cir. 2001). 
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When the Ninth Circuit examined the same facts under the tying claim, the court 
included financial incentives as a form of coercion that could be qualified as unlawful 
tying, if their effect was to coerce the customers to buy the tying and the tied product.  
Persuasion by financial incentives and coercion have similar effects and the Ninth 
Circuit was quick to find that PeaceHealth’s practice of giving a larger discount to 
insurers who dealt with it as an exclusive preferred provider “may have coerced some 
insurers to purchase primary and secondary services from PeaceHealth rather than from 
[its rival,] McKenzie.”200 Indeed, “the fact that a customer would end up paying higher 
prices to purchase the tied products separately does not necessarily create a fact issue on 
coercion” and “additional evidence of economic coercion” is required.201 Although “not 
dispositive evidence of an illegal tie,” the fact that McKenzie’s prices for primary and 
secondary services were lower than PeaceHealth’s prices on those services was 
considered by the court as constituting a “permissible inference that a rational customer 
would not purchase PeaceHealth’s allegedly overpriced product in the absence of a tie” 
and therefore that if customers agreed on an exclusive relationship with PeaceHealth, it is 
because they were coerced by the latter.202 
If coercion can also be established by evidence of economic incentives, which 
have the potential to induce a rational consumer to buy the tying and the tied product 
together, there is little difference between a tying and a bundled discount claim. The 
                                                 
200  Cascade Health Solutions, 515 F.3d at 914 (emphasis added). 
 
201  Id. at 915. 
 
202  Id. 
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Ninth Circuit recognized the problem when it accepted that economic coercion through 
inducement could be an alternative theory for McKenzie to present its tying claim:  
 
[S]uch a claim might raise the question of whether, to establish the 
coercion element of a tying claim through a bundled discount, McKenzie 
must prove that PeaceHealth priced below a relevant measure of its costs. 
Some commentators would require a plaintiff alleging that a bundled 
discount amounts to an illegal tie to prove below-cost prices. . . . It is 
unclear whether the AMC intended its three-part test to apply when a 
plaintiff alleging an illegal tying arrangement asserts that the defendant’s 
pricing practices coerced unwanted purchases of the tied product. . . . The 
parties have not briefed this issue to us, and the parties did not raise the 
issue before the district court. We therefore leave it to the district court, if 
necessary, to decide the issue in the first instance on remand.203 
 
This demonstrates the internal contradiction of the court’s decision: how is it 
possible to think that coercion distinguishes tying from bundled discounts while 
considering, at the same time, that bundled discounts may constitute a form of coercion? 
Furthermore, should financial coercion be interpreted as covering only situations where 
the “pricing structure makes purchase of the tying and tied products together the only 
viable economic option” or is this standard “too extreme”?204  
The Ninth Circuit’s espousal of a different antitrust standard for bundled 
discounts than for tying practices is thus based on shaky grounds, both in terms of law 
and policy. Adopting the modified predatory cost/price standard for bundled discounts 
would imply the abandonment of the anticompetitive foreclosure test for all exclusionary 
practices — tying, exclusive dealing, etc. -- in favor of a cost/price predation test or, in 
                                                 
203  Id. at 916 n.27. 
 
204  Ortho Diagnostic Sys., Inc. v. Abbott Labs., Inc., 920 F. Supp. 455, 471 & n.23 
(S.D.N.Y. 1996) (citing 10 PHILLIP AREEDA & DONALD F. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 
1758b, at 345–46 (1978)). 
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other words, of an “as efficient as competitor” test. Legal precedent, economic analysis, 
and policy choices, however, are all obstacles to this prospect.205  
The generalization of the approach followed by the Ninth Circuit in Cascade 
Health Solutions for non-price restraints also could lead to an important divergence with 
EC competition law. The choice between the two analogies — price predation versus 
anticompetitive foreclosure — is an issue that is not only linked to the apparent need, or 
not, to build safe harbors for “efficient” pricing practices of dominant firms and also is 
related to the theory of competition that underscores the enforcement of Section 2 of the 
Sherman Act and Article 82 . The interpretation of the concept of anticompetitive 
foreclosure in both jurisdictions illustrates the different theoretical foundations of U.S. 
antitrust law and EC competition law. 
II. THE DIFFERENT MEANING OF ANTICOMPETITIVE FORECLOSURE IN U.S. 
ANTITRUST AND EC COMPETITION LAW 
 
The competitive assessment of bundling practices requires analysis of the 
foreclosure of competition in the tying or tied market (depending on the theory of 
anticompetitive harm) in both EC and U.S. antitrust law. The meaning of the concept of 
anticompetitive foreclosure has been, and still is, one of the most controversial issues in 
antitrust law enforcement, not only for bundling but also for all types of exclusionary 
practices. An important aspect of this debate has been the definition of a limiting 
                                                 
205  Although the D.C. Circuit acknowledged in United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 
F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001), that, except for situations of predatory pricing, “antitrust laws 
do not condemn even a monopolist for offering its product at an attractive price,” id. at 
68, it did not apply the predatory pricing test or a modified version of it for the nonprice 
exclusionary practices and bundling, in general, id. at 96-97. See PAGE & LOPATKA, 
supra note 2, at 66. 
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principle for antitrust law enforcement: whether anticompetitive foreclosure should be 
perceived as requiring something more than foreclosure or the exclusion of a rival. For 
bundling practices, the debate over the adequate standard of foreclosure has focused on 
the following two questions: (i) should the foreclosure effect be presumed from the 
nature of the bundling practice and/or the existence of tying market power (dominant 
position); and (ii) in which circumstances does the foreclosure of a competitor from the 
tied product market harms consumers? 
A. FORECLOSURE AND THE NATURE OF BUNDLING: A QUASI-PER SE RULE OR A MORE 
FLEXIBLE STANDARD? 
 
Framing effective (neither overinclusive, nor underinclusive) and workable 
(easily administrable) competition law standards for bundling practices is not an easy 
exercise. It is more usual to contrast effects-based approaches to form-based approaches: 
the former require the examination of the effects of a practice before concluding that it is 
anticompetitive, while the latter focus on the nature of the practice before arriving at any 
conclusion with regard to its anticompetitive effects. A form-based approach is not 
necessarily incompatible with the analysis of the anticompetitive effects of a practice. 
Nevertheless, instead of analyzing the effects of the specific practice within the specific 
market context (an ex post and concrete analysis206), the competition authority or the 
judge characterizes the practice as falling within an ex ante pre-defined category of 
practices that are generally deemed — from previous practical experience or because of 
their opposition to a fundamental aim of competition law — to produce anticompetitive 
effects (abstract/categorical analysis).  
                                                 
206  That does not necessarily require evidence of actual effects of anticompetitive 
foreclosure. See, our discussion infra Part II.B. 
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The U.S. and EC competition law on tying and bundling practices illustrate the 
evolution of antitrust standards towards a more effects-based approach. Although judicial 
decisions were often developed without much concern for analyzing anticompetitive 
effects, the more recent case law in the United States requires the examination of the 
anticompetitive effects of the practice before concluding whether there is illegal tying. In 
Jefferson Parish, the Supreme Court adopted a modified per se test for contractual 
tying.207 There was a presumption of anticompetitive effects whenever a firm with market 
power employed bundling practices that had the effect of foreclosing rivals from 
significant market shares in the tied product market,208 of extracting consumer surplus,209 
or of raising barriers to entry in both the tying and the tied markets.210 In United States v. 
Microsoft, the D.C. Circuit moved to a rule of reason test for software bundles that 
requires plaintiffs to demonstrate that the benefits of the tying practice are outweighed by 
the harms in the tied product market.211 This essentially is a cost-benefit analysis test that 
takes fully into account the efficiency gains to the benefit of consumers and allocates the 
legal burden of proof to the plaintiff: the plaintiff “must demonstrate that the 
                                                 
207  Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 12–18 (1984). 
 
208  Fortner Enters. v. U.S. Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495 (1969). 
 
209  Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 14–15 (market power in the tying market is 
employed to “impair competition on the merits in another market,” thus “increasing 
monopoly profits over what they would be absent the tie”). 
 
210  Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451 (1992). 
 
211  United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 95–97 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
Procompetitive justifications for tying were also considered in Illinois Tool Works, 547 
U.S. 28, 36 (2006). 
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anticompetitive harm of the conduct outweighs the procompetitive benefit.”212 If the 
plaintiff successfully establishes a prima facie case by demonstrating anticompetitive 
effects, it is on the defendant monopolist to “proffer a ‘procompetitive justification’ for 
its conduct” (evidentiary burden of proof or efficiency justifications).213 The burden then 
shifts back to the plaintiff to rebut that claim and to prove that “the anticompetitive harm 
of the conduct outweighs the procompetitive benefit.”214 This cost-benefit analysis test, 
and attendant burden shifting, also applies to bundled discounts.215 In essence, the 
anticompetitive foreclosure test in the United States looks to the anticompetitive effects 
of the practice and concludes that there is anticompetitive foreclosure only when the 
benefits of a practice do not outweigh its costs, from the point of view of the consumers. 
The position of EC competition law was initially quite hostile to any form of 
tying.216 In Hilti and Tetra Pak II the ECJ applied a per se test and found that by 
imposing on their customers numerous obligations that had no link with the purpose of 
the contracts, the dominant firms in question had restricted the market access of their 
competitors and had deprived consumers of any freedom to make their own choices. 217 
                                                 
212  Microsoft D.C. Circuit 2001, 253 F.3d at 59. 
 
213  Id. 
 
214  Id. 
 
215  LePage’s Inc. v. 3M, 324 F.3d 141, 163–64 (3d Cir. 2003). 
 
216  VALENTINE KORAH, AN INTRODUCTORY GUIDE TO EC COMPETITION LAW AND 
PRACTICE 142 (8th ed. 2004). 
 
217  See Case IV/30.787 and 31.488—Eurofix-Bauco v. Hilti, Comm’n Decision, 
1988 O.J. (L 65) 19, ¶ 75; Case T-83/91, Tetra Pak Int’l SA v. Comm’n, 1994 E.C.R. II-
755, ¶ 140 (Ct. First Instance); Case C-333/94, Tetra Pak Int’l SA v. Comm’n, 1996 
E.C.R. I-5951, ¶ 36 (Eur. Ct. Justice). 
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Consequently, if there are independent producers in the tied product market, it is required 
that dominant undertakings abstain from any conduct, such as contractual tying, that 
would have the effect of restricting the freedom of these independent producers to 
compete in the tied market.  
Dominant undertakings may argue the existence of an objective justification for 
their conduct. Early case law has, however, restrictively interpreted this concept as not 
including any efficiency defense, but only broad non-economic public policy concerns, 
such as safety or health factors related to the dangerous nature of the product in 
question.218 The CFI’s 2007  Microsoft decision and the Commission’s Guidance 
constitute, in this respect, an interesting evolution. 
The two steps in the abuse control test of Article 82 are as follows:  
 
Article [82] covers practices which are likely to affect the structure of a 
market where, as a direct result of the presence of the undertaking in 
question, competition has already been weakened and which, through 
recourse to methods different from those governing normal competition in 
products or services based on traders’ performance, have the effect of 
hindering the maintenance or development of the level of competition still 
existing on the market.219 
                                                 
218  For an analysis, see Ekaterina Rousseva, Abuse of Dominant Position Defenses – 
Objective Justification and Article 82 EC in the Era of Modernization, in EC 
COMPETITION LAW – A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT 377–431 (Giuliano Amato & Claus-Dieter 
Ehlermann eds., 2007); Albertina Albors-Llorens, The Role of Objective Justifications 
and Efficiencies in the Application of Article 82 EC, 44 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 1727 
(2007). 
 
219  Case 322/81, NV Nederlandsche Banden Industrie Michelin v. Comm’n 
(Michelin I), 1983 E.C.R. 3461, ¶ 70 (Eur. Ct. Justice). Compare with the terminology 
used by the ECJ in Case 85/76, Hoffman-La Roche & Co. v. Commission, 1979 E.C.R. 
461, ¶ 91 (Eur. Ct. Justice), and Case C-95/04, British Airways plc v. Commission, 2007 
E.C.R. I-2331, ¶ 66 (Eur. Ct. Justice): Article 82 “refers to conduct which is such as to 
influence the structure of a market where, as a result of the very presence of the 
undertaking in question, the degree of competition is already weakened.” British Airways, 
2007 E.C.R. I-2331, ¶ 66 (emphasis added). The difference between “likely to affect” and 
“conduct which is such as to influence” may indicate a difference in the degree of 
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As a first step, the abuse test involves assessing whether the conduct is of a type 
“likely” or “such as” to affect the structure of an otherwise concentrated market and 
which constitutes a (business) method “different from those governing normal 
competition in products or services based on traders’ performance” (abstract/categorical 
analysis) that would initially require the classification of the practice into a specific 
antitrust category. In the second step, the competition authority or judge will examine the 
anticompetitive effects of the specific practice (fact-based analysis).220 The first prong of 
this abuse test, abstract/categorical analysis, implies that for certain practices there is a 
presumption of anticompetitive or pro-competitive effect when the firm has a dominant 
position.  
The case law of the European Courts is ambiguous as to which practices are 
presumptively anticompetitive in the abstract/categorical analysis part of the abuse test. 
Certain forms of practices, such as tying, loyalty rebates, predatory prices, and exclusive 
dealing obligations imposed by dominant firms, were often analyzed as being 
anticompetitive and therefore infringing Article 82 by their nature and effect.221 It is true 
                                                                                                                                                 
probability of the occurrence of the outcome (“affect” or “influence” the structure of the 
market) as a result of the specific conduct. 
 
220  See MONTI, supra note 56, at 171. 
 
221  Joined cases C-468/06 to C-478/06, Sot. Lelos kai Sia EE v. GlaxoSmithKline 
AEVE Farmakeftikon Proionton, 2008 E.C.R. [00], ¶ 50 (Eur. Ct. Justice)(opinion of 
Advocate General Colomer), available at http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/jcms/j_6/ (search by 
lead case number under “Search for a case”); Case T-203/01, Manufacture Française des 
Pneumatiques Michelin v. Comm’n (Michelin II), 2003 E.C.R. II-4071, ¶ 241 (Ct. First 
Instance) (“[F]or the purposes of applying Article 82 EC, establishing the anti-
competitive object and the anti-competitive effect are one and the same thing. If it is 
shown that the object pursued by the conduct of an undertaking in a dominant position is 
to limit competition, that conduct will also be liable to have such an effect.” (citation 
omitted)); Intel, Comm’n Decision, supra note 97, ¶ 923 (“…a violation of Article 82 
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that the case law does not always require the examination of the existence of actual 
anticompetitive effects, as these follow from the qualification of the conduct as being 
tying, a loyalty rebate, or predatory pricing.222 This classification or characterization 
process that precedes the assessment of the anticompetitive effects of the conduct plays 
an important role. 
It is not clear, however, what the European Court of Justice meant by “methods 
different from those governing normal competition in products or services based on 
traders’ performance” (“abnormal” practices). Would that mean that EC competition law 
prohibits certain commercial practices, such as tying and loyalty discounts, per se? The 
Commission’s Guidance refers to certain circumstances where it would not be necessary 
to carry out a detailed assessment before concluding that the conduct in question is likely 
to result in consumer harm. 223 It is true that the Commission considers that the 
anticompetitive effect will be inferred in this case, as that type of conduct can only raise 
obstacles to competition without adding any efficiency gain. One could argue, however, 
that this paragraph of the Guidance does not affect the theoretical possibility for 
dominant undertakings to invoke efficiencies, in particular as it remains possible for 
conduct leading to anticompetitive foreclosure to be justified by the objective necessity 
                                                                                                                                                 
may also result from the anticompetitive object of the practices pursued by a dominant 
undertaking”). 
 
222  Michelin II, 2003 E.C.R. II-4071,¶ 239 (loyalty rebates); Case T-340/03, France 
Télécom SA v. Comm’n, 2007 E.C.R. II-107, ¶¶ 195, 197 (Ct. First Instance) (predatory 
pricing); Microsoft (Ct First Instance), ¶ 1035 (tying). 
 
223  Guidance, supra note 70, ¶ 22. The Commission provides some non-exhaustive 
examples, such as conduct through which the dominant undertaking prevents its 
customers from testing the conduct of competitors or pays a distributor or a customer to 
delay the introduction of a competitor’s product. 
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defense and efficiencies, before finding the existence of an abuse of a dominant position. 
The Commission does not explicitly exclude these practices from Section D of the 
Guidance on objective necessity and efficiencies, although, in practice, it seems unlikely 
that the alleged efficiencies will be accepted for failure to comply at least with the first 
two cumulative conditions of the efficiency defense under EC competition law.  
In Sot. Lelos kai Sia, a case involving the refusal to supply by a dominant 
undertaking with the aim of avoiding all parallel exports from a Member State to other 
Members States, the ECJ implicitly recognized that certain types of conduct, such as a 
restriction of parallel trade, may create a presumption of negative effects on consumers 
and therefore shift the burden of proof to the defendant, without it being necessary for the 
claimant to bring additional evidence on the causal link between the specific conduct and 
consumer harm.224 Despite, however, the language employed, the Court immediately 
recognized that this does not amount to an absolute presumption of consumer harm or a 
per se prohibition. The presumption of anticompetitive effects may still be rebutted by the 
defendant in limited circumstances: a company must be “in a position to take steps that 
are reasonable and in proportion to the need to protect its own commercial interests.”225 
The first prong of the abuse test, abstract/categorical analysis, does not therefore establish 
a per se prohibition of certain commercial practices, such as tying or bundling. 
One also could interpret the first prong of the test as covering all practices that are 
likely to (not just may potentially) exclude rivals from the market, a test that would 
require more than just establishing the mere probability of exclusion and would resemble 
                                                 
224  Sot. Lelos kai Sia, 2008 E.C.R. [00], ¶¶ 56–57. 
 
225  Id. ¶ 69. 
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a balance of probabilities test.226 Nevertheless, distinguishing the practices that, on a 
balance of probabilities following an abstract/categorical analysis, are likely to produce 
such an effect from those that are not likely to achieve exclusion is still an unclear test. 
Furthermore, the case law on tying and loyalty rebates might seem to be in 
conflict with the more flexible position on refusals to deal adopted by the ECJ in 
Bronner. The court took a restrictive view in this case of the obligation of a dominant 
undertaking to grant competitors access to its facilities.227 Bronner, a publisher of a 
newspaper in Austria, had refused access to a competing newspaper to the nationwide 
home-delivery scheme it had established. The court stressed that the refusal must “be 
likely to eliminate all competition” on the part of the competitor requesting access, that 
access should be indispensable and not only make it harder for the requesting undertaking 
to compete, and that it should not be capable of being objectively justified.228 With regard 
to the indispensability condition, the court held that access would have been 
indispensable only if it was not economically viable to create a home-delivery system for 
a newspaper with a comparable circulation to the dominant firm’s.229  
One could argue that the conditions in Bronner set the outer boundaries of the 
special responsibility of a dominant firm and consequently of the corresponding duty, 
                                                 
226  On the terminology (e.g., likely, capable or tend to restrict competition) used by 
the different cases of the CFI and the ECJ in the context of a multilingual legal system, 
see Klaus Pfeiffer, Reflections on British Airways v. Comm’n, 28 EUR. COMPETITION L. 
REV. 597, 599 (2007). 
 
227  Case C-7/97, Oscar Bronner GmbH & Co. KG v. Mediaprint Zeiturgs-und 
Zeitschriftenverlag GmbH & Co., KG, 1998 E.C.R. I-7791 (Eur. Ct. Justice). 
 
228  Id. ¶ 41. 
 
229  Id. ¶¶ 45–46. 
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under Article 82, to abstain from any action that would be likely to exclude rivals from 
the market. The excluded rival would be granted access only if it would be impossible for 
an undertaking with a comparable output to the dominant firm to develop such facility—
that is, the facility should be indispensable. The indispensability test laid down by the 
ECJ and Advocate General Jacobs in Bronner requires the plaintiff to prove that it would 
not be economically viable for a competitor with a comparable turnover to create the 
facilities/input to which his rivals are requesting access. The test integrates a (not yet) 
equally efficient competitor test, as it is only if the input or facility would not be 
economically viable,230 “in the sense that it would not generate enough revenue to cover 
its costs”231 that a duty to deal may be imposed under Article 82. The test involves 
comparing relevant costs and revenues. The dominant firm’s costs in running the 
upstream facility are employed as the basis for comparison for the evaluation of the costs, 
hence the implicit introduction of an equally efficient competitor test. 
Drawing on this case law, Jean-Yves Art and Gregory McCurdy argue that the 
Microsoft bundling case could fit in the refusal to supply category and that it should be 
examined under the limiting principles of Bronner.232 They assert that the main issue 
involved in the bundling part of the case was that by offering to OEMs only a bundled 
version of Windows and WMP, Microsoft had effectively denied its rivals in the media 
player market access to the appropriate “distribution services” of the OEMs. The OEMs 
                                                 
230  Id. ¶¶ 43–46; id. ¶ 68 (opinion of Advocate General Jacobs). 
 
231  Discussion Paper, supra note 70, ¶ 229. 
 
232  Jean-Yves Art & Gregory V.S. McCurdy, The European Commission’s Media 
Player Remedy in Its Microsoft Decision: Compulsory Code Removal Despite the 
Absence of Tying or Foreclosure, 25 EUR. COMPETITION L. REV. 694, 703–07 (2004). 
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would operate in this case as intermediaries between the market players in the tied 
product market and the final consumers. Art and McCurdy’s argument is that the 
application of the Bronner principles in the factual situation of Microsoft would not have 
led to an infringement of Article 82 because distribution of the player in Windows was 
not indispensable and that Internet downloading was a feasible and only “less 
advantageous” distribution channel. 
There are at least two problems with this conclusion. First, even if the Bronner 
conditions applied in this case, it is not clear that they would not have led to the finding 
of an infringement. Indispensability of access is measured with reference to the 
possibility of creating an economically viable distribution channel. It remains to be seen 
if Internet downloading is an economically viable alternative to access to the OEMs to 
bring the product to the attention of the final consumers. Second, in Bronner, the 
dominant firm was refusing access to a facility it owned, which was the product of its 
own investment and efforts.233 The refusal of access was therefore a legitimate exercise 
of the undertaking’s property rights. Thus, if we follow Art and McCurdy’s arguments, 
Microsoft’s refusal to supply to its rivals access to the distribution services of the OEMs 
could not be considered as the legitimate exercise of a property right for the simple 
reason that the OEMs were not owned by Microsoft and there was no exclusive contract 
that linked the OEMs to Microsoft.234 But how is it possible to explain the fact that for 
                                                 
233  See also, Case C-552/03, Unilever Best Foods (Ireland) Ltd. v. Commission, 
2006 E.C.R. I-9091, ¶ 137 (Eur. Ct. Justice). (favoring this interpretation of Bronner 
Case C-7/97, Eur. Ct. Justice)  
 
234  The result would not have been different in EC competition law if Microsoft 
decided to integrate vertically (and to own OEMs). This situation could have been 
analyzed as a case of refusal to supply to existing customers (in the sense that competing 
media players would not have access to OEMs that would have been open to them 
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refusals to deal there is no presumption of anticompetitive effects, under the first prong of 
the abuse of dominance test, while there is one for bundling or loyalty rebates? 
It is possible to understand the EC abuse test by referring to two important 
factors: first, the idea that dominant firms have a special responsibility in preserving 
competition;235 and second, but closely linked to the first factor, the importance of the 
objective of consumer sovereignty in EC competition law.  
The concept of special responsibility means that dominant firms’ commercial 
freedom is restricted in comparison to non-dominant undertakings. The latter remain free 
to use commercial practices that are different from those governing normal competition. 
The focus of the test seems to be the protection of “free competition” or “complete 
competition” and “open markets.”236 The underlying theoretical assumption is that rivalry 
brings variety in the marketplace, in the sense that entrepreneurs test a certain number of 
                                                                                                                                                 
otherwise) and judged under the strict standards of Commercial Solvents. See Joined 
cases 6 and 7/73, Instituto Chemioterapico Italiano Spa & Commercial Solvents Corp. v. 
Comm’n, 1974 E.C.R. 223 (Eur. Ct. Justice). 
 
235  Or this may be seen as the “system of variable thresholds” (“System beweglicher 
Schranken,” i.e., the concept that behavior which may be unproblematic for competition 
law purposes in the hands of a firm in a competitive market need not be harmless in the 
hands of a dominant firm). See Wernhard Möschel, Art. 82 EGV, in WETTBEWERBSRECHT 
EG TEIL I 534, ¶ 120 (Ulrich Immenga & Ernst-Joachim Mestmäcker eds., 4th ed. 2007); 
Wernhard Möschel, GWB § 19, in WETTBEWERBSRECHT EG TEIL I, supra. But see 
VOLKER EMMERICH, KARTELLRECHT § 27, ¶ 63 (10th ed. 2006). 
 
236  Walter Eucken, Die Wettbewerbsordnung und ihre Verwirklichung [The 
Competitive Order and Its Implementation], 2 ORDO, JAHRBUCH FÜR DIE ORDNUNG VON 
WIRTSCHAFT UND GESELLSHEFT 1–99 (1949), translated in Walter Eucken, The 
Competitive Order and Its Implementation, 2 COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L 219 (2006). 
More recently, see Jürgen Basedow, Konsumentenwohlfahrt und Effizienz – Neue 
Leitbilder der Wettbewerbspolitik?, 57 WIRTSCHAFT UND WETTBEWERB 712 (2007); C. 
Christian von Weizsäcker, Konsumentenwohlfahrt und Wettbewerbsfreiheit: Über den 
tieferen Sinn des “Economic Approach,” 57 WIRTSCHAFT UND WETTBEWERB 1078 
(2007).  
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hypotheses on the parameters of the “product” (price, quality, service, and so on) that 
they think will satisfy consumers’ demands; variety ultimately preserves the choice of the 
consumers and their ability to test the solutions adopted by the entrepreneurs.237 The 
variety of “products” (or solutions suggested by the entrepreneurs) therefore are not the 
outcome of the “natural” selection process of the marketplace but result from a process of 
“artificial selection” by formal and informal institutions that “channel the competitive 
process and give it a certain direction” and select “at the same time, artificially, which 
entrepreneurial hypotheses will survive.”238 Dominant firms are in a position to influence 
directly the market activities of other economic agents and therefore may constitute an 
informal institution that can indirectly affect the ultimate choice of the consumers.239 
Their freedom of action is restricted to “performance competition,” offering better terms 
to consumers, and does not extend to “impediment competition,” where commercial 
practices such as loyalty rebates or predatory pricing hinder the ability of rivals to 
                                                 
237  CHRIS MANTZAVINOS, INDIVIDUALS, INSTITUTIONS, AND MARKETS 193–203 
(2001). This conception of competition as a process of rivalry rather than as a market 
equilibrium (neoclassical theory) is not very different from that developed by the Old-
Institutionalist School in the United States and that of John M. Clark. See J.M. Clark, 
Competition and the Objectives of Government Policy, in MONOPOLY AND COMPETITION 
AND THEIR REGULATION 317, 326 (Edward H. Chamberlin ed., 1954). However, although 
these concepts of competition are different from “perfect competition,” they are not 
unrelated. See John Vickers, Concepts of Competition, 47 OXFORD ECON. PAPERS 1, 5, 6–
7 (1995). 
 
238  MANTZAVINOS, supra note 232, at 174. 
 
239  See recent literature on market manipulation, providing evidence that firms take 
advantage of the specific characteristics of consumers and manipulate their cognitive 
biases. See, e.g., Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: 
Some Evidence of Market Manipulation, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1420 (1999). 
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compete, in other words, to offer their own set of solutions to the essential problem of 
productive activity: what “products” do the consumers prefer?240 
  The concept of special responsibility of dominant firms may be explained by the 
emphasis of EC competition law on consumer sovereignty, rather than on the concept of 
consumer welfare as such. Consumer sovereignty can be preserved by the ability of 
consumers to influence price, quality, variety, and subsequently the competitive (or 
innovation) process according to their own preferences.241 The emphasis on the special 
responsibility of dominant firms to protect the competitive process should therefore be 
understood as a proxy for consumer sovereignty: open and contestable markets are a 
prerequisite for the empowerment of consumers.  
  This doctrine is not antithetical to modern economic thinking. It may not always 
be compatible with mainstream neoclassical economic theory, but one should not forget 
                                                 
240  The distinction between “performance competition” and “impediment 
competition” was suggested as an element distinguishing abusive from non-abusive 
practices by professor Peter Ulmer of the University of Heidelberg and was influential in 
the enforcement of the German Act Against Restraints of Competition (GWB). DAVID J. 
GERBER, LAW AND COMPETITION IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY EUROPE: PROTECTING 
PROMETHEUS 313 (1998) (citing PETER ULMER, SCHRANKEN ZULÄSSIGEN 
WETTTBEWERBS MARKTBEHERRSCHENDER UNTERNEHMEN (1977)); see also Kallaugher 
& Sher, supra note 59, at 269; Liza Lovdahl Gormsen, Article 82 EC: Where Are We 
Coming from and Where Are We Going to?, 2(2) COMPETITION L. REV. 5, 25 (March 
2006) For a criticism from other ordo-liberals of the “impediment competition” concept, 
see Erich Hoppmann, Behinderungsmissbrauch und Nichtleistungswettbewerb, 30 
WIRTSCHAFT UND WETTBEWERB 811 (1980); Möschel, GWB § 19, supra note 230, ¶¶ 
102–105; EMMERICH, supra note 230, § 27, ¶ 68. 
 
241  For another formulation of this principle see Neil W. Averitt & Robert H. Lande, 
Consumer Sovereignty: A Unified Theory of Antitrust and Consumer Protection Law, 65 
ANTITRUST L.J. 713, 715 (1997) (“[C]onsumer sovereignty is . . . the set of societal 
arrangements that causes that economy to act primarily in response to the aggregate 
signals of consumer demand, rather than in response to government directives or the 
preferences of individual businesses.”). 
 
 
 
89 
that economic theory is in constant evolution. What was considered as mainstream in the 
past may well be marginalized in the future especially in light of recent economic turmoil 
and the causes attributed to it. Recent economic thinking has cast doubt on several 
assumptions and the analytical framework of neoclassical price theory. Behavioral law 
and economics challenges the premise of perfect rationality that permeates much of 
neoclassical economic analysis. This has profound implications for antitrust policy and 
doctrine.242 Behavioral economists’ emphasis on bounded rationality may explain much 
of this behavior and could lead to different prescriptions for public policy, even, in some 
circumstances, to more active antitrust enforcement.  
 Recent evolutionary thinking on the theory of consumer behavior has also 
challenged the neoclassical price theory assumption that consumers act upon exogenously 
given preferences. Consumers are influenced in their decisions by “the context of choice, 
defined by the set of options under consideration. In particular, the addition and removal 
of options from the offered set can influence people’s preferences among options that 
were available all along.”243 The firms with their marketing activities may, for example, 
shape endogenously consumer preferences by establishing an artificial selection process.  
 Neoclassical economic theory operates on the assumption that preferences are 
revealed by market behavior244 and ignores the psychological aspect of the formation of 
                                                 
242  See Maurice E. Stucke, Behavioral Economists at the Gate: Antitrust in the 
Twenty-First Century, 38 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 513 (2007); Avishalom Tor, Illuminating a 
Behaviorally Informed Approach to Antitrust Law: The Case of Predatory Pricing, 
ANTITRUST, Fall 2003, at 52. 
 
243  Eldar Shafir, Itamar Simonson & Amos Tversky, Reason-based Choice, 49 
COGNITION 11, 21 (1993). 
 
244  Paul A. Samuelson, Consumption Theory in Terms of Revealed Preference, 15 
ECONOMICA 243, 243 (1948). 
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these preferences. Recent studies have challenged this assumption: “preferences are 
actually constructed — not merely revealed.”245 A greater focus on consumer sovereignty 
may, in some cases, lead to more intensive competition law intervention to establish the 
parameters of independent consumer choice246 and specific presumptions against 
commercial practices that deny the sovereignty of consumer choice. 
  It follows that certain commercial practices (that we will call coercive abuses) are 
more likely than others to affect the competitive process by interfering with the sovereign 
decision of the consumer in the choice of the bundle of the parameters of a product. This 
category regroups practices, such as bundling (tying, multi-product rebates) and 
conditional rebates, which interfere with an established consumption trend and tend to 
influence it to the benefit of the dominant firm. By employing these practices, the 
dominant firms aim to exclude rivals by increasing their costs or by denying them the 
necessary economies of scale in the distribution of their products. They do not compete 
on the merits by offering better quality parameters of the specific product bundle and they 
attempt to interfere with the consumers’ final choice of the entrepreneurial hypothesis 
that will survive. In other words, the dominant company will not respond to consumer 
preferences on the parameters of the bundle of a product and/or service but will attempt 
to reduce consumer sovereignty by coercing or inducing the intermediaries to reject 
competing bundles of products and/or services, therefore denying the final consumers the 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
245  Shafir et al., supra note 238, at 34. 
 
246  For a recent setting of the theoretical foundation of state intervention to protect 
consumer choice, see Cass R. Sunstein & Richard H. Thaler, Libertarian Paternalism Is 
Not an Oxymoron, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1159 (2003), and Cass R. Sunstein & Richard H. 
Thaler, Libertarian Paternalism, 93 AM. ECON. REV. 175 (2003). 
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opportunity to influence the market selection process according to their own preferences. 
This implies that the conduct would require at least the passive assistance or participation 
of intermediaries to achieve its effects.247 The antitrust standard/test applicable in this 
case should be consistent with the standard applied in the context of Article 81 for 
vertical restraints that affect interbrand competition, as it is generally difficult to 
distinguish between these two forms of coercive practice in terms of anticompetitive 
effects. Hence, the courts should not apply in this case a predatory or equally efficient 
competitor test, since the conduct of the dominant undertaking is of the nature to limit 
consumer sovereignty. The risk of false negatives is, in this instance, reduced as there is a 
clear indication that the dominant undertaking’s conduct affects the competitive process. 
There is, however, an important ambiguity underlying this entire approach: the 
identification of the practices that are deemed “abnormal” or coercive, if we employ this 
terminology. In theory, many commercial practices may have the effect to exclude rivals 
from the market or substantially to hinder their ability to compete.248 The test is 
                                                 
247  If the assistance is active that will amount to an agreement not a unilateral 
practice. See Ioannis Lianos, Collusion in Vertical Relations Under Article 81 EC, 45 
COMMON MKT. L. REV. 1027 (2008). 
 
248  See Case C-95/04, British Airways plc v. Comm’n, 2007 E.C.R. I-2331, ¶ 68 
(Eur. Ct. Justice) (To determine if there is exclusionary effect one should determine 
whether the dominant firm’s conduct/practices are “capable, first, of making market entry 
very difficult or impossible for competitors of the undertaking in a dominant position 
and, secondly, of making it more difficult or impossible for its co-contractors to choose 
between various sources of supply or commercial partners”). This seems to set the 
standard of proof too high. Compare, however, the French version of the decision: “[I]l 
convient, d’abord, de vérifier si ces rabais ou primes peuvent produire un effet 
d’éviction, c’est-à-dire s’ils sont à même, d’une part, de rendre plus difficile, voire 
impossible, l’accès au marché pour les concurrents de l’entreprise en position dominante 
et, d’autre part, de rendre plus difficile, voire impossible, pour ses cocontractants, le 
choix entre plusieurs sources d’approvisionnement ou partenaires commerciaux.” Id. 
(emphasis added), available at http://curia.europa.eu/jurisp/cgi-bin/form.pl?lang=fr 
(search by case number under “Numéro d’affaire”) (summary translation: It is sufficient 
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unworkable without a limiting principle that could provide dominant undertakings the 
ability to identify, ex ante, if their commercial practices would be considered illegal. This 
is where recourse to an effects-based approaches makes a difference. 
In an effects-based approach, the identification of a specific practice as coercive 
or abnormal should not lead to a presumption of anticompetitive effects and consumer 
harm. It only indicates that the fact-finder should examine the existence of consumer 
harm according to a different decision procedure than non-coercive purely unilateral 
abuses, such as refusals to deal.249 The latter are subject to a test of indispensability (as 
access is provided only if the resource is considered indispensable for the continuation of 
the activity of the excluded undertaking)250 or of a price/cost test measuring the relative 
efficiency of the excluded or marginalized undertaking as a filter for a more detailed 
competition law assessment. There is no such filter for coercive abuses, as in this case 
there is a greater likelihood that consumer sovereignty is affected. However, it is only if 
there is an identifiable consumer detriment, either direct (empirically verified) or indirect 
(involving a plausible theory of consumer harm), that the practice will be found contrary 
                                                                                                                                                 
for Article 82 to apply that market access for the competitors became more difficult or [in 
certain cases] impossible.). 
 
249  There is no doubt that the risk of false positives is higher if antitrust law 
intervenes in the unilateral decisions of dominant firms to lower the prices of a product, 
such as unconditional single product discounts/rebates, or to set other dimensions of a 
product transaction (quality, quantity of products sold, their commercial partner) or 
finally to pursue legal proceedings against a competitor. These are practices that are 
purely unilateral in their form and essence, as they do not require for their success the 
assistance or contribution of other market players situated in the downstream or upstream 
market. The assumption is that, absent evidence of the contrary, the dominant 
undertaking engages in this conduct without having the objective or intent to affect the 
principle of consumer sovereignty. 
 
250  See supra text accompanying notes 225–226.  
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to Article 82. Identifiable efficiency gains, such as lower costs or better quality inputs 
that are likely to be passed on to final consumers, should be able to mitigate the 
anticompetitive effects. This balancing test (cost-benefit analysis) will ensure that 
practices that could enhance consumer sovereignty in the long run are not prohibited 
under Article 82, without a more careful analysis of their effects on final consumers.  
The comparative analysis of the Michelin II and the British Airways rebates cases 
may provide an example of how a form-based approach could be different from a more 
effects-based test. In Michelin II, the CFI spent a number of paragraphs examining 
whether the specific target rebate scheme could be characterized as loyalty inducing, 
which did not require the court to analyze the concrete effects of the specific scheme on 
consumers. The CFI conducted instead an abstract/categorical analysis of the facts of the 
case to find out if the quantity rebate system, put in place by Michelin, fit the 
characterization of “loyalty inducing” rebates.251 The CFI considered that quantity 
rebates that are justified by a “countervailing advantage” that is “economically justified” 
do not constitute in general loyalty inducing rebates and therefore would escape the 
prohibition of Article 82.252 The court subjected this economic justification of the rebate 
to a high standard of proof,253 and, in the absence of an objective justification, the CFI 
concluded that the rebate system was loyalty inducing.254 As a result of its loyalty-
                                                 
251  Case T-203/01, Manufacture Française des Pneumatiques Michelin v. Comm’n 
(Michelin II), 2003 E.C.R. II-4071, ¶ 95 (Ct. First Instance). The court concluded that the 
rebate scheme offered by Michelin “has the characteristics of a loyalty-inducing discount 
system.” 
 
252  Id. ¶ 100. 
 
253  Id. ¶¶ 108–09. 
 
254  Id. ¶ 113. 
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inducing character, the quantity rebate scheme “limited the dealers’ choice of supplier 
and made access to the market more difficult for competitors.”255 The anticompetitive 
effect of this practice was thus presumed from the simple characterization of the rebate 
scheme as loyalty inducing without any analysis of anticompetitive effects and possible 
consumer detriment. One could compare this approach to a quasi-per se illegality test for 
loyalty-inducing rebates. 
The position of the CFI, confirmed by the ECJ, seems to have slightly evolved in 
British Airways towards a more flexible approach in the form-based/effects-based 
continuum. First, the court found that even if the specific schemes had a “fidelity-
building” effect, they could escape the application of Article 82 if they were based on an 
“economically justified consideration.”256 It would be possible for the dominant 
undertaking to justify these fidelity-inducing rebates by referring to efficiency 
justifications.257 The consideration by the CFI of the existence of objective economic 
justifications did not aim to determine whether the rebate scheme has a loyalty inducing 
effect, as it was the case in Michelin II, but followed the characterization step of the 
rebate scheme as having a fidelity-building character.258 Thus, it formed part of the 
second prong of the abuse test, the assessment of anticompetitive foreclosure under a cost 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
255  Id. ¶¶ 110, 240. 
 
256  Case T-219/99, British Airways plc v. Comm’n, 2003 E.C.R. II-5917, ¶ 271 (Ct. 
First Instance). 
 
257  Id. ¶ 280. This  included efficiency gains. 
 
258  See ALISON JONES & BRENDA SUFRIN, EC COMPETITION LAW 504 (3d ed. 2008). 
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benefit analysis test.259 Moreover, the second prong of the abuse test may include 
countervailing efficiency gains that benefit consumers.260 In British Airways, CFI 
concluded that the loyalty rebates schemes should not only be examined under the first 
prong of the abuse test, but instead that the competition assessment should include an 
analysis of their anticompetitive effects under the second part of the test. This is closer to 
a structured rule of reason approach than to a quasi-per se illegality rule. The ECJ 
confirmed the approach of the CFI in British Airways and adopted a standard resembling 
to a structured rule of reason approach: 
It has to be determined whether the exclusionary effect arising from such a 
system, which is disadvantageous for competition, may be 
counterbalanced, or outweighed, by advantages in terms of efficiency 
which also benefit the consumer. If the exclusionary effect of that system 
bears no relation to advantages for the market and consumers, or if it goes 
beyond what is necessary in order to attain those advantages, that system 
must be regarded as an abuse.261 
 
Second, in contrast to Michelin II, the court emphasized the existence of a 
consumer prejudice, an indication that it placed its analysis under the second prong of the 
abuse test under Article 82 EC.262 The consideration of anticompetitive effects and 
consumer harm constitutes the main difference between the decision of the CFI in 
                                                 
259  One could refer to this step as an equivalent to an Article 81(3) defense. Article 
81 identifies two analytical steps: the prohibition principle of article 81(1), which is a 
quick look establishing the existence of anticompetitive effects, and the exception 
principle of article 81(3), which integrates a more detailed assessment of the practice 
under a cost benefit to consumers test. No such distinction is however mentioned in the 
context of Article 82. 
 
260  British Airways, 2003 E.C.R. II-5917, ¶¶ 279–80 (not just public policy type of 
justifications). 
 
261  Case C-95/04, British Airways plc v. Comm’n, 2007 E.C.R. I-2331, ¶ 86 (Eur. 
Ct. Justice). 
 
262  Id. ¶ 106. 
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Michelin II and that of the ECJ in British Airways. Nonetheless, examining the existence 
of exclusionary effects does not necessarily mean that evidence of anticompetitive effects 
and consumer detriment is required. In other words, the analysis of possible economic 
justifications of a discount with a fidelity-building effect does not necessarily amount to 
the adoption of a full effects-based approach that would require empirical evidence of 
actual consumer prejudice. 
In Microsoft, the European Commission was constrained by the  previous case 
law of the Court in Hilti and in Tetra Pak II. Instead of basing its decision on the 
traditional theory of tying, which advocates a quasi-per se illegality test if the undertaking 
employing the tying practice holds a dominant position (thus inferring anticompetitive 
foreclosure from these two elements), the Commission proceeded to the second prong of 
the abuse test: 
[T]here are indeed circumstances relating to the tying of WMP which 
warrant a closer examination of the effects that tying has on competition in 
this case. While in classical tying cases, the Commission and the Courts 
considered the foreclosure effect for competing vendors to be 
demonstrated by the bundling of a separate product with the dominant 
product, in the case at issue, users can and do to a certain extent obtain 
third party media players through the Internet, sometimes for free. There 
are therefore indeed good reasons not to assume without further analysis 
that tying WMP constitutes conduct which by its very nature is liable to 
foreclose competition.263 
 
The Commission thus applied a structured rule of reason approach by examining the 
anticompetitive effects of the practice, including the efficiency justifications argued by 
Microsoft and Microsoft’s incentives to foreclose, before concluding that Microsoft’s 
conduct infringed Article 82.  
                                                 
263  Microsoft Comm’n Decision, supra note 3, ¶ 841. 
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The CFI accepted the position of the Commission, but used language that limits 
the scope of the structured rule of reason approach in situations of technological tying. 
The court mentioned that “while it is true that neither [the] provision nor, more generally, 
Article 82 EC as a whole contains any reference to the anti-competitive effect of 
bundling, the fact remains that, in principle, conduct will be regarded as abusive only if it 
is capable of restricting competition.”264 The court referred to Michelin II265 to 
substantiate this point, a case standing for the proposition that “establishing the anti-
competitive object and the anti-competitive effect are one and the same thing.”266 The 
following paragraph of the Microsoft decision also illustrates the ambivalence of the 
CFI’s approach with regard to the applicable antitrust standard for tying: 
 
[T]he applicant cannot claim that the Commission relied on a new and 
highly speculative theory to reach the conclusion that a foreclosure effect 
exists in the present case. As indicated at recital 841 to the contested 
decision, the Commission considered that, in light of the specific 
circumstances of the present case, it could not merely assume, as it 
normally does in cases of abusive tying, that the tying of a specific product 
and a dominant product has by its nature a foreclosure effect. The 
Commission therefore examined more closely the actual effects which the 
bundling had already had on the streaming media player market and also 
the way in which that market was likely to evolve.267 
 
It follows that although the CFI did not reject the structured rule of reason 
approach of the Commission with regard to technical tying, it maintained its previous 
                                                 
264  Case T-201/04, Microsoft Corp. v. Comm’n, 2007 E.C.R. II-3601, ¶ 867 (Ct. 
First Instance). 
 
265  Case T-203/01, Manufacture Française des Pneumatiques Michelin v. Comm’n 
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266  Id. ¶ 241. 
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quasi per se illegality approach for all other forms of bundling (essentially contractual 
tying). In the French version of the same paragraph, the CFI even uses the expression 
“effet d’exclusion sur le marché per se” (bundling of two products by a dominant 
undertaking leads to an exclusionary effect per se) when it refers to the “normal” 
approach for abusive tying cases. 
In sum, in examining the existence of the fourth step of a tying claim,268 the CFI 
did not presume that there was foreclosure of competition from the simple fact that a 
dominant undertaking tied two distinct products; instead, it found that one had to 
determine if the foreclosure of competitors led to anticompetitive effects and if there 
were objective justifications (efficiencies). It seems, therefore, that the analysis of 
objective (or efficiency) justifications constitutes a necessary complement to the analysis 
of the existence of an anticompetitive foreclosure. This in turn implicitly injects a 
structured rule of reason approach into the analysis of technological tying, which raises 
the issue of who has the burden of proof of the anticompetitive effects and objective 
justifications (burden of proof) and how much evidence is required (standard of proof).  
The court explained the position clearly with regard to the issue of the burden of 
proof: 
 
[A]lthough the burden of proof of the existence of the circumstances that 
constitute an infringement of Article 82 EC is borne by the Commission, it 
is for the dominant undertaking concerned, and not for the Commission, 
before the end of the administrative procedure, to raise any plea of 
objective justification and to support it with arguments and evidence. It 
then falls to the Commission, where it proposes to make a finding of an 
abuse of a dominant position, to show that the arguments and evidence 
relied on by the undertaking cannot prevail and, accordingly, that the 
justification put forward cannot be accepted.269 
                                                 
268  Id. ¶ 852 (referring to ¶ 842). 
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The CFI seems to distinguish between the legal burden of proof that is borne by 
the plaintiff and the evidentiary burden of proof of objective justifications that is borne by 
the defendant. If the defendant raises these objective justifications, instead- the burden 
shifts to the plaintiff. The position is not very different from that prevailing in U.S. 
antitrust law.270 
There are, however, important dissimilarities with regard to the standard of proof 
for objective justifications—that is, the amount of evidence required by the defendant to 
substantiate efficiency gains. The Commission’s Guidance subjects objective 
justifications to four cumulative requirements, similar to those required for the 
application of Article 81(3):  
[T]he dominant undertaking will generally be expected to demonstrate, 
with a sufficient degree of probability, and on the basis of verifiable 
evidence, that the following cumulative conditions are fulfilled: 
- the efficiencies have been, or are likely to be, realised as a result 
of the conduct. They may, for example, include technical 
improvements in the quality of goods, or a reduction in the cost of 
production or distribution; 
- the conduct is indispensable to the realisation of those 
efficiencies: there must be no less anti-competitive alternatives to 
the conduct that are capable of producing the same efficiencies; 
- the likely efficiencies brought about by the conduct outweigh any 
likely negative effects on competition and consumer welfare in the 
affected markets; 
- the conduct does not eliminate effective competition, by 
removing all or most existing sources of actual or potential 
competition.271 
 
The Commission’s Guidance  employs a slightly different formulation of the third 
requirement, in comparison to the text of Article 81(3), by not explicitly requiring that “a 
fair share of the resulting benefit” be passed on to consumers. However, this requirement 
                                                 
270  See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 59 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
271  Guidance, supra note 70, ¶ 30 (footnote omitted). 
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was interpreted restrictively by the Guidelines on Article 81(3), paragraph 85 (the net 
effect of the agreement must at least be neutral from the point of view of those consumers 
directly or likely affected by the agreement). The requirement in the Commission’s 
Guidance that “the likely efficiencies brought about by the conduct outweigh any likely 
negative effects on competition and consumer welfare in the affected markets” has the 
same meaning.272 According to the Guidance, “[i]t is incumbent upon the dominant 
undertaking to provide all the evidence necessary to demonstrate that the conduct 
concerned is objectively justified,” the Commission making “the ultimate assessment of 
whether the conduct concerned is not objectively necessary and, based on a weighing-up 
of any apparent anti-competitive effects against any advanced and substantiated 
efficiencies, is likely to result in consumer harm.”273  
In practice, it would be very difficult for a dominant undertaking to prove the 
existence of objective justifications, the control and the conditions for such a defense 
being at least as restrictive as the conditions of Article 81(3).274 In contrast, the standard 
of proof for anticompetitive foreclosure (and consumer harm) is particularly low, as there 
is no need to prove the existence of an actual or direct consumer detriment.275 There is, 
thus, an important asymmetry between the standard of proof that is required from the 
plaintiff and the standard of proof required by the defendant, to the benefit of the former. 
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This asymmetry of the standard of proof in EC competition law is the principal 
reason why it is normatively undesirable to adopt a presumption of consumer harm when 
an undertaking with a dominant position employs tying/bundling practices, subject to the 
assessment of efficiency justifications.276 It is true that the single monopoly profit 
theorem, which constitutes the Chicago school’s foundation stone, applies only in certain 
restrictive conditions and is therefore unfit for policy prescription. However, relying only 
on market power and absence of objective justifications277 may increase the risk of false 
positives because of the asymmetry of the standard of proof between anticompetitive 
effects and objective justifications in EC competition law. Thus, because of this specific 
asymmetry of the standard of proof, the requirement of anticompetitive foreclosure, on 
top of market power/dominant position, may reduce the risk of over-inclusive antitrust 
standards for tying/bundling practices. This approach will be compatible with the 
emphasis given by EC competition law on consumer sovereignty and competition as a 
process of rivalry rather than on consumer surplus and competition as an efficient 
outcome, which explains the first prong of the abuse test in Article 82. The plaintiff 
should bring evidence that the competitors will be excluded or marginalized as a 
consequence of the tying/bundling practice. It is true that this requirement will not take 
into account two of the “power effects” of tying, which are that “tying can profitably 
allow price discrimination among buyers of the tying product”278 and that tying can 
                                                 
276  See, for such a proposal, Elhauge, supra note 8, at 48–57. 
 
277  On the distinction between competition as a process of rivalry, and competition 
as an efficient outcome, see Mark Blaug, The Fundamental Theorems of Modern Welfare 
Economics, Historically Contemplated, 39 HIST. POL. ECON. 185 (2007). 
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“profitably permit price discrimination across buyers of both products.”279 In contrast to 
Section 2 of the Sherman Act, Article 82 does not, however, prohibit the acquisition or 
exercise of market power but only its abuse. Furthermore, price discrimination constitutes 
a distinct claim from tying of an abuse of a dominant position under Article 82, with 
specific requirements for its application. In conclusion, proof of foreclosure of rivals 
should form a necessary step of the analysis of tying/bundling or loyalty rebates. But is it 
a sufficient condition for inferring consumer harm? 
B. WHEN DOES THE FORECLOSURE OF A COMPETITOR PRODUCE CONSUMER HARM? 
 
Proving anticompetitive foreclosure requires an analysis of the concrete effects of 
the practice adopted by the alleged monopolist (or dominant firm). It is therefore 
necessary to analyze how the specific practice may affect consumers. Just excluding or 
foreclosing competitors is not sufficient to substantiate a claim of anticompetitive 
foreclosure.280 Something more is required. This is an assertion to which both EC and 
U.S. antitrust law would agree, at least for technological (technical) tying. There is, 
however, a significant divergence between the European and the U.S. approach with 
regard to these additional elements that may substantiate a finding of anticompetitive 
foreclosure. The role and the standard of proof of objective (or efficiency) justifications 
                                                 
279  Id. at 7. 
 
280  This is particularly clear in the recent Commission Notice on the Guidelines on 
the Assessment of Non-Horizontal Mergers Under the Council Regulation on the Control 
of Concentrations Between Undertakings, 2008 O.J. (C 265) 6, where the Commission 
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were examined in the previous section. We will now focus our analysis on two other 
factors considered: the anticompetitive harm inquiry and the role of a consumer 
detriment. 
The denial of market access to rivals does not by itself constitute evidence of 
anticompetitive foreclosure, but only a starting point for the analysis of exclusionary 
abuses. Both EC and U.S. antitrust law require a showing of anticompetitive harm that 
links the exclusion of the competitors to the existence of a consumer detriment or to a 
negative consumer welfare effect. “Leveraging” constitutes an anticompetitive harm in 
Europe, although it seems to be controversial in the United States. Anticompetitive 
leveraging was one of the main theories of harm advanced by the Commission in the 
Microsoft case.281 The CFI also relied on the same theory of anticompetitive harm282 and 
confirmed, on this basis, the substantial fine imposed by the Commission.283 
One could compare the approach of the Commission and the CFI with that of the 
U.S. case against Microsoft, where the separate claim of monopoly leveraging was 
dismissed by Judge Jackson of the D.C. District Court.284 Although the Supreme Court 
                                                 
281  Microsoft Comm’n Decision, supra note 3, ¶ 982. 
 
282  Case T-201/04, Microsoft Corp. v. Comm’n, 2007 E.C.R. II-3601, ¶¶ 1344, 1347 
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revived a version of the leverage theory in Eastman Kodak,285 it has recently held in 
Trinko that for a leverage claim to succeed there must be a “‘dangerous probability of 
success’ in monopolizing a second market.”286 The existence of market power in an 
adjacent market does not seem to be a requirement for the application of the leverage 
theory in Europe.287 Consequently, the standard of proof for leverage claims is higher in 
the United States than in Europe.288 
The EC and U.S. approaches also diverge with respect to the analysis of the 
anticompetitive effects. The Commission claimed in its Microsoft decision that the tying 
of WMP had not only foreclosed competition in the media players market,289 but had also 
“spillover effects on competition in related products such as media encoding and 
management software (often server-side),” as well as “in client PC operating systems for 
                                                 
285  See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 497 (1992). 
 
286  Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 
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which media players compatible with quality content are an important application.”290 
The Commission found the following anticompetitive effects: 
–  Microsoft uses Windows as a distribution channel to ensure for itself a 
significant competitive advantage on the media players market; 
 
–  because of the bundling, Microsoft’s competitors are a priori at a 
disadvantage even if their products are inherently better than 
Windows Media Player; 
 
–  Microsoft interferes with the normal competitive process which would 
benefit users by ensuring quicker cycles of innovation as a 
consequence of unfettered competition on the merits; 
 
–  the bundling increases the content and applications barriers to entry, 
which protect Windows, and facilitates the erection of such barriers 
for Windows Media Player;  
 
–  Microsoft shields itself from effective competition from vendors of 
potentially more efficient media players who could challenge its 
position, and thus reduces the talent and capital invested in innovation 
of media players; 
 
–  by means of the bundling, Microsoft may expand its position in 
adjacent media-related software markets and weaken effective 
competition, to the detriment of consumers; 
 
–  by means of the bundling, Microsoft sends signals which deter 
innovation in any technologies in which it might conceivably take an 
interest and which it might tie with Windows in the future.291 
 
The CFI conducted a limited analysis of the alleged anticompetitive effects. This is 
normal practice as Article 230292institutes a limited control of the legality of the 
Commission’s decisions and the intensity of the judicial review of the economic 
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reasoning of the Commission is necessarily restricted.293 The CFI concluded that “there 
was a reasonable likelihood that tying Windows and Windows Media Player would lead 
to a lessening of competition so that the maintenance of an effective competition 
structure would not be ensured in the foreseeable future.”294 The CFI used the expression 
“reasonable likelihood” of anticompetitive effects, instead of the expression “capable of 
having” anticompetitive effects, which it had used in previous decisions.295 It also used 
the expression “actual effects” when it referred to the Commission’s analysis of the 
anticompetitive effects of bundling.296 
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A closer look at the alleged anticompetitive effects and their analysis by the court 
reveals though that most of these negative effects on consumers were indirect and 
emanated from the fact that Microsoft — as compared with its media player rivals — 
benefited from an “unparalleled advantage with respect to the distribution of its product” 
that “inevitably had significant consequences for the structure of competition” on the 
streaming media player market.297  
First, the bundling of Windows and WMP allowed WMP to benefit “from the 
ubiquity of that operating system on client PCs, which cannot be counterbalanced by the 
other methods of distributing media players.”298 There was a risk of “de facto 
standardization of the Windows Media Player” market that could follow from 
Microsoft’s leveraging of its quasi-monopoly from the PC operating system market to the 
media player market. Although the court accepted that “standardisation may effectively 
present certain advantages,” it did not accept that an undertaking in a dominant position 
could impose that by means of tying.299 The emergence of a de facto standard should be 
the result of competition between the “intrinsic merits” of the products and, in short, 
depends on the consumers’ choice rather than from the arbitrary decision of a dominant 
firm to impose its own standard.300  
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Second, Microsoft’s bundling practice would have restricted consumers’ access to 
similar or better quality products than WMP.301 Because of the bundling practice, 
“consumers have an incentive to use Windows Media Player at the expense of competing 
media players, notwithstanding that the latter players are of better quality.”302 The CFI 
based this finding on the comparative reviews of media players presented by Microsoft 
during the administrative procedure before the Commission’s decision. These 
comparative reviews indicated that WMP was of lower quality than some of the other 
excluded media players, having achieved a lower rank than RealPlayer in more than half 
of these reviews.303 
Third, the ubiquity of WMP as a result of its bundling with Windows was capable 
of having “an appreciable impact on content providers and software designers” because 
of the significant “indirect network effects” (“positive feedback loop”) that existed in the 
WMP market.304 The greater the number of users of a given software platform, the more 
will be invested in developing products compatible with that platform, which in turn will 
reinforce the popularity of that platform with users.305 There indeed was evidence that the 
content providers and software developers chose the technology for which they develop 
their own products on the basis of the percentage of installation and use of media players. 
Because of additional development and administrative costs, the developers were inclined 
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to use only one technology for their products. Encoding streamed content in several 
formats is expensive and time-consuming, and these costs may not be outweighed by the 
advantages of increasing the potential reach of content providers and software 
developers’ products.306 
The ubiquity of WMP on Windows PCs “secured Microsoft a competitive 
advantage unrelated to the merits of its products” and erected a barrier to entry to new 
“contenders,” not only on the media players market but also “on other adjacent markets,” 
such as “media players on wireless information devices, set-top boxed, DRM solutions 
and on-line music delivery.”307 The evolution of the market consistently pointed to “a 
trend in favour of usage of [WMP] and Windows Media formats to the detriment of the 
main competing media players (and media technologies),” such as RealPlayer and 
QuickTime Player.308 Furthermore, RealPlayer’s installed base was significantly lower 
than that of WMP, as it was present on only 60 to 70 percent of home PCs in the United 
States, while the rate of installation of WMP was 100 percent on Windows client PCs and 
more than 90 percent on all client PCs, including non-Windows ones.309 
Significantly, nowhere does the CFI discuss the existence of direct consumer harm, 
but it instead seems to infer consumer detriment from the alteration of the competitive 
structure of the media player market. This is in conformity with the approach generally 
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followed by the European Courts for exclusionary abuses under Article 82.310 The 
preservation of the competitive process constitutes an important objective of EC 
competition law. Advocate General Kokott in British Airways has explained this position: 
The starting-point here must be the protective purpose of Article 82 EC. 
The provision forms part of a system designed to protect competition 
within the internal market from distortions (Article 3(1)(g) EC). 
Accordingly, Article 82 EC, like the other competition rules of the Treaty, 
is not designed only or primarily to protect the immediate interests of 
individual competitors or consumers, but to protect the structure of the 
market and thus competition as such (as an institution), which has already 
been weakened by the presence of the dominant undertaking on the 
market. In this way, consumers are also indirectly protected. Because 
where competition as such is damaged, disadvantages for consumers are 
also to be feared.311 
 
Thus, the ECJ and the CFI take a long-term view of consumer detriment and favor 
the protection of competitors instead of short-term efficiencies. This approach contrasts 
with the dominant approach of the U.S. courts to require evidence of at least a reduction 
of prices or output in the market.312  
                                                 
310  Case C-95/04, British Airways plc v. Comm’n, 2007 E.C.R. I-2331, ¶ 106 (Eur. 
Ct. Justice) (“Article 82 EC is aimed not only at practices which may cause prejudice to 
consumers directly, but also at those which are detrimental to them through their impact 
on an effective competition structure, such as is mentioned in Article 3(1)(g) EC.”); In 
the context of Article 81 EC, see Case C-8/08, T-Mobile Netherlands and others (June 4, 
2009) unreported, ¶ 38 (“Article 81 EC, like the other competition rules of the Treaty, is 
designed to protect not only the immediate interests of individual competitors or 
consumers but also to protect the structure of the market and thus competition as such”) 
 
311  Id. ¶ 68 (opinion of Advocate General Kokott) (emphasis added) (footnotes 
omitted). 
 
312  See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 84 (D.C. Cir. 2001). Section 1 
cases: NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85 (1984); FTC v. Ind. Fed’n 
of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447 (1986) (requiring evidence of anticompetitive effects in the 
form of reduced output, higher prices or diminished quality). For a comparison, see Barry 
E. Hawk, Article 82 and Section 2, in OECD, POLICY ROUNDTABLES: COMPETITION ON 
THE MERITS 2005 at 251 (2005), available at 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/7/13/35911017.pdf. 
 
 
 
111 
The perspective of the European Courts is that competition is a process of 
discovering the most efficient solution that benefits consumers and that restricting 
competition (in the sense of less rivalry in the market) is presumed to reduce efficiency 
and be detrimental to consumers in the long term, in particular if the undertaking has an 
overwhelming dominant position. The obvious shortcoming of this approach is the 
absence of clear boundaries for competition law enforcement. This approach may also 
explain why EC competition law considers that anticompetitive effects may result not 
only from practices that restrict output or increase prices, but also those that restrict more 
broadly consumer choice.313 It is not clear, however, if choice is valued as such or if it is 
preserved only when more choice is likely to lead to identifiable consumer benefits, such 
as better quality products, lower prices, and additional services.  
The CFI’s Microsoft decision seems to indicate that choice was valued with the 
purpose of  preserving the continuing offer in the market of media players that were at 
least of similar, if not better, quality than WMP.314 What would have been the position of 
the Commission and the CFI if there was no evidence that the excluded media players 
were better or at least similar quality products than WMP?  The language used by  the 
CFI315 seems to indicate that the preservation of consumer choice is linked to the 
preservation of the competitive structure of the market and the protection of competitors. 
                                                 
313  See Commission Notice on the Guidelines on the Application of Article 81(3) of 
the Treaty, supra note 112, ¶ 24 (interpreting anticompetitive effects as including 
negative effects on prices, output, innovation, or the variety or quality of goods and 
services). 
 
314  Microsoft CFI Decision, 2007 E.C.R. II-3601, ¶ 1356. 
 
315  “Microsoft impaired the effective competitive structure on the work-group server 
operating systems market by acquiring a significant market share on that market.” Id. ¶ 
664. 
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If this interpretation is correct, then there ultimately is little difference between the 
previous quasi per se illegality approach for tying and the CFI’s position in Microsoft on 
technological tying. 
A possible limiting principle to the expansive approach of the CFI with regard to 
the scope of Article 82 is the unique character of the Microsoft case. The court considered 
that the ubiquity of Windows granted Microsoft’s WMP an overwhelming distribution 
advantage, compared to other media players. The existence of important network effects 
provided Microsoft with the opportunity to extend its quasi-monopoly to other markets 
and to exclude even products of equal or superior quality. Without employing the 
essential facilities terminology, the court concluded that it would have been very difficult 
or even impossible for other media players to compete on equal terms with WMP without 
having effective (meaning without additional costs for the final consumer) access to the 
Windows platform. The protection of the competitive process seems in this case 
intrinsically linked to the concept of consumer sovereignty, as consumers’ effective 
choice would have been limited by Microsoft’s “artificial selection” of media player. The 
emphasis given to the protection of the competitive process is therefore explained by the 
presumption that the extension of Microsoft’s quasi-monopoly to the media player 
market would marginalize all existing or potential competition and could therefore lead to 
consumer harm. The assumption is that competition guarantees consumer sovereignty, 
while monopoly does not.  
 
III. A DIFFERENT EMPHASIS ON CONSUMER CHOICE  
AND ADEQUATE REMEDIES 
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 Antitrust and competition law are for the benefit of consumers and not necessarily 
the benefit of competitors.316 Consumers benefit from lower prices. Consumers also 
benefit from having choices both in abundance of varieties offered as well as from 
availability of an array of goods of different quality levels.317 The effects of tying and 
bundling are complex and require significant economic analysis to be fully understood, as 
discussed earlier. The effects of these practices have not yet been fully analyzed by 
economists, and the legal understanding of economic analysis suffers from significant 
lags. In the two Microsoft cases, the issue of consumers’ harm was particularly 
complicated because, in both the U.S. and EU cases, both the tied products (Internet 
Explorer and WMP, respectively) and the competing products (Netscape and RealAudio) 
were offered (at least in their basic versions) at no charge.  
 The fact that the incremental cost of licensing software is negligible allows it to 
be distributed for free with the expectation or hope that the software development cost 
will be recouped if (i) in the future the product will be sold at a positive price;  (ii) the 
firm will be able to sell upgraded versions of the software (with more features) at a 
positive price; or (iii) the firm will be able to sell products or services complementary to 
the free product (for example, sell music or video downloads at a positive price). The EU 
case was additionally complicated by the fact that the WMA format (which is the default 
format for the WMP) also was publicly available, and a number of firms competing with 
Microsoft distributed players that played content in this format, among others. In fact, in 
                                                 
316  See Case T-168/01, GlaxoSmithKline Servs. Unlimited v. Comm’n, 2006 E.C.R. 
II-2969, ¶¶ 121, 171 (Ct. First Instance). 
 
317  See Neil W. Averitt & Robert H. Lande, Using the “Consumer Choice” 
Approach to Antitrust Law, 74 ANTITRUST L.J. 175 (2007). 
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the peculiar world of freely distributed software, and in particular in media players, we 
observe a number of companies distributing players that each has a favored format and at 
the same time can play in a number of other formats, to the extent that the other format 
owners allow it. So, for example, WMP plays WMA and MP3 formats among others but 
does not play the RealAudio format because its specifications have not been made public. 
Similarly, RealAudio plays its proprietary format, as well as WMA, MP3, and others. 
The distribution advantage that any player enjoys also is limited because each media 
player can be downloaded and installed in a few minutes. Additionally, in the aftermath 
of the United States v. Microsoft settlement, any consumer as well as any computer 
manufacturer can set up any media player as the default one.  
The lack of friction in the distribution of all media players, the zero price, the 
quick download and installation, the ability of the consumer to designate the default 
media player, and the fact that many media players each play many formats, make it 
likely that the potential loss to consumers from a skewed distribution of market shares in 
the media players market will be small. The fact that many players play many formats 
each, and the fact that they can be downloaded freely and easily, has resulted in many 
consumers having installed in the same computer and using in the same time period more 
than one media player. In this setup, it is much more difficult to foreclose rival media 
players. Similarly, the fact that many media players from different producers each play 
many formats reduces the chance that some formats will be marginalized or foreclosed.318 
The Commission and the court may have overestimated the distributional advantage 
                                                 
318  If RealAudio was trying to get the largest market share for its format, it is 
surprising that RealAudio did not license its format to be used (among other formats) in 
rival players. 
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conferred to WMP by Windows. Furthermore, in a market where all products are priced 
at zero, it is hard to make an argument of consumer loss because of an anticompetitive 
price change. It also is hard to make a convincing argument of anticompetitive effects 
based on pricing below cost by Microsoft because all firms in this market are pricing 
below cost.  
There are only two potentially credible consumer detriment arguments: (i) that 
there is a restriction of variety or reduction in quality because of the tying of WMP with 
Windows, and (ii) that there will be a clear detriment to future consumers if WMA 
becomes the dominant standard in media players. The Commission argued that the 
eventual dominance of WMP (which it incorrectly predicted) would create a restriction of 
quality in media players. Not only are these quality differences difficult to establish 
factually in a high technology market where product specifications change frequently, but 
blaming a zero priced product for its low quality is going a bit far. The Commission also 
made the argument that future consumers will lose because of less innovation. From an 
economics point view, it is not always easy to sustain such an argument because there are 
published economic models where a monopolist innovates more than a perfectly 
competitive industry.319  
                                                 
319  Additionally, in the software industry (and in other high technology industries) 
there are plenty of examples of innovative small new firms being acquired by larger and 
established firms and using the distribution channels of the established firms. An 
assessment of innovation incentives without such consideration could lead to the wrong 
conclusions. But see Richard Gilbert, Looking for Mr. Schumpeter: Where Are We in the 
Competition-Innovation Debate?, 6 INNOVATION POL’Y & ECON. 159 (2006); Richard J. 
Gilbert, Competition and Innovation (Competition Policy Ctr., Paper No. CPC07-069, 
2007), available at 
http://repositories.cdlib.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1070&context=iber/cpc. 
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The Commission imposed as a remedy on Microsoft the requirement to produce 
and distribute in the European Union a version of Windows without a media player, 
which became known as Windows-N. The Commission’s remedy allowed Microsoft to 
continue producing and distributing in the European Union and the United States a 
version of Windows that was subject to the requirements of the consent decree that 
resolved United States v. Microsoft. The EU did not mandate a specific price difference 
between Windows and Windows-N.320 The two versions of Windows were sold at the 
same price and practically no OEM bought and adopted Windows-N. Thus, the remedy 
imposed by the Commission had no noticeable effect in the marketplace. At the same 
time, the dire predictions of expanded dominance of WMA never materialized in the long 
period between the beginning of the EU case and the Commission’s decision. In contrast, 
a new proprietary format promoted by Apple (tied to hardware also produced by Apple) 
has become the dominant format in the market for song downloads, a key market for 
goods that are complementary to media players. Additionally, “flash player,” a new 
player from Adobe has become the standard video player in Internet browsers. 
The most surprising element in the EU’s decision was the remedy. It was almost 
mathematically certain that Windows-N (without WMP), sold at the same price as 
                                                 
320  The lack of a price difference requirement is in sharp contrast to the proposal to 
the district court of the nine states (litigating states) that did not agree with the DOJ-
Microsoft settlement that was also signed by nine other states. The litigating states 
proposed to “freeze Windows” to its pre-1998 state and impose on Microsoft the 
requirement to sell any additional functionality at an additional price. It is interesting, 
however, that the CFI noted in its decision that “[s]hould Microsoft now decide to sell the 
unbundled version of Windows at the same price as the bundled version, the Commission 
would examine that price by reference to the present market situation and in the light of 
Microsoft’s obligations to refrain from any measure having an equivalent effect to tying 
and, if necessary, adopt a new decision pursuant to Article 82 EC.” Microsoft CFI 
Decision, 2007 E.C.R. II-3601, ¶ 908. 
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Windows (with WMP), would not sell well, and therefore would have no impact. It is 
also hard to imagine how depriving consumers of WMP in Windows-N in the post-U.S.-
settlement environment, where both the OEM and the final consumer can designate any 
media player as the default one, would have enhanced consumers’ choice. To the extent 
that the OEMs’ purchasing decisions express the desires of consumers, the devastating 
failure of Windows-N to sell is evidence that consumers in fact liked to have WMP in 
Windows and the imposed remedy was misguided. 
Surprisingly, in negotiations before the Commission’s decision was announced, 
the Commission rejected a reported Microsoft proposed remedy to include in the 
distribution of Windows three rival media players besides WMP and let the consumer 
designate the default player.321 This proposal would have guaranteed as wide a 
distribution of RealAudio and other players as WMP, would have completely erased any 
distributional advantage of WMP, would have dispelled any tying concerns, and would 
have given full decision power to consumers. Such a remedy would have addressed the 
competition law concerns raised by Microsoft’s abuse most effectively and precisely.322 
From an economics point of view, this proposal would have eliminated Microsoft’s 
                                                 
321  See Byron Acohido & Noelle Knox, Regulators Want Microsoft to Pull Media 
Player Out, USA TODAY, Mar. 25, 2004. 
 
322  Indeed, the issue in this case was “not that Microsoft integrates [WMP] in 
Windows, but that it offers on the market only a version of Windows in which [WMP] is 
integrated, that is to say, that it does not allow OEMs or consumers to obtain Windows 
without [WMP] or, at least, to remove [WMP] from the system consisting of Windows 
and [WMP].” Microsoft CFI Decision, 2007 E.C.R. II-3601, ¶ 1149. The remedy could 
have identified a number of media players from those existing at the time of the 
commitment of the abuse that would have been integrated into Windows. It is in this 
respect different from a common carrier obligation, as it would not necessarily have 
extended to media players that would have been commercialized after the termination of 
the abuse. 
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distribution advantage. At the same time, its adoption would have at least guaranteed the 
ability of even a dominant firm to innovate and distribute in the way it finds most 
appropriate.  
The benefits of this proposal both for consumers and innovation are obvious and 
substantial in comparison to the imposed remedy.323 This seems a much more consumer-
friendly remedy than the one imposed. It is remarkable that in its most recent 
investigation of Microsoft’s bundling of Windows with Internet Explorer324 the 
Commission has noted with interest the commitments offered by Microsoft to address the 
issues raised by the bundling of Internet Explorer with Windows. Microsoft had 
withdrawn its unilateral plan of distributing Windows 7-E325 and proposed a final 
resolution that would commit326 it to (i) distribute a “ballot screen” through software 
                                                 
323  This is particularly surprising since Professor Mario Monti, head of the 
Commission at the time, was quoted as to the objectives of the Commission in the 
decision: “In the end, we decided to do what’s best for innovation and European 
consumers.” Acohido & Knox, supra note 316. 
 
324  Following complaints by the Norwegian Internet browser maker Opera, in 
December 2007, the Commission initiated investigations and sent a Statement of 
Objection (SO) in January 2009 alleging a violation by Microsoft of Article 82 for tying 
its Web browser Internet Explorer to its dominant client PC operating system Windows. 
See Press Release, European Comm’n, supra note 191. 
 
325  Microsoft intended to produce and distribute in Europe a special edition of 
Windows 7 called Windows 7-E which would not have Internet Explorer or any other 
browser pre-installed, adopting the removal approach of the Windows-N remedy imposed 
by the Commission in the WMP case as the sole version of Windows in Europe. 
Computer manufacturers (OEMs) would have the option to install an Internet browser of 
their choice as the default as well as include other browsers before the PC reaches the 
final consumers. See Posting of Dave Heiner to Microsoft on the Issues, 
http://microsoftontheissues.com/cs/blogs/mscorp/archive/2009/07/31/windows-7-and-
browser-choice-in-europe.aspx (July 31, 2009, 17:20 PST). 
 
326  Proposed Commitment, Microsoft Corp., Commitment to Address the 
Competition Concerns Identified by the European Commission in Case No. COMP/C-
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update327 to EEA users of Windows XP, Windows Vista and Windows Client PC 
Operating Systems, by means of Windows Update; and (ii) allow both computer 
manufacturers and users to turn on or off Internet Explorer.328 The ballot screen will 
allow consumers to choose among a number of Internet browsers. This screen will be 
available only to users whose computer came from the manufacturer with Internet 
Explorer installed as the default browser. Thus, a browser manufacturer other than 
Microsoft could provide an incentive to OEMs to install its browser as the default, and 
then end user of such a computer will not be offered the choice of the ballot screen.329 In 
that sense, the playing field is tilted against Microsoft and in favor of browsers made by 
for-profit companies that can afford to provide incentives to OEMs. Thus the ballot 
screen procedure also differs from the “Set Defaults” requirement of the Microsoft US 
settlement that was available to all users, and covered all middleware, including 
browsers. On October 7, 2009, the EU gave its preliminary approval to the ballot screen 
proposal and opened it to testing and feedback.330 
                                                                                                                                                 
3/39.530 (July 24, 2009), http://www.microsoft.com/presspass/presskits/eu-msft/docs/07-
24-09Commitment.doc. 
 
327  A preliminary design of the ballot screen is available online at 
http://www.microsoft.com/presspass/presskits/eu-msft/docs/Annex_B.ppt (last visited 
Sept. 18, 2009). The words “ballot screen” are used inappropriately; the appropriate 
words are “choice screen.” There is no ballot here and there is no decision by majority or 
any other rule that will be imposed on all participants. The screen will allow each 
consumer to set the default browser, and, if he wants to, uninstall Internet Explorer. 
 
328  A detailed description of how this will be implemented in Windows 7 is available 
at http://www.microsoft.com/presspass/presskits/eu-msft/docs/ANNEX_A.doc. 
 
329  Similarly, among old PCs, Windows Update will bring up the ballot screen only 
on those with Internet Explorer installed as default. 
330  See Press Release, European Comm’n, Antitrust, Commission market tests 
Microsoft's proposal to ensure consumer choice of web browsers; welcomes further 
improvements in field of interoperability (Oct. 7, 2009) (Memo/09/439). (accessed 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
 
It is widely accepted that doctrinal categories or concepts emerge to serve a 
specific (analytical or other) purpose, intrinsically linked to the meta-principle that 
inspires the particular disciplinary field.331 There are two objectives to be served by 
classifying: First, there is an instrumental one, which “looks to the reasons that the 
categories were formulated in the first place” and recognizes that “[b]ehind the different 
categories lie distinct objectives, principles.” Second, there is an analytical one where the 
aim of classification is to create and maintain “a rational structure for doctrine” that 
would be rigorous enough to fit in different factual contexts.332 Both of these objectives 
should be fulfilled for the operation of classification to be useful. 
The comparative analysis of the antitrust standards that are being applied to 
bundling practices in Europe and in the United States shows that the debate over the 
“right” analogy for both bundled discounts and the required elements of illegal tying 
(such as the separate products and the coercion test) are profoundly interlinked with the 
prior beliefs or the first principles of competition law in each jurisdiction.333  
                                                                                                                                                 
October 28, 2009). For an analysis of the remedies aspect of the Microsoft cases, see 
Economides & Lianos, supra note 4. 
 
331  See Roscoe Pound, Classification of Law, 37 HARV. L. REV. 933, 939 (1924). 
 
332  Jay M. Feinman, The Jurisprudence of Classification, 41 STAN. L. REV. 661, 
672–73, 675 (1989). 
 
333  See Ken Heyer, A World of Uncertainty: Economics and the Globalization of 
Antitrust, 72 ANTITRUST L.J. 375, 376 (2005). 
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But, to fulfill their analytical objective, categories in antitrust should “have 
empirical support” and should “communicat[e] valuable information to courts about the 
competitive effects of a general practice.”334 “Categorical analysis” also should 
accomplish an instrumental objective. When the aims of competition law are still 
evolving and unclear, which is still the case in EC competition law,335 the relative weight 
of the analytical or instrumental objectives of classification will depend on the 
availability of empirical evidence on the pro- or anticompetitive effects of the practice. If 
there is sufficient empirical support and broad consensus in the economics profession 
over the competitive virtues or the anticompetitive effects, the analytical objective of 
classification will be more compelling than the instrumental one, and the specific conduct 
will be analyzed according to the precepts of economic analysis. However, if empirical 
evidence or broad consensus is insufficient, the classification process will emphasize the 
instrumental element, and the objectives of competition law and the input of economic 
analysis will be less significant. The relative discord of economic analysis on bundled 
discounts and tying is the main reason EC competition law and U.S. antitrust law have 
adopted different approaches, as each jurisdiction seems to have different prior beliefs on 
the existence and/or the degree of the duty of dominant firms to preserve the competitive 
process. 
This analytical schism is particularly evident in the way each jurisdiction deals 
with the issue of anticompetitive foreclosure. It seems that in Europe the causal link 
between anticompetitive foreclosure and consumer harm is easily found, that consumer 
                                                 
334  Lemley & Leslie, supra note 7, at 1212. 
 
335  See generally EUROPEAN COMPETITION LAW ANNUAL 1997: THE OBJECTIVES OF 
COMPETITION POLICY (Claus Dieter Ehlermann & Laraine L. Laudati eds., 1998). 
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detriment is interpreted very broadly, and that it is not always a requirement for the 
application of Article 82, or at least that the standard of proof of a consumer detriment is 
very low in bundling cases compared to the U.S. approach. This, as well as the broad 
interpretation of the coercion requirement for tying cases, may lead to the risk of over-
enforcement of Article 82, and consequently to false positives, as rivals may use Article 
82 to extract favorable terms in settlements or to impose an important litigation burden on 
the dominant firm. This can be avoided if the courts strengthen the standard of proof of 
anticompetitive effects by requiring a consistent theory of consumer harm, reduce the 
asymmetry of the standard of proof between anticompetitive effects and efficiency gains, 
and examine in depth the cost and benefits of the given practice for the consumer (an 
anticompetitive foreclosure test).  
In the meantime, the hostility of the CFI to bundling practices in Microsoft will 
certainly lead to a number of cases being brought to the European Commission and courts 
by marginalized rivals because of Microsoft’s significant distribution advantage. As the 
CFI recognized in Microsoft: 
Since Microsoft is very likely to maintain its dominant position on the 
client PC operating systems market, at least over the coming years, it 
cannot be precluded that it will have other opportunities to use leveraging 
vis-à-vis other adjacent markets. Furthermore, Microsoft had already faced 
proceedings in the United States for a practice similar to the abusive tying 
at issue, namely the tying of its Internet Explorer browser and its 
Windows client PC operating system, and the possibility cannot be 
precluded that it might commit the same type of infringement in future 
with other application software.336 
                                                 
336  Case T-201/04, Microsoft Corp. v. Comm’n, 2007 E.C.R. II-3601, ¶ 1363 (Ct. 
First Instance); see also Neelie Kroes, European Comm’r for Competition Policy, 
Introductory Remarks on Microsoft’s Compliance with March 2004 Antitrust Decision, 
Remarks at Press Conference in Brussels (Oct. 22, 2007) (Speech/07/647) (“[T]he March 
2004 Decision, as confirmed by the Court of First Instance last month, also sets a 
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In fact, even Microsoft's U.S. antitrust problems have yet to end. In April 2009, 
court oversight of Microsoft's compliance with prior antitrust settlements was extended 
for the second time, to May 2011.337 The recent developments in the European Union — 
including the European Commission's investigation of Microsoft for bundling Internet 
Explorer with Windows338 and the current consideration of a “ballot screen” remedy339 
illustrate that, for now, perhaps the only possible limiting principle for the application of 
Article 82 to the bundling practices of Microsoft may be international comity for similar 
practices that have been the object of a U.S. settlement.340 Without doubt, the CFI’s 
decision does not mark the end of the Microsoft case(s). 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
precedent with regard to Microsoft’s future market behaviour in this and other areas. 
Microsoft must bear this in mind.”). 
 
337  Jacqui Cheng, Microsoft in “Much Better Place”: Oversight Extended to 2011, 
ARS TECHNICA, Apr. 22, 2009, http://arstechnica.com/microsoft/news/2009/04/antitrust-
oversight-of-microsoft-extended-to-may-2011.ars. 
 
338  Press Release, European Comm’n, Antitrust: Commission Initiates Formal 
Investigations Against Microsoft in Two Cases of Suspected Abuse of Dominant Market 
Position (Jan. 14, 2008) (Memo/08/19). 
 
339  A preliminary design of the ballot screen is available online at 
http://www.microsoft.com/presspass/presskits/eu-msft/docs/Annex_B.ppt (last visited 
Sept. 18, 2009). The words “ballot screen” are used inappropriately; the appropriate 
words are “choice screen.” There is no ballot here and there is no decision by majority or 
any other rule that will be imposed to all participants. The screen will allow each 
consumer to set the default browser, and, if he wants to, uninstall Internet Explorer. 
 
340  In Microsoft the CFI adopted a restrictive position on the sufficiency of the U.S. 
settlement: to put an end to the abuse. Microsoft CFI Decision, 2007 E.C.R. II-3601, ¶¶ 
272, 274, 1227. 
